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Transatlantische Studien zu Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit –
Transatlantic Studies on Medieval and Early Modern Literature and Culture 2

Alexander Sager

minne von mœren

On Wolfram's ›Titurel‹

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und Früher Neuzeit –
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and Early Modern Literature and Culture

Band 2

Herausgegeben von
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Introduction

In the final scene of Wolfram von Eschenbach's ›Titurel‹, the maiden Sigune begins to read a story embroidered in a jeweled script (*schrift*) upon a leash of prodigious length attached to a runaway hound her beloved, Schionatulander, has just captured in the forest. In order to finish reading the story, Sigune unties the knot binding the leash to the pole of her tent. The animal, sensing his chance to escape and return to the game trail (after all, his name is Gardeviaz, »keep to the path!«), leaps up and makes for the woods, tearing the line out of Sigune's hands. The young woman promptly summons her companion, ordering him to retrieve the leash. Schionatulander balks and tries to talk her out of it, assuring her that the *schrift* is inconsequential. But Sigune tells him that if she is unable to finish her reading, her life will be meaningless to her. Taken aback by the intensity of her reaction, and spurred on by her promise to give herself to him in return, Schionatulander accedes to Sigune's demand, agreeing to go after Gardeviaz and retrieve the leash, even at the cost of his life. Here the text breaks off.

We already know – and the audience of ›Titurel‹ already knew – what ultimately happens to the young couple. Wolfram's Grail romance ›Parzival‹, written some years before ›Titurel‹ (and immediately preceding it in the only manuscript containing both texts),[1] but set in a later narrative time, had told of their fates. Schionatulander, as Sigune informs her cousin Parzival during their first meeting in that narrative, has died because of a dog's leash (»*nu hær was disiu mære sîn: / ein bracken seil gap im den pîn*«). She reproaches herself for not consummating their love (»*ich hete kranke sinne / daz ich im*

1 In manuscript G (cgm 19 in the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich), ›Parzival‹ fills pages 1ʳ–70ᵛ, ›Titurel‹ 71ʳ–74ʳ. Manuscript H (Ser. nova 2663 in the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna), the ›Ambraser Heldenbuch‹, contains no other text by Wolfram, and manuscript M (8° Cod. ms. 154 [= Cim. 80ᵇ], fragment II, in the Munich Universitätsbibliothek) consists of ›Titurel‹-stanzas alone. See Wolfram von Eschenbach, ›Titurel‹, edited, translated, and commented by Helmut Brackert, Stephan Fuchs-Jolie, Berlin, New York 2002 , pp. 6–9. All ›Titurel‹ quotes and numeration from this edition (hereafter BFJ) unless otherwise noted, although I will often standardize the Middle High German spelling when quoting single words and phrases, and my punctuation differs on several occasions. The new edition by Joachim Bumke and Joachim Heinzle was published only after I completed work on this manuscript.

niht minne gap«), an error for which she will spend the rest of her short life wasting away in bitter regret.[2]

Already in ›Parzival‹ there was something highly unusual about this leash: namely, its seeming gratuitousness. Sigune's explanation in 141, 16 comes after she has already clearly identified the agent of Schionatulander's death (the knight Orilus), the reason he was killed (for defending Parzival's lands) and the manner in which his demise took place (in a joust).[3] The dog's leash (*brackenseil*), which is mentioned only this once, is a strangely blind motif in the Grail romance. Nonetheless, its appearance under the sign of a plurality of narratives – »*nur hœr was disiu mære sîn*« – is an indication that there is a separate story lurking somewhere in the background.[4]

This story is told in ›Titurel‹, where Wolfram transforms the dog's leash from the mysterious superfluousness of this single line in ›Parzival‹ into the thematic and characterological center of a complex narrative. Yet the element of gratuitous excess remains. Why does Sigune plunge into nothing less than existential crisis at the loss of a mere leash, the *schrift* upon which (she is completely indifferent to its masterful workmanship and the beauty of its jewels, the only obviously valuable things about it) seems little more than a short proverb (»stay on the path!«) and a biographical sketch of its original owners? And why does Schionatulander first treat the *schrift* with such indifference, indeed contempt, but then himself overdramatize the situation by wagering his life and reputation on what can hardly appear more than the prospect of a short search in the forest?[5] For, as the narrator describes in naturalistic detail unusual in medieval literature, the underbrush is thick, and the leash more than sixty feet long![6]

Albrecht, the later thirteenth-century continuator of the ›Titurel‹-fragments, noted these incongruities and sought to compensate for them. In his gigantic ›Jüngerer Titurel‹, he rationalizes Sigune's obsession by ascribing a

2 ›Parzival‹, 141. 15–16, 20–21. All ›Parzival‹ quotes from Wolfram von Eschenbach, ›Parzival‹, ed. KARL LACHMANN (6th edition), Berlin 1965 unless otherwise noted.

3 141. 2–9.

4 On the importance of *mære* as a poetological program of narrative plurality in ›Parzival‹ see ARTHUR GROOS, Romancing the Grail. Genre, Science, and Quest in Wolfram's ›Parzival‹. Ithaca, London 1995, p. 3 and below, pp. 157–158. It is, of course, not impossible that this passage refers to an external source; see MOHR, footnote 13. (who does not refer to the words *disiu mære* in 141, 15 in his argument, however).

5 »A whim, one that a short search in the forest could probably set to rest« (HELMUT DE BOOR, Die höfische Literatur. Vorbereitung, Blüte, Ausklang, 1170–1250 [v. 2 of HELMUT DE BOOR and RICHARD NEWALD, Geschichte der deutschen Literatur], Munich 1962, p. 124.

6 140, 4 (*dicke strût*); 165, 2 (*ronen, brâmen*); 144, 2 (*zwelf klâfter lanc*).

powerful magic to the jewels on the leash and by expanding the *schrift* to contain a universal teaching of the secrets of courtly virtue, which all parties (in his version the quest for the leash mobilizes the whole court) understandably burn to unlock. After escaping, Albrecht's Gardeviaz manages to get only a realistically short distance before his long leash becomes entangled in the underbrush.[7] There it is promptly coveted by a nearby knight, and Schionatulander is immediately engaged in a long series of battles for its recovery. Wolfram's brief, spare fragments provide no hint of such things. In the original text, Sigune's and Schionatulander's reactions to the leash stand forth in a hyperbolic contrast difficult to understand.

To understand it will be the central task of this study. I hope to show that these reactions to the *schrift* have emerged from two distinct attitudes or – to introduce a BAKHTINIAN term that will later become important – character »ideologies« vis-à-vis the world of courtly discourse about love. These attitudes can, in turn, be traced to the divergent modes of socialization experienced by Sigune and Schionatulander in childhood. The representation of child socialization and of the relationship between socialization and character development is, I argue, one of ›Titurel‹'s primary focal points and literary innovations.

It also provides a key to some of the text's central formal, narratological, and text-critical problematics. Why, for example, did Wolfram compose ›Titurel‹ in stanzaic form instead of the rhymed couplets of traditional Arthurian romance, including his own ›Parzival‹, the only known source of the story of Sigune and Schionatulander and the meta-narrative of which it forms a part? Why does the ›Titurel‹-narrator, in contrast to the poetologically highly self-reflective and voluble narrators of ›Parzival‹ and ›Willehalm‹, have so little to say about his storytelling, completely eschewing the traditional narrator-prologue, the romance author's main point of contact with his audience and platform of interpretive control? Do the text-critically contested stanzas 30–31, 33–34, 36, and 53, all of which deal with the theme of socialization in an unusual way, represent post-Wolfram interpolations in the redaction of the H manuscript, or were they athetized by the redactor of G? If the latter, why?

The main characterological problem in ›Titurel‹ has traditionally been considered the following: while the narrator claims that Schionatulander is the story's »hero« (39, 4: *er wirt dirre âventiure hêrre*), Sigune is clearly the dominant figure throughout the text. Not only is more narrative space and greater narrative detail dedicated to her than to her partner, she is also de-

7 Albrecht, ›Jüngerer Titurel‹, 1911–1927; 1292–1293 (Unless otherwise noted all Albrecht quotes from WERNER WOLF, ed., Albrechts von Scharfenberg Jüngerer Titurel, v. 1, Berlin 1955 [Deutsche Texte des Mittelalters 45], mutational superscripts subsumed). All translations from Albrecht are my own.

picted as a complex and problematic character in a way Schionatulander seems not to be. The best proof of this discrepancy lies in the scholarly treatment of the question of her culpability. Hundreds of pages of interpretive literature have been devoted to arguing over the question of whether Sigune, in sending Schionatulander to retrieve the dog's leash, makes herself culpable or responsible for his death. The figure of Schionatulander has provoked no such debate. Accordingly it is Sigune, and not Schionatulander, who seems to correspond to the other great *âventiure hêrren*, the problematic, culpable, and ultimately redemptive heroes of Arthurian romance of the school of Chrétien de Troyes, the literary tradition within which ›Titurel‹ is – at least nominally – located. Schionatulander, in comparison, seems to correspond more to a figure like Enite than to Erec: narratively prominent, but mostly passive, reactive, morally-ethically impeccable, and somewhat flat. Sigune's narrative hegemony appears so great as to inspire at least one ›Titurel‹ scholar to rename the text after her.[8]

This study will come to somewhat different conclusions. To be sure, the main focus will still be on Sigune, whose early childhood and upbringing receive far more narrative attention than that of Schionatulander, who is introduced only in his adolescence. It is also in the context of Sigune's socialization that the text-critically most problematic and narratologically most interesting stanzas are to be found. Nonetheless, the narrative's comparative silence about Schionatulander's early childhood is in itself significant. It means that he appears in the story as a kind of »tabula rasa«, under the sign of a certain openness or indeterminateness, wherein resides – theoretically at least – a certain freedom of action and decision. How Schionatulander avails himself of this freedom – or fails to do so – will be the most important aspect of his role in the narrative. What is most significant about Sigune, in comparison, will be clear from the first moment she opens her mouth at the age of five: her self-image as a kind of literary-ideological construct, a *frouwe*, a courtly lady disposing over the service of knights. Sigune's character is far more determined than that of Schionatulander, in both senses of the word. These differences have a strong impact on what happens when Gardeviaz bursts on the scene with his mysterious leash at the end of the story.

Before a detailed examination of the socialization theme, the first chapter will begin with a new look at the old question of the ›Titurel‹-›Parzival‹ relationship. I propose that the current prevalent argument for a strong interpretive separation between the two texts needs reassessment. We can no longer argue that we are dealing with two completely different kinds of narratives, ›Parzival‹ self-contained, organically whole, interpretively coherent and closed-ended, and ›Titurel‹ fragmented, contradictory, and open-ended.

8 BERNARD RAHN (Wolframs Sigunendichtung. Eine Interpretation der Titurelfragmente, Zurich 1958) refers to the text as ›Die Sigune‹. See below, p. 50.

Such a view is predicated on an understanding of the narrativity of the Grail romance that no longer reigns unquestioned, as I shall discuss in a review of ARTHUR GROOS'S 1995 study »Romancing the Grail«. In order to make a case for a strong »interillumination« of the two epics, I will examine an aspect of the ›Parzival‹-›Titurel‹ relationship hitherto unnoticed and unexamined: the way in which the reception and reading of the *schrift* on Gardeviaz's leash is prefigured in the gendered representation of literary reception and interpretation in some of the poetological discourse of ›Parzival‹. The ›Parzival‹-narrator entertains problematic relations with female readers/recipients of literature. In the prologue of that text, he directs his comments on literary interpretation and his ideal reader to an exclusively male audience; women are addressed in a separate section, and only concerning matters of proper social behavior and morality. Then, in the so-called »self-defense« between Books II and III, the narrator criticizes »weak witted« women who are more interested in literature than in deeds of chivalry. These remarks, and the narratorial attitude behind them, reveal compelling parallels to ›Titurel‹'s final episode, in which a female reader places a greater value on a literary text than on the knightly accomplishments of her beloved in the context of a love service relationship. In ›Titurel‹, I argue, Wolfram has transformed a constellation on the meta-narrative, »autobiographical« level in ›Parzival‹ into the characterological world – a phenomenon we shall observe many times in the course of the text.

Chapters two and three are devoted to the central theme of socialization. Chapter two focuses mainly upon two important stanzas, 30–31, the so-called »doll episode«, in which Sigune and her father Kyot talk optimistically about the little girl's bright future in courtly love service. These passages – the first of several, all of which will be considered – do not appear in the G manuscript, only in H.[9] Their difficulties and incongruities prompted many earlier editors and critics to consider them inauthentic. I venture a new interpretation: the *tocken* should not (after the model of Obilot in ›Parzival‹, as is generally thought) be understood as tokens of her favor to be distributed to knights in her service, but rather as a reference to role-playing games, by means of which Sigune rehearses for her future as a courtly lady. Here, I draw upon material from late twelfth/early thirteenth-century Latin hagiography to argue that Wolfram was influenced by a contemporaneous literary-cultural paradigm shift in the interpretation of the significance of children's games. As a quasi-hagiographic *præfiguratio* of Sigune's future life course, the doll episode is at the heart of a fundamental narrative paradox. On the one hand, it functions as an expression of *sælde*, the »guarantee of success« (JAMES SCHULTZ) vouchsafed to the protagonist within the fictional world of romance childhood. On the other hand, it is clear from the beginning that the

9 In H they are numbered 35 and 36.

guarantee is itself a fiction: Sigune will fail (has, in fact, always already failed, in light of ›Parzival‹) in her aspiration to become a *frouwe*.

The first sections of chapter three continue with the investigation of Sigune's early socialization at Herzeloyde's court in Kanvoleiz. Once again, the focus is on text-critically problematic passages found exclusively in the H manuscript, stanzas 33–34 and 36. The narratorial breaks, incongruities, and evident plurality of narratorial perspectives in these stanzas, which led many earlier critics to question their authenticity, have been much commented upon in recent scholarship. Building upon GROOS'S interpretation of ›Parzival‹, I offer a BAKHTINIAN approach: the hybrid nature of narrative voice in these stanzas can be understood as a kind of dialogic controversy between the narrator and the court over the figure of Sigune. In the narratorial voice and ideology of the court, Sigune, though still a child, already merits the kind and measure of praise due to a full-fledged courtly woman. To this the narrator raises »realist« objections, pointing out the fact that she is physically still too young, and drawing attention to Herzeloyde as a more appropriate object of courtly encomium. In this dialogue we see a continuation of the paradoxical dichotomy at work in the doll episode: the court represents the plot-internal, characterological confidence in Sigune's beneficent fate, her *sælde*; the narrator voices reservations and doubts. In the court's perspective, the language of female praise and Sigune's physical person are, in effect, con-substantial. In the narrator's view this is precisely the problem, and Sigune's pubescence is the occasion for irony, critique and foreboding on his part.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of Schionatulander's socialization, which contrasts with that of Sigune to a degree hitherto unappreciated. Unlike Sigune, whose relationship to courtly love-language is immediate and physical-substantial, Schionatulander – who appears in the text only after pubescence – is initiated into and develops a distanced, rational-instrumental, »accidental« relationship to the discourse of *minne*. This difference is further emphasized in the early representation of the relationships between the protagonists and their respective guardians: Sigune and Herzeloyde are competitors in the contest between the narrator and the court over the propriety of female praise; Schionatulander has a role-model in Gahmuret, whom he observes and with whom he apprentices, becoming »wise« in the proper employment of the language of *minne*.

Chapter four explores the theme of amorous secrecy, which is introduced in the protagonists' love affair in yet another philologically controversial passage exclusive to manuscript H (stanza 53). This theme, too, is at the center of a textual ambivalence: on the one hand, Sigune and Schionatulander make a great effort to keep their relationship secret from outside observation; on the other hand, stanza 53 depicts this secrecy as part of the »proper« process of socialization. Several comments on the narratorial level reinforce the idea of the »obvious« nature of amorous secrets »among children«, and the

language of corporeal description contains a number of striking neologisms and Wolframian »sensual etymologies« that highlight the paradox of open secrecy. The result, I argue, is a highly innovative and strikingly modern representation of character subjectivity as a psychological inner world of a social-ideological outer world.

Combined with insights from the earlier part of the socialization process explored in chapters two and three, this approach also provides a new way of looking at the famous love-confession scene between the protagonists. Against the common critical opinion that Sigune's and Schionatulander's conversation reveals their inexperience and lack of autonomy in matters of *minne*, I argue that the conversation demonstrates precisely the opposite: while adhering to a certain protocol of amorous discourse, the couple nonetheless shows a searching insight into the conditioned nature of their own subjective process. This is especially true of Schionatulander, and I interpret his handling of the difficulties of communicating with Sigune to be an indication of why he is designated *dirre âventiure hêrre*. It is less true of Sigune, which I discuss in light of the problems of her socialization. I then examine the couple's conversations with their respective authority figures, Gahmuret and Herzeloyde, in which the secrecy of the relationship is lifted and Sigune and Schionatulander granted »permission before all the world« for their relationship. The chapter concludes with a survey of the theme of secrecy in modern scholarship on the medieval period and two literary comparisons: DIETRICH HUSCHENBETT'S analysis of the genre of the »Minneroman« and HORST WENZEL'S interpretation of Gottfried's ›Tristan‹. Secrecy in ›Titurel‹, I argue, stands in diametric contrast to Gottfried's valorization of secret love against the rest of the world. This provides further evidence for the widespread scholarly view that Wolfram's text was intended as a response to ›Tristan‹.

The last chapter returns to ›Titurel‹'s final scene. Sigune's and Schionatulander's contrasting reactions to the *schrift* on the leash can now be viewed in terms of a long history of simultaneously socialized and individual responses to the world of courtly discourse, from which the story or stories on Gardeviaz's leash do not, I argue, fundamentally differ. Although it is Sigune's reaction that has received and must receive the most attention, I propose that we also interpret Schionatulander's decision to go after Gardeviaz as no less problematic than that of Sigune's demand that he do so – he is, in fact, the »faint-hearted pledger« the narrator mentions in the text's last line. At the same time, I argue that the close methodological connection with ›Parzival‹ posited at the beginning of this study allows for a new and less dogmatic approach to old the question of character guilt and leads, I hope, to a new understanding – or perhaps a renewed old understanding – of ›Titurel‹'s connection with the Sigune-episodes in the Grail romance.

In many places throughout this study I will turn to Albrecht's ›Jüngerer Titurel‹ for insight into Wolfram's text, especially with regard to the text-critically problematic stanzas that H contains over G. The insights will almost always come by way of contrast. While maintaining a narratorial pose as »Wolfram von Eschenbach« over the greater part of his giant ›Titurel‹-continuation, Albrecht followed a poetic program that contrasted sharply with what is generally recognized – and was recognized at the time – as Wolfram's »wild« and »crooked« narrative style.[10] At the beginning of the ›Jüngerer Titurel‹, Albrecht qua Wolfram is a poetologically penitent storyteller determined to redress the criticism his obscurantist style has generated:

Di trægen (man da merket) und witze di tunkel sehende mich zihent,
ich hab verterket ein pfat, vil wit daz lig der diet unspehende,
da zuo hab ich in schif und bruk enpfueret,
straz unde pfat verirret, immer all ir verte ungerueret. (19)

Hie wil ich nicht me sumen der selben sache kunde,
gar all ir straze rumen. ir irreganc der wer mir lichte sunde.
ich wil die krumb an allen orten slichten,
wan sumeliche jehende sint, ich kunne iz selbe niht verrichten. (20)

[...]

Ob sinnericher stiure dise mær iht walten?
si tuont sich niemant tiure, si nennent sich den jungen zuo den alten.
und mugen sich die tumben dar gesellen!
durch sinneriche lere muoz ich di wilden mær hie zam gestellen. (59)

Slow people (note well!) and those of dim wit accuse me of obscuring a path, a wide path that would lie open to people of little sight, and that furthermore I have hidden away the boats and bridges, led the roads and paths astray, and confused all their paths. I will now hasten to investigate the matter, and completely clear all their ways. Their straying might be laid at my door as a sin. I will straighten all that is crooked, for some have said that I myself could not set things right. [...] Do these tales have a guiding meaning? They do not consider themselves to good for anyone, but recommend themselves to young and old, and may the foolish also include themselves too! I will here make the wild stories tame with sensible teaching.

10 See Gottfried von Strassburg, ›Tristan‹, 4636–4643 and 4557–4688; Wolfram von Eschenbach, ›Willehalm‹, 4. 19–24; DIETRICH HUSCHENBETT, Albrechts ›Jüngerer Titurel‹. Zu Stil und Komposition, Munich 1979, pp. 166–72; WERNER SCHRÖDER, Wolfram-Nachfolge im ›Jüngeren Titurel‹. Devotion oder Arroganz? Frankfurt am Main, 1982; Demontage und Montage von Wolframs Prologen im Prolog zum ›Jüngeren Titurel‹, Munich 1983; ANDREA LORENZ, Der Jüngere Titurel als Wolfram-Fortsetzung. Eine Reise zum Mittelpunkt des Werks, Bern et al. 2002. On Albrecht's revision of the Arthurian romance in general see WALTER HAUG, Vernacular Literary Theory in the Middle Ages: The German tradition, 800–1300, in its European Context, Cambridge (England), New York 1997, pp. 366–381.

Since scholars agree that the original ›Titurel‹-fragments contain some of Wolfram's wildest and crookedest narrative art, it stands to reason that we can learn a good deal by closely comparing their most problematic stanzas with Albrecht's efforts to »straighten them out«. While such comparison has long since become a standard part of editorial practice,[11] the interpretive ›Titurel‹ scholarship could go further in this regard. All of the following chapters except the first draw upon substantial material from Albrecht to make or support arguments about Wolfram's text.

11 JOACHIM BUMKE, Zur Überlieferung von Wolframs Titurel. Wolframs Dichtung und der Jüngere Titurel, in: ZfdA 100 (1971), pp. 390–431; Titurelüberlieferung und Titurelforschung. Vorüberlegungen zu einer neuen Ausgabe von Wolframs Titurelfragmenten, in: ZfdA 102 (1973), pp. 147–188; BFJ, pp. 10–17.

Chapter 1. Gendered readership in ›Parzival‹

I

Modern ›Titurel‹ scholarship has a great deal to say regarding the methodological problems encountered by the reader who attempts to interpret ›Titurel‹ in light of ›Parzival‹:

> The interpretation of ›Titurel‹ is faced with a special difficulty: the story of Sigune can only be understood if we join together the story of her courtly childhood and youth, such as it is narrated in the ›Titurel‹ fragments, with the scenes of her mourning in ›Parzival‹ into a poetic biography. However, it is methodologically questionable to interpret the later work in light of the earlier, since we have no specific knowledge concerning the overarching plan behind ›Titurel‹.[12]

There is a curious paradox in the history of scholars' attitudes on this question. The older generation, although generally guided by the assumption that Wolfram used an external source for the story of Sigune and Schionatulander (as in the case of the Gahmuret story in ›Parzival‹), nonetheless treated the relationship to ›Parzival‹ as central to the interpretation of what Wolfram artistically intended with ›Titurel‹.[13] Today, the situation is exactly the opposite. On the source question, a majority of scholars is now willing to ascribe to Wolfram a degree of artistic freedom and creativity unprecedented for a medieval author – namely, that he invented the story virtually wholesale.[14] At the same time, however, current scholarship is dominated by at times rather dogmatic assertions about ›Titurel‹'s aesthetic autonomy and interpretive independence from the Grail romance. HELMUT BRACKERT, for example, has gone so far as to claim that ›Titurel‹ is to be understood »exclusively in terms of itself«:

> The author proceeds [...] from the viewpoint that ›Titurel‹, which [...] as generally agreed, differs fundamentally from ›Parzival‹, can only be

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12 BUMKE, Wolfram von Eschenbach, Stuttgart, Weimar 1991 (6th edition), pp. 286–287 (Hereafter BUMKE I).

13 Characteristic of the older school is WOLFGANG MOHR'S theory about a French courtly love novella about the Dauphin of Graisivaudan as the source for the adventure on the dog's leash. Wolfram von Eschenbach. ›Titurel‹. Lieder, ed. WOLFGANG MOHR, Göppingen 1978 (Göppinger Arbeiten zur Germanistik 250), pp. 122–123.

14 BUMKE, Wolfram von Eschenbach, Stuttgart, Weimar 1997 (7th edition), p. 254. (Herafter BUMKE II).

> understood on its own terms and that undifferentiated interpreting back and forth can only lead to misinterpretations.[15]

The faults and blind spots of the older approach have been discussed at great length. The methodological problems of the newer approach are more subtle. If one assumes that Wolfram both possessed the artistic freedom (and the indulgence of a patron) to invent a story completely independent of a source and sought to make a narrative statement completely independent of ›Parzival‹, then one must be at some pains to explain why Wolfram even chose characters, settings, motifs, and plot-elements derived from an already thoroughly constructed narrative. If anything, one would expect modern scholarship to devote itself with even greater intensity to the interillumination of ›Parzival‹ and ›Titurel‹ than before.

Besides this methodologic contradiction, any claim that an interpretation based on close comparison, or »interpreting back and forth« between ›Titurel‹ and ›Parzival‹, is necessarily prone to wrong interpretations is problematic in two other ways. First, it disregards the fact that the ›Titurel‹-narrator himself not only interprets back and forth between the two texts, but also addresses his audience as one that is familiar with ›Parzival‹, inviting them to compare and relate the stories and characters as parts of the same epic world. We shall look at one such passage shortly. Everything we know about the reception of ›Parzival‹ in particular, and medieval literature in general, tells us that Wolfram's and later medieval audiences of ›Titurel‹ understood the text as an extension of the Grail romance.

Secondly, the strong autonomy thesis cannot offer an explanation of why an interpretation that radically excludes ›Parzival‹ is not also a valid interpretation. For example, if we interpret ›Titurel‹ exclusively in terms of itself with regard to plot, we choose not to know that Schionatulander dies in the quest for the dog's leash. To be sure, we could argue from the narrator's dark hints in the second fragment that something terrible will happen to him, but we could not claim that it is his death. In fact, the narrator's comments, which allude only to a great sorrow Schionatulander will receive in consequence of his encounter with the hound, suggest rather that Sigune is the primary subject of the catastrophe. How else could we interpret the remark that Schionatulander »received lasting sorrow« when he decided to go after

15 BRACKERT, Sinnspuren. Die Brackenseilinschrift in Wolframs von Eschenbach ›Titurel‹, in: Erzählungen in Erzählungen. Phänomene der Narration in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit, ed. HARALD HAFERLAND/MICHAEL MECKLENBURG, Munich 1996 (Forschungen zur Geschichte der älteren deutschen Literatur 19), p. 156, footnote 6. The formulation in BFJ is more categorical, dismissing the possibility of even a »differentiated« intertextual comparison: »One thing is clear: any attempt to interpret ›Titurel‹ in the context of ›Parzival‹ must ultimately come up short and go astray« (p. 441). Similarly BUMKE, Wolfram von Eschenbach, Stuttgart, Weimar 2004 (8th edition; hereafter BUMKE III), p. 417.

Gardeviaz (139, 3), or »caught the lack of all joys, such that he never again was joyful« (159, 2–3)? As far as I can tell, there is no specific reference in the whole text to any future sorrow on the part of Sigune alone. In the absence of ›Parzival‹, this state of affairs could be interpreted to the effect that the dog's leash somehow leads to Sigune's death (dead people experiencing no »lasting sorrow«), leaving Schionatulander to mourn his beloved for the rest of his days. Such a reading would obviously be very problematic. An approach that insists on ›Titurel‹'s absolute hermeneutic autonomy, however, could have no logical reason to find it so.[16]

Obviously, then, at least one basic plot-fact of ›Parzival‹ must be imported into an interpretation of ›Titurel‹. There must be a fundamental ontological and biographical connection between the two texts. Yet once this connection is made, it is not methodologically possible to insist *a priori* that it extend only so far and no further. For how do we distinguish between a plot-fact necessary for understanding ›Titurel‹ and one that is not necessary, much less one that should be discounted? Let us consider the vexed question of guilt. Sigune's self-accusation of *kranke sinne* in ›Parzival‹ led the older scholarship to conduct endless debates over the extent to which ›Titurel‹ represents Sigune's character and actions as culpable or responsible in bringing about Schionatulander's death. In the present day, the tendency is to consider the whole debate over guilt inappropriately imported from ›Parzival‹.[17] That it is imported is certain. But on what basis is it inappropriate? Sigune's self-inculpation in ›Parzival‹ is no less a plot-fact than Schionatulander's death. On what methodological basis, then, can we determine which facts from ›Parzival‹ must be considered, which others excluded in a reading of ›Titurel‹?

II

The focus on the differences between ›Titurel‹ and ›Parzival‹ has tended obscure important aspects of their meta-narrative continuity, a continuity expressly mandated by the ›Titurel‹-narrator. When, in the middle of the first fragment, Sigune and Schionatulander separate at the latter's departure for the Orient, the narrator turns to his audience and comments:

> Vil liep beleip aldâ, liep schiet von dannen.
> ir gehôrtet nie gesprechen von mageden, von wîben, von manlîchen mannen,
> die sich herzenlîcher kunden minnen.
> des wart sît Parzivâl an Sigûnen zer linden wol innen. (78)

16 See BFJ, p. 439, where it is claimed that Wolfram presents Schionatulander's subsequent fate as »emphatically open«, thereby calling into question the »putatively certain knowledge« of his death in ›Parzival‹.

17 See BRACKERT, Sinnspuren, p. 156, footnote 6, after the above-quoted passage.

> Much love remained there, and love departed thence. You never heard tell of maidens, of women, of manly men, who loved each other more profoundly. Parzival later recognized this of Sigune at the linden tree.[18]

This is a clear reference to Parzival's second meeting with Sigune, perched in a linden tree with the corpse of her beloved in her arms, after the hero's failure at the Grail castle in Book V of the earlier romance. According to recent commentary, however, this passage functions more to obfuscate and ironize than to underscore or clarify the relationship between the earlier and later works. BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE make much of ostensible incongruities of detail: »a lover who remains alive after the death of her beloved cannot herself alone manifest the quality of a mutual love [*die sich...kunden minnen*], such as depicted here«.[19] Nor is *herzenlîchiu minne*, they argue, what really leads to Parzival meeting Sigune in the linden tree, »but the exact opposite: [Sigune] is unable to live this *herzenlîche minne* while Schionatulander is alive [...]«. Disjunctions of this kind led ULLRICH WYSS to speak, in a 1974 essay that played a key role in the development of modern ›Titurel‹ scholarship, of the ›Titurel‹-narrator's »drastic ironization« and »calling into question« of the »illusionary connectedness of narrated events« with ›Parzival‹. In WYSS'S view, this radical irony reflects a fundamental narratorial »self-critique« and demontage of the romance tradition Wolfram undertakes with ›Titurel‹.[20]

There is another way of looking at stanza 78, however. It can also be read as a specific and contextually highly sensitive evocation of the Grail romance's idiosyncratic characterological world. After all, the whole basis of Sigune's life after the disaster of Schionatulander's death in that text is that he is not really dead, that he lives on, and that the two are united in marriage and mutual love – not in some future heavenly union, but in the here and now. As Sigune tells Parzival at her forest hermitage at the beginning of Book IX, Schionatulander »*is* my husband before God« (440. 8), and her final living words on the matter show how literally she means the mutuality implicit in this belief:

> »ich pin hinne selbe ander:
> Schîânatulander
> ist daz eine, dez ander ich«. (440. 17–19)

18 The translations from ›Titurel‹ are either my own or based on Wolfram von Eschenbach, ›Titurel‹ and the Songs, transl. MARION E. GIBBS and SIDNEY M. JOHNSON, New York, London 1988.

19 BFJ, pp. 78–79.

20 ULLRICH WYSS, Selbstkritik des Erzählers. Ein Versuch über Wolframs Titurel-fragmente, in: ZfdA 103 (1974), pp. 249–289, here pp. 273–274.

> »Here within I am not alone. Schionatulander is the one, I am the other«.[21]

Sigune's viewpoint is not confined to her own distressed imagination. A detail of material-biological reality supports the possibility that Schionatulander really is still alive in some way: his body remains *unrefûlt* (804. 29) for the more than four and a half years between Parzival's first and last encounters with his cousin. Wolfram obviously borrowed this motif from hagiography, in which the uncorrupted body of the dead saint represents the material disavowal of death's ultimate reality and sting. In ›Parzival‹, Schionatulander's intact flesh offers material support for the transcendental narrative truth of Sigune's highly idiosyncratic interpretation of her life with a corpse.[22] This quasi-hagiographic representation of Sigune's and Schionatulander's relationship commences with the linden-scene in Book V. As MAX WEHRLI and others have pointed out, Wolfram probably intended the description of Sigune in the linden tree to invoke a kind of pietà-image.[23] In singling out this episode in ›Parzival‹ as a paradigmatic scene of Sigune's and Schionatulander's »mutual« *herzenlîche minne*, therefore, the ›Titurel‹-narrator powerfully and precisely evokes an iconic image encapsulating the entire meaning of Sigune's existence in the Grail romance.

I believe we have good reason to assume that Wolfram intended his earlier and later accounts of Sigune to be precisely that kind of poetic biography so many modern ›Titurel‹ scholars find methodologically problematic. In any case, I would suggest that the methodological hazards run both ways. There certainly are serious disjunctions and incongruities in ›Titurel‹ that make the interpretation of its meta-narrative association with the Grail romance difficult, and this study will explore a number of them. But there are also serious methodological problem with not interpreting – or insufficiently interpreting – ›Titurel‹ in light of ›Parzival‹.

One of the major ones is that the current standard arguments for maximal difference between the two narratives are built on a view of the Grail romance that is itself now somewhat obsolete. Most modern ›Titurel‹ scholars still echo WEHRLI'S view that ›Titurel‹ represents a »rejection of the belief in the possibility of a comprehensive, constructive world project in the style of ›Parzival‹«.[24] But the view of the Grail romance as this kind of »world project«, a unitary, centered, complete, and closed narrative whole, is now a thing of the past. Many features traditionally associated with ›Titurel‹ – the decentered and pluralistic narrative, the coexistence of incommensurate per-

21 All translations from ›Parzival‹ are mine.

22 On the text's alternative explanation of embalming see below, p. 155.

23 MAX WEHRLI, Wolframs ›Titurel‹ (Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vorträge G 194), Opladen 1974, p. 10 and footnote 15.

24 WEHRLI, p. 19.

spectives, fragmentality, open-endedness, and so forth – are now understood as central to the analysis of ›Parzival‹.[25] ›Titurel‹ scholars, in their efforts to move ›Titurel‹ away from ›Parzival‹, have often not been aware of the extent to which our understanding of ›Parzival‹ has been moving the narrative world of that text toward ›Titurel‹.

The biggest step in this direction was taken by ARTHUR GROOS in a BAKHTINIAN approach to the Grail romance, worked out in his 1995 book ›Romancing the Grail. Genre, Science, and Quest in Wolfram's Parzival‹[26] Following BAKHTIN'S own remarkable but unelaborated assessment of the significance of ›Parzival‹ in the developmental history of the European novel, GROOS shows how Wolfram »creates a dialogic narrative with a heteroglot counterstyle and a tendency toward a decentered pluralism of speech types, genres, and nonliterary discourses«, a »pluralization of romance differ[ing] fundamentally in its self-conscious complexity« from other twelfth-century romances such as those of Heinrich von Veldeke and Hartmann von Aue, as well as from Wolfram's source, ›Li Contes del Graal‹ of Chrétien de Troyes.[27] This pluralized and decentered narrative coordinates and weaves together three separate worlds, Oriental, Arthurian, and Grail, each possessing »distinct discourses with distinct constituent features, ranging from the emplotting of time and space to genre expectations«. As a true »dialogic structure« (BAKHTIN spoke of ›Parzival‹ as »profoundly and fundamentally double-voiced«), Wolfram's romance resists »ideological closure« in a way many scholars consider to be characteristic of novelistic discourse.

Although GROOS has little to say concerning Wolfram's other works, it is clear – or I hope to make it so – that a BAKHTINIAN approach is also highly germane to the interpretation of ›Titurel‹.[28] It is true that ›Titurel‹ is fundamentally more double-voiced and more resistant to ideological closure than ›Parzival‹. But I regard those differences in terms of degree, not in essential nature.

Several of these differences are already intimated in a pair of reservations GROOS expresses concerning the most extreme of BAKHTIN'S claims about Wolfram's ›Parzival‹, that it represents »already an authentic novel«. In the first place, GROOS points out that ›Parzival‹ is still a verse narrative, and that verse »inevitably exerts a leveling effect on language through the constraints of rhyme and meter«. Thus,

25 See, for example, the new section on »Mehrdeutigkeit« in ›Parzival‹ in BUMKE III, pp. 125–126.

26 ARTHUR GROOS, Romancing the Grail. Genre, Science, and Quest in Wolfram's ›Parzival‹. Ithaca, London 1995. All quotes from BAKHTIN are from The Dialogic Imagination, ed. MICHAEL HOLQUIST, University of Texas Press, 1981.

27 GROOS, pp. 17–18; 16.

28 See also my review in PBB 124 (2002), Heft 1, pp. 171–174.

> Wolfram's world exhibits [...] a disproportion between the wide variety of imagined social roles and their comparatively limited differentiation by linguistic registers. [...] [A]lthough it defamiliarizes both the unified rhetorical ideal of romance verse and the unifying language of the court, [it] is not yet entirely »prosaic«, does not yet articulate a universe of individual registers and idiolects.

Secondly, there is what GROOS identifies as the limited »interplay of genres« in the Grail romance:

> In most cases the polygeneric tendency of the narrative is intermittent, usually involving bitonality or opposition of romance with other genres (lyric, saint's life, epic). [...] [T]he resulting heterogenic pluralism is highly unusual for a medieval narrative around 1200, but ›Parzival‹ is still far from the truly polyphonic use of registers and genres in a Dostoyevsky novel.

These limitations circumscribe, in my view, two areas in which ›Titurel‹ will go further than the Grail romance towards BAKHTIN'S concept of the authentic novel. First, although ›Titurel‹, too, is a verse narrative, its verses are cast in a highly unusual stanza open to a broad variety of different interpretations pointing, in terms of the history of novelistic discourse, in opposite directions: some critics have argued that it is a throwback to the – already deliberately archaizing – ›Nibelungenlied‹-stanza or the stanza of early Danube-area minnesong,[29] while others have argued that its metric irregularities, which have thwarted all attempts to describe a singular archetypical stanza, approximate the stylistic principle of prose.[30] Both views are plausible. As an extremely open and poetologically equivocal form, therefore, the ›Titurel‹-stanza is capable of counteracting the leveling tendencies of the traditional rhymed couplet of romance. In fact, as we shall see, the occasional addition of surplus metrical constraints – in the form of internal rhymes – can have precisely the opposite of the »monologizing« effect BAKHTIN ascribed to verse.

This brings us to GROOS'S second reservation, concerning the intermittent nature of ›Parzival‹'s polygeneric character. ›Titurel‹ is less intermittent than ›Parzival‹ in this regard. In a sense, the whole narrative is relentlessly polygeneric in nature, constantly shifting and oscillating between the different literary resonances built into its multivalent stanza: the fortune-assured sanguinity of romance, the heroic epic's dark adumbrations of ultimate tragedy, and the stylized vernal imagery of minnesong.[31] If ›Parzival‹ is bitonal, that is, if it represents a basically romance narrative discourse with intermittent

29 On connections with heroic epic see VOLKER MERTENS, Zu Text und Melodie der Titurelstrophe: *iamer ist mir entsprungen*, in: Wolfram-Studien 1 (1970), pp. 219–239, here pp. 234–239. On connections with lyric see BFJ, p. 26.

30 MOHR, Wolfram von Eschenbach, ›Titurel‹. Lieder, pp. 11–17; WYSS, p. 257.

31 See BFJ, p. 26.

infusions of differentially »marked« speech or »heteroglossia« (GROOS identifies foreign languages, bookish or scientific languages of astronomy and medicine, genealogical lists, epistolary discourse, poems, slang, et al.),[32] ›Titurel‹, it would seem, has almost completely forsaken grounding in the fundamental tonic of romance and been given over to the free play of heteroglossia. It cannot be interpreted as belonging to any one particular genre. It is a thoroughly »hybridized« text, a »cross section of many genres and their formal and stylistic traditions«.[33]

JOACHIM BUMKE suggests that the great scholarly interest shown in ›Titurel‹ in the 1970s and 1980s has decreased due to the realization that some of the interpretations have distanced themselves too far from the text.[34] I believe the great distance now generally placed between ›Titurel‹ and the Grail romance has also played a part in this decline of interest. Proceeding from GROOS' analysis of ›Parzival‹, this study will argue for a strong – though hopefully not undifferentiated – interillumination of the two texts in many places. In the rest of this chapter, I propose that one important moment of continuity has hitherto escaped notice: the way in which Sigune's and Schionatulander's dispute over the significance of the *schrift* on the dog's leash is prefigured in the poetological and »autobiographical« discourse of the Grail romance.

III

The narrator of ›Parzival‹ is intensely concerned with the proper behavior of women, not only that of his literary characters, but also of the women in his audience and in courtly society as a whole. Both in the prologue and the so-called »self-defense«, the audience address cum literary excursus between Books II and III, the narrator claims the right to prescribe and judge feminine comportment and morality. In the prologue he does the prescribing:

> für diu wîp stôze ich disiu zil.
> swelhiu mîn râten merken wil,
> diu sol wizzen war si kêre
> ir prîs und ir êre,
> und wem si dâ nâch sî bereit
> minne und ir werdekeit,
> sô daz si niht geriuwe
> ir kiusche und ir triuwe. (2. 25–3. 2)
>
> For women I set up the following goals: any woman willing to heed my advice should know where to bestow her praise and honor, and, accordingly, whom to grant her love and respect, so that she will not regret her purity and faithfulness.

And in the »self-defense«, the narrator claims the right to judge feminine comportment:

> ine hân des niht vergezzen,
> ine künne wol gemezzen
> beide ir bærde unt ir site. (114. 29–115. 1)
>
> I have not forgotten how to judge well their (womens') manners and their morals.

What has been overlooked in the scholarly debate over these passages is the manner in which the narrator's address to the women has, in both cases, been situated in a discussion of the interpretation of literature and an address to the audience as listener-interpreters of stories. In the prologue, women are tacitly excluded from narrator's comments about his ideal listener: he turns to the women in his audience (2. 25ff.) only after he has concluded his comments on literary interpretation (1–2. 24). To be sure, his famously disparaging first address to the listening/interpreting public might very well include women, since *liute*, »people«, makes no distinction of gender:

> diz vliegende bîspel
> ist tumben liuten gar ze snel,
> sine mugens niht erdenken:
> wand ez kan vor in wenken
> rehte alsam ein schellec hase. (1. 15–19)
>
> This flying metaphor [i.e., the opening image of the human soul like the magpie] will be much too swift for dull people. They will not be able to think it through because it will run from them like a startled rabbit.

Obviously, however, *tumbe liute* are not ideal listeners. Only after dismissing these and further undesirables does the narrator turn to his real audience, the truly active listener and seeker of narrative understanding. This group is addressed as male:

> ouch erkante ich nie sô wîsen man,
> ern möhte gerne künde hân,
> welher stiure disiu mære gernt
> und waz si guoter lêre wernt. (2. 5–8)
>
> Never have I met a man so wise as not to be interested in finding out what authority these stories claim and what good lessons they provide.

The word *man* initially may seem little more than the grammatically masculine indefinite subject pronoun. But the pursuit of narrative meaning is described entirely in terms of masculine activities and images. The skilled interpreter of the narrator's elusive stories will be very much like the ideal

32 See GROOS, pp. 21–45.
33 BFJ, p. 26.
34 BUMKE III, v.

Arthurian knight (à la Chrétien/Hartmann) who exercises the golden chivalric mean between the sedentary and the wayward life:[35]

> swer mit disen schanzen allen kan,
> an dem hât witze wol getân,
> der sich niht versitzet noch vergêt
> und sich anders wol verstêt. (2. 13–16)
>
> Whoever can make sense out of all these turns of chance has been well treated by Wisdom; he is one who neither sits idle nor goes astray, but in general understands.

The narrator's final comment about his ideal listeners/interpreters, which prefaces his discourse on feminine morals discussed above, makes the implicit gender divide unambiguously clear:

> Dise manger slahte underbint
> iedoch niht gar von manne sint.
> für diu wîp stôze ich disiu zil: (2. 23–25)
>
> These various precepts do not solely concern men; I would establish the following goals for women: [...]

In other words, the whole opening section on literary interpretation is to be understood by the audience as involving precepts *gar von manne*, »only about men«. Whereafter the narrator, as if by way of fairness and balance, wishes to say something constructive to the ladies, as if having hitherto neglected properly feminine interests and concerns. Wolfram thus represents the relationship between the audience and literary narrative in terms of a gender dichotomy. Reading and interpretation belong to the masculine sphere; the subject of the literary quest is analogous to the male subject of the chivalric quest. Women, in contrast, are addressed as subjects of morality. Their concern is not the interpretation of stories, but proper comportment in society.

In discussing the role of women in the »self-defense«,[36] scholars have focused primarily on two things: the narrator's diatribe against a particular woman who he claims has been disloyal to and committed a misdeed against him, a passage that has given rise to far-flung biographical speculations;[37] and secondly, a reference to the debates of the minnesingers over the proper relationship between the courtly poet and the lady of his praises. Criticizing the poet »who places all other ladies in checkmate just to show his own lady

35 See EBERHARD NELLMANN, Wolframs Erzähltechnik. Untersuchungen zur Funktion des Erzählers, Wiesbaden 1973, p. 10; HAUG, Das Literaturtheoretische Konzept Wolframs von Eschenbach. Eine neue Lektüre des ›Parzival‹-Prologs, PBB 123 (2001), pp. 211–229, here p. 225.

36 ›Parzival‹, 114. 5–116. 4

37 114. 10–18. See NELLMANN, pp. 18–21.

to advantage«,[38] Wolfram comes down on the side of the minnesinger Walther von der Vogelweide in his celebrated literary feud against Reinmar der Alte.[39]

What has been often overlooked is the converse of the poet's attitude toward his lady and his representation of her in his poetry. The »self-defense« also comments on the proper feminine attitude toward the poet and his poetry:

> schildes ambet ist mîn art:
> swâ mîn ellen sî gespart,
> swelhiu mich minnet umbe sanc,
> sô dunket mich ir witze kranc.
> ob ich guotes wîbes minne ger,
> mag ich mit schilde und ouch mit sper
> verdienen niht ir minne solt,
> al dar nâch sî sie mir holt. (115. 11–18)
>
> My heritage is the office of the shield; if my bravery is underrated by any woman who loves me for my poetry, I consider that she is weak in her wits. If I seek a good woman's love, let her bestow her favor only according to how I perform with shield and spear.

The ability to produce poetry is represented here as a kind of secondary virtue. The comment *ich* [...] *kan ein teil mit sange* (114. 12–13) likewise suggests an unwillingness on the narrator's part to identify completely with his literary craft. Rather, he desires women to love him for his »authentic nature« (*mîn art*), his knightliness, manifest in his military prowess. Yet women do not do so. Implicit in this passage is a problematic female literary recipient or »reader« who loves literature more than she loves the person of the poet-knight, or who loves the poet-knight in surrogate fashion for his literature (*umbe sanc*).

The reproach of *kranke witze* (»weak wits«), as well as the indefinite nature of the addressee (*swelchiu*, »any woman«), imply that the narrator's dissatisfaction is not simply individual and idiosyncratic, but intended as part of the general judgment of female behavior he has just claimed the right to make and that is already implicit in the prologue. A woman who loves literature too much offends against an objective moral order of priorities. »Right thinking« women must love a knight-poet above all because he is a knight and for his chivalric deeds, only secondarily – if at all – because he is a poet and for his art. Clearly, the narrator himself personally wishes to be loved

38 *Sîn lop hinket ame spat, / swer allen frouwen sprichet mat / durch sîn eines frouwen* (115. 5–7).

39 Reinmar, Lieder, ed. GÜNTHER SCHWEIKLE, Stuttgart 1986, pp. 336–338; Walther von der Vogelweide, Werke. Band 2: Liedlyrik, ed. GÜNTHER SCHWEIKLE, Stuttgart 1998, pp. 606–610.

this way, yet he represents the non-satisfaction of his desire in terms of an supra-personal, moral critique of »wrong-thinking« women.

Thus the »self-defense« builds upon and elaborates the gender-dichotomy established in the prologue. Whereas there the narrator tacitly excluded women from his address to those interested and invested in the interpretation of literature, he now polemicizes against women who place their interest in literature above their moral-societal obligation to love the knight for his chivalry.[40] This dichotomy is also present in other passages in the text addressed to female members of the audience. At the end of Book VI, the narrator prefaces a summary of exemplary female characters thus far encountered in the story (Belakane, Herzeloyde, Ginover, Jeschute, and Cunneware) with the following comment about female readers:

> Nu weiz ich, swelch sinnec wîp,
> ob si hât getriwen lîp,
> diu diz mære geschriben siht,
> daz si mir mit wârheit giht,
> ich kunde wîben sprechen baz
> denne als ich sanc gein einer maz. (337. 1–6)
>
> Now I know that any woman of sense who sees this story written, if she is also true of heart, will own to me in truth that I can speak better of women than I did in the songs I sang to a particular one.

This passage reflects both aspects of the representation of the female reader thus far discussed. One the one hand, women seem not to be actually present in the audience: the narrator, addressing his listeners as usual in the second person (337. 27: *ich tætz iu gerne vürbaz kunt*), discusses women and their reception of his story only in the third person and in the conditional: »any woman of sense who reads this story [...]«. This comment implies that there are, in fact, no *sinnec wîp* present in the immediate audience; if there were, they would have no need to »see the story written« in order to learn about its exemplary female characters and communicate their opinion to the narrator. And even when their opinion is solicited, female readers are invoked for one act of interpretation only: to judge of the narrator's depiction of specifically feminine behavior and morality. Women are not addressed here as readers/interpreters in general.

Finally, there is the audience address at the very end of the text:

> swes lebn sich sô verendet,
> daz got niht wirt gepfendet
> der sêle durch des lîbes schulde,
> und der doch der werlde hulde
> behalten kan mit werdekeit,

40 The seriousness of the reproach of *kranke witze* is especially evident in 463. 1–3, where Trevrizent reprimands Parzival for seeking after the Grail.

> daz ist ein nützіu arbeit.
> guotiu wîp, hânt die sin,
> deste werder ich in bin,
> op mir decheiniu guotes gan,
> sît ich diz mær volsprochen hân.
> ist daz durh ein wîp geschehn,
> diu muoz mir süezer worte jehn. (827.19–30)
>
> A life so concluded that God is not robbed of the soul through fault of the body, and which can obtain the world's favor with dignity – that is a worthy work. To good women, if they are sensible, I am all the more worthy – in case one of them wishes me well – now that I have completed this story. If it was done for a woman's sake, she will have to speak sweet words to me.

Here we see the same gender-division that characterized the prologue. The first sentence, though not explicitly addressed to men, nonetheless rehearses the same ideal of moderation between extremes that characterizes male chivalry of romance, a discourse the narrator appropriates as a model for – tacitly masculine – literary interpretation in the first part of the prologue. The final, separate address to women calls to mind the second, women-exclusive part of the prologue.[41] It also returns to the motif of *sinnec wîp* seen in 337.1 and the »self-defense« (as the implicit positive term of comparison to women of *kranke witze*) as well as to the motif of the particular woman of the narrator's affection/antipathy. As in the »self-defense«, however, the narrator does not speak to the women in their capacity as interpreters of literature; rather, he suggests that they owe him »good acts« and »sweet words« – *minne*, in other words – for finishing his tale.

Thus far I have spoken generally of »literature«. However, the prologue and the »self-defense« address literature in different forms.[42] The prologue focuses on narratives, »stories« (*mære*). The proper attitude on the part of the male interpreter (*wîse man*) is that of curiosity (*gerne künde hân*) about the meaning (*stiure*) and good teachings (*guote lêre*) of the stories. While the

41 I do not see how GROOS arrives at the conclusion that Wolfram here addresses an audience »comprised entirely of women« (Romancing the Grail, pp. 13–14, 16). My view is that of KÄTHE IWAND, who believes the narrator is addressing the women within a mixed audience (Die Schlüsse der mittelhochdeutschen Epen, in: Germanische Studien 16 [1922], p. 93).

42 By »literature« I do not of course mean fiction in the modern sense. Like all medieval poets, Wolfram criticizes explicitly fictional stories as »false, lying tales«: (338. 17: *valsch lügelîch ein mære*) in contrast to stories that tell the »truth« (338. 12, 21: *wârheit*). Those who hanker after the former are »weak of wit«: *swem ist ze sölhen werken gâch, dâ missewende hæret nâch, pfliht werder lîp an den gewin, daz muoz in lêren kranker sin* (338. 25–28). For a paradigmatic contemporaneous didactic-theoretical discussion of this distinction see Thomasin von Zerklære, ›Der Welsche Gast‹, vv. 1079–1148.

tales themselves are extremely chaotic, mobile, and polyvalent in nature (»they never hesitate to flee and chase, dodge and run back, condemn and praise«),[43] the ideal interpreter must conform to certain parameters in his involvement with them. The analogy between the pursuit of narrative understanding and the knight who exercises moderation between *versitzen* and *vergên* implies that it is possible to commit two distinct errors of literary reception: on the one hand to sit idle, and on the other to go astray with respect to the text. The emphasis on the intelligence and understanding (*an dem hât witze wol getân*; *der sich wol verstêt*) suggests that the proper interpreter exercises reason and rationality with regard to the narratives' many *schanzen*, »turns of chance«.

After all, the consequences of an improper approach to the stories are drastic:

> valsch geselleclîcher muot
> ist zem helleviure guot,
> und ist hôher werdekeit ein hagel.
> sîn triuwe hât sô kurzen zagel,
> daz si den dritten biz niht galt,
> vuor si mit bremen in den walt. (2. 17–22)
>
> False sociability is good for the fires of hell, and it beats upon high dignity like a hailstorm. Its faithfulness has such a short tail that it couldn't swipe at the third bite of the horsefly as it ran into the wood.

In his recent »new reading« of the ›Parzival‹-prologue, WALTER HAUG describes the »incredible daring« of this passage:

> This passage gives expression to the highest possible artistic aspiration, ascribing salvational power to a work of literary fiction. And Wolfram does not hesitate to damn to hell anyone unwilling to persevere in accompanying his narrative.[44]

For HAUG, Wolfram's ideal reader is one who »persistently follows that which happens in the story, and identifies with [*nachvollziehen*] that which happens to the protagonist«.[45] Conversely, he sees the improper approach as a »refusal to go along with the narrator's tale«. But this interpretation neglects half of the poetological message implicit in 2. 13–16. Obstinate »refusal to go along with the tale« obviously corresponds to the *versitzen* of the chivalric analogy. But what about the other extreme, *vergên*? Is it not also possible, like Iwein with knightly adventure, to go astray in one's involvement with the tale, or to go too far? If, as HAUG claims, audience identification with the story and characters is the narrator's wish or ideal, and if that ideal is seen as

43 *dar an si nimmer des versagent, / beidiu si vliehent unde jagent,/ si entwîchent unde kêrent, / si lasternt unde êrent* (2. 9–12).

44 HAUG, Das literaturtheoretische Konzept, p. 226.

45 HAUG, Das literaturtheoretische Konzept, p. 225.

the golden mean between extremes, is there not also a danger of overidentification? Indeed, the concept of *valsch geselleclîcher muot* seems too strong to apply to an audience who simply does not go along with the tale. One would expect such an audience to exhibit no *geselleclîcher muot* at all with regard to the narrative and its figures. We recall that the narrator has already dismissed such listeners, the *tumbe liute* who cannot follow the *fliegendez bîspel* at the beginning of the prologue.

With those of *valsch geselleclîcher muot* Wolfram must mean the opposite extreme, those who go too far, who overextend their relationship to the narrative, its events and figures, in some way. But if this be the case, what then is the difference between such an interpreter and HAUG'S – positively-regarded – dogged follower of the narrator's chaotic tale? If the *tumbe liute* are an example of those who do not go along, are there any concrete examples of interpreters who go too far?

I suggest that the »weak-witted«, poetry-loving women of the »self-defense« provide an example of such literary waywardness. To be sure, the kind of literature in question is different in this case: *sanc*, »song«, which seems – especially in light of the preceding reference to the minnesingers – to point to the genre of lyric. Moreover, the nature of the overidentification here is not so much a going astray in a quest for narrative meaning or teaching as the misapplication to literature of an otherwise proper emotion, *minne*: Nonetheless, as an example of »false feeling« for or a »false relationship« to literature, a relationship with negative consequences for societal ethics (courtly literature being of course a social enterprise), the poetry-obsessed women in the »self-defense« provide, I believe, a more convincing example of *valsch geselleclîcher muot* than Haug's thesis about the condemnation of those who simply opt out of the literary-interpretive enterprise altogether.

Unlike other elements of the prologue (the magpie-simile, for example), gendered modalities of literary reception do not belong among the important or even particularly salient themes in the characterological world of ›Parzival‹. Apart from the narrator-figure and the ladies he addresses, there are no literary figures in the Grail romance who »stand for« either model. Indeed, the whole phenomenon of literary reception and interpretation is, by and large, excluded from the level of plot in ›Parzival‹ and restricted to its narratorial commentaries. There are few significant readers or acts of reading in the text, and in the few episodes in which stories or texts play any significant role (the deciphering of the *schrift* on the Grail, for example), their interpretation does not depend on gender.

Yet this very incongruence may well have prompted Wolfram in the direction he took with ›Titurel‹. As a thematic surplus, latent but narratively undeveloped in the earlier epic, the representation of literary reception as a potential source of error and misunderstanding between the sexes provided fruitful material for working out the background of the Sigune-Schionatulander story.

As mentioned above, we learn nothing in ›Parzival‹ about the reason for Sigune's self-reproach concerning her dead beloved. She says only that she was possessed of *kranke sinne* for not granting her love to Schionatulander, who had served her impeccably.[46] Before ›Titurel‹ was composed, the audience of ›Parzival‹ can hardly have associated Sigune's *kranke sinne* with the *kranke witze* of poetry-obsessed women the narrator complains about in the »self-defense«. Yet in retrospect a remarkable and hardly fortuitous parallel emerges. Is not the Sigune of the second ›Titurel‹-fragment just such a woman who places her love of literature (in the form of the *âventiure* on the dog's leash) above her love for her knight and his chivalric *art*? For however one wishes to justify Sigune's demand that Schionatulander retrieve the leash for her, one thing it cannot easily be construed to be, at least from the point of view of the characters themselves: a part of the contract for chivalric-military service the couple originally agreed to make the basis of their love's fulfillment. As Sigune tells Schionatulander at the end of their confession of mutual love in the first fragment: »*du muost mich unter schilteclîchem dache ê gedienen: des wis vor gerwarnet!* (71). Schionatulander accepts this stipulation (72) and it seals, in quasi-prenuptial fashion, the beginning of their *geselleschefte* (73).

I suggest that the main theme of the leash episode in ›Titurel‹, the female reader problematic in her overidentification with a literary text at the expense of her societal obligations (her *geselleclîcher muot*, as it were), has its origins in the two contrasting modes of literary reception that emerge in ›Parzival‹: an idealized, »male« model of literary reception involving a rational, balanced approach to narrative *mære* analogous to the proper conduct of a knight, a model from which women are *a priori* excluded; and a female counter-model characterized by an erroneously displaced, affective relationship to lyrical *sanc*, a relationship deleterious to proper societal relations, leading the woman to privilege the literary text over the attention she owes to the knight and his chivalry.

There are also compelling parallels between the figure of Schionatulander and the counterpart to the poetry-obsessed women of the »self-defense«: the ›Parzival‹-narrator himself, in his role as a knight with a self-consciously distanced relationship to literature. We shall return to these connections later. The next two chapters are primarily concerned with Sigune, and argue that the idea of a problematic overidentification of life with literature, the subject of the leash episode, is implicit in Sigune's biography since the very beginning of ›Titurel‹. The doll-scene shows her already planning and role-playing her future as a paradigmatic literary *minnefrouwe*. It is to this episode we now turn.

46 ›Parzival‹, 141. 11–21.

Chapter 2. *tocken* and prefiguration[47]

Sign of the urge for domination:
in play with her obedient doll
the child prepares for protocol –
that corps of social legislation –
and to it, with a grave import,
repeats what her mama has taught.

Pushkin, ›Eugene Onegin‹.[48]

I

The first thirty-six stanzas of ›Titurel‹ deal with Sigune's family heritage, birth and upbringing. Considering the comparative brevity of the narrative (175 stanzas), this is an unusual amount of space. Considering the narrative tradition, it is an anomaly. Descriptions of the birth and early childhood of a male protagonist are common in courtly literature. Female protagonists almost always enter the scene only at puberty, the point at which they begin to entertain relations with men and the masculine world. JAMES SCHULTZ, who has surveyed hundreds of medieval narratives of childhood, synopsizes the cultural attitude behind this difference: »There are [...] no stories worth telling about [a maiden] [...] except in relation to male sexuality«.[49]

Only a handful of medieval German texts feature the early life of a central female character. Among these, ›Titurel‹ seems to have been the first.[50] In

47 This and the next chapter have evolved from ALEXANDER SAGER, Sozialisation und Minneordnung in Wolfram von Eschenbach's ›Titurel‹, in: Ordnung und Unordnung in der Literatur des Mittelalters, ed. WOLFGANG HARMS, STEPHEN JAEGER und HORST WENZEL in Verbindung mit KATHRIN STEGBAUER, Stuttgart 2003, pp. 97–108.

48 XXVI, vv. 9–14; CHARLES H. JOHNSTON, trans., Narrative poems by Alexander Pushkin and by Mikhail Lermontov, New York, 1983.

49 JAMES A. SCHULTZ, The Knowledge of Childhood in the German Middle Ages, 1100–1350, Philadelphia 1995, p. 257.

50 SCHULTZ lists Wolfram's ›Titurel‹, Konrad Fleck's ›Flore und Blanscheflur‹ (c. 1220), the anonymous ›Gute Frau‹ (c. 1230), Albrechts ›Jüngerer Titurel‹ (c. 1260–1270), the anonymous ›Mai und Beaflor‹ (1270–1280) and Heinrich von Neustadt's ›Apollonius von Tyrland‹ (1305–1315). HUSCHENBETT believes that ›Flore und Blanscheflur‹ preceded and influenced ›Titurel‹; (Ehe statt Minne? Zur Tradition des Minneromans in Mittelalter und Neuzeit, in: Spannungen und Konflikte menschlichen Zusammenlebens in der deutschen Literatur des Mittelalters.

fact, ›Titurel‹ not only violates the convention, it reverses it: *dirre âventiure hêrre* Schionatulander first appears in the story only after a strikingly physical description of Sigune's puberty (stanza 36), and his birth and childhood are rapidly passed over (stanzas 38–42). We might say that there seem to be no stories worth telling about Schionatulander except in relation to female sexuality![51]

The narrator himself explicitly addresses the unconventional nature of his character introductions. Sigune's high birth, the fact that she comes from the Grail dynasty, gives her and her family pride of place in the story:

> Daz ih des werden Kurzkrîen sun niht benande
> vor der maget Sigûnen, diu genôz des: ir muoter man sande
> ûz der phlege von dem reinen grâle.
> ir hôchgeburt si zucket ouch her für unde ir künne daz lieht gemâle. (43)
>
> The reason I did not name the son of the worthy Gurzgrie before the maiden Sigune is because her mother was sent from the community guarding the pure Grail. Her high birth, too, gives her and her distinguished kindred the priority.

Yet this justification only serves to highlight another unconventional aspect of the text's narrative structure: ›Titurel‹ contains no prologue, the place where the *âventiure hêrre* is typically introduced before the story commences.[52] The place of a prologue is occupied by the valedictory speech (stanzas 1–12) of the patriarch of Sigune's illustrious family, Titurel, who, orating at length on the meaning and future of his legacy, passes the rulership and sacred mission of the Grail-kingdom to his son Frimutel.

This unusual beginning seems to have had an impact on the text's manuscript transmission. For the section of the narrative in which they overlap (stanzas 1–67), manuscript G contains six fewer stanzas than H: 30–31, 33–34, 36, and 53. As I mentioned in the introduction, all of these stanzas have to do with the theme of socialization. All but one of them concern Sigune alone, of whose childhood and upbringing they treat in conspicuous detail, as we shall see. For precisely these reasons, many earlier scholars argued that these passages represent post-Wolfram interpolations. In light of the unconventional nature of ›Titurel‹'s introduction, however, I think it more likely that they represent authentic Wolfram-stanzas athetized by the redactor of G (or his predecessors) in an effort to render the figure of Sigune and its narrative presentation more conventional. This chapter discusses the first pair of these problematic stanzas, H 30–31, the so-called »doll episode«. The second and third sections examine this episode and the symbolic importance of the events in Sigune's life that precede it. The fourth part will argue that Wolfram's model for H 30–31 is to be found in early thirteenth-century hagiographic literature. The last section will explore the controversial manuscript status of these stanzas in more detail.

Bristoler Colloquium 1993, ed. KURT GÄRTNER et al., Tübingen 1996, p. 190, note 5; p. 195).

51 MERTENS suggests the focus on Sigune's birth and childhood might indicate that Wolfram intended ›Titurel‹ as a »Frauen-Roman« (Wolfram von Eschenbach: ›Titurel‹, in: Deutsche Heldenepen und Romane, ed. Horst Brunner, Stuttgart 1993, p. 203).

52 As in ›Parzival‹, 4. 9–26.

II

In her first words in the text, Sigune, all of five years old, expresses great confidence in the romantic successes she expects to find at the court of her aunt, Herzeloyde:

> Das kint sprach: »liebez väterlin, nu hayss mir gewinnen
> mein schrein vollen tocken, wenn ich zu meiner muomen var von hynnen.
> so bin ich zu der ferte wol berichtet.
> es lebt manig ritter, der sich in meinen dienst noch verphlichtet«.
>
> »Wol mich so werdes kindes, das ist also versuonnen!
> got muoss Kathelangen also herer frawen an dir lannge gunnen.
> mein sorge slaffet, so dein sælde wachet.
> und were Swartzwalde hie ze lannde, er wurd ze scheften gar durch dich gemachet«. (30–31)
>
> The child said: »My dear Papa, please have my chest filled with dolls brought along for me when I travel from here to my aunt's. That way I'll be well prepared for the journey. There are many knights alive who will one day bind themselves to my service«. »I am fortunate to have a child of such sense! May God long grant Katelangen to such a splendid lady as you! My cares can sleep so long as your blessed fortune is awake. If this were the Black Forest, it would be turned completely into lance shafts on your account«.

At first reading, the correlation between Sigune's interest in *tocken* and her precocious prognosis of a successful love life seem incongruous. Scholars have frequently pointed out the parallels between this scene and the Obilot episode in Book VII of ›Parzival‹. There, Obilot's companion suggests that she give her knight Gawan a doll as a gift of parting and token of service.[53] WOLFGANG MOHR proposed that Sigune intends to use her own dolls in this fashion: »the little girl [...] wishes to take her dolls with her when she moves

53 ›Parzival‹, 371. 23–372. 21. See JOACHIM HEINZLE, Stellenkommentar zu Wolframs ›Titurel‹. Beiträge zum Verständnis des überlieferten Textes. Tübingen 1972, p. 53 (Hereafter HEINZLE I).

so that she might one day give them away as gifts of love service. This is, of course, a borrowing from little Obilot in ›Parzival‹«.[54]

The problem with this reading is that in ›Parzival‹, Obilot actually dismisses the doll as a gift too childish to give to a knight.[55] So it seems unlikely that Sigune, who demonstrates even more precociousness than Obilot in matters of *minne*, would consider them appropriate for such a purpose. Like Obilot, Sigune not only understands the social ritual of *minnedienst*, but, in contrast to Obilot, realizes (at least initially) that her role in it is reserved for the future. This is the meaning of *noch* in »*es lebt manig ritter, der sich in meinen dienst noch verphlichtet*«.

Recognizing the difference between the two figures, JOACHIM HEINZLE rejects any direct borrowing or imitation of a fixed textual motif. According to him, what we have here is nothing more than »variation of a basic literary theme«. This suggests that the doll-motif acquires a different meaning in ›Titurel‹. HEINZLE, however, does not venture to say what this new meaning might be. In fact, he see no special significance in Sigune's words: »[t]he little girl is simply alluding to the external conditions of the love service relationship«.[56]

But few things will be as central to the problem – indeed the tragedy – of Sigune's later life than the »external conditions« of the courtly love service relationship. Her would-be lover Schionatulander will die in his attempt to fulfill such conditions at her behest. This is already clear in Book III of the Grail romance, where Sigune represents her error as a failure to fulfill obligations imposed upon her by Schionatulander's impeccable service: »*mir dienende ân alle schande / dirre fürst von dîm lande* [...] / *ich hete kranke sinne, / daz ich im niht minne gap*«. (141. 11–12, 20–21).

In ›Titurel‹, therefore, the child Sigune's allusion to her future status as obligatrix of knights, in addition to shedding light on her text-immanent character, also functions poetologically, as an adumbration of her future (mis)adventure in *minnedienst* with Schionatulander. Clearly, there can be nothing simple about such an allusion. The doll passage, in which the theme

54 Wolfram von Eschenbach, ›Titurel‹. Lieder. Mittelhochdeutscher Text und Übersetzung, ed. WOLFGANG MOHR, Göppingen 1978 (Göppinger Arbeiten zur Germanistik 250), p. 126. Similarly also HAUG, Erzählen vom Tode her. Sprachkrise, gebrochene Handlung und zerfallende Welt in Wolframs ›Titurel‹, Wolfram-Studien 6 (1980), pp. 8–24, here p. 18; and MERTENS, Wolfram von Eschenbach: ›Titurel‹, pp. 196–211, here p. 205).

55 ›Parzival‹, 373. 18–25. It is incorrect that Obilot »contemplates using her dolls as pledges of love service«, as claimed by BFJ (p. 216); rather, it is her friend Clauditte who proposes them. Obilot ignores this advice and settles on the traditional token of the sleeve (375. 10–13). See also SCHULTZ, p. 246.

56 HEINZLE I, p. 53.

of love service appears for the first time in connection with Sigune, and in her first words, must merit our special attention.

III

Between old Titurel's farewell address and the doll episode, the narrator presents the history of Sigune's family, the narrative priority of whom he retroactively justifies in 43, 4. We shall return to both Titurel's speech and the discussion of the Grail family in more detail in the next chapter. For the present, I will focus on one seemingly minor aspect of Sigune's family background important for our understanding of the doll episode: her relocation from her homeland of Katelangen to Belrapeire while she is a baby, and her subsequent passage from Belrapeire to Kanvoleiz when she is five years old.

After the death of her mother Schoysiane in Katelangen, the infant Sigune, much like a young male protagonist of chivalric romance,[57] is fostered out to another court, that of her father Kyot's brother Tampunteire at Belrapeire. There she meets Tampunteire's daughter Condwiramurs. Bringing the two together seems to be the men's primary motivation: we are told that Tampunteire [*fuorte*] *Sigûnen die kleinen / zuo sîner tohter* (25, 1–2). Condwiramurs, too, is an infant: she *lac ouch an der brüste* (25, 3). The girls become *gespilen*, »playmates«, and grow up together in Belrapeire.

After the death of Sigune's benefactor in Belrapeire, however, Herzeloyde makes a great effort to obtain the girl's wardship:

> Diu küngin Herzelaude an Sigûnen dâhte.
> si warp mit al ir sinnen, daz man die von Brûbarz ir brâhte.
> Kondwîrâmûrs begunde weinen,
> daz si gesellekeit unt der stæten liebe an ir solte vereinen. (29)
>
> Queen Herzeloyde thought of Sigune and took great pains to see that she was brought to her from Brobarz. Condwiramurs began to weep at the prospect of having to do without Sigune's companionship and firm affection.

This episode, too, has given cause for speculation on the incongruity between ›Titurel‹ and ›Parzival‹. As scholars have pointed out, Wolfram establishes a relationship between Sigune and Condwiramurs at the price of chronological consistency with the Grail romance. In ›Parzival‹, Condwiramurs was raised by Sigune's mother Schoysiane,[58] which means that she was older than Sigune. The reason for this change has puzzled scholars. In the commentary to their recent edition, BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE suggest that the »parallel-equivalent construction of girlhood upbringing« shared by Sigune and Condwiramurs reveals a »compelling inner logic beyond external consistency« and

57 See SCHULTZ, p. 194.

58 *wand si* [i.e., Condwiramurs'] *Schoysîâne / der tôten meide* [i.e., Sigune's] *muoter zôch / kind wesnde* [...] (›Parzival‹, 805. 6–8).

that »such structural design and placement of his characters [...] according to parallel or contrasting narrative patterns« was more important for Wolfram than chronological consistency.[59] This explanation, however, begs the question of why Wolfram chose to establish a structural parallel between Sigune and Condwiramus in the first place.

Sigune's passage to Condwiramurs at Belrapeire, and from Condwiramurs to Herzeloyde at Kanvoleiz, possesses, I believe, a symbolic importance hitherto neglected. In bringing her to Condwiramurs, Wolfram associates Sigune with a figure who, in ›Parzival‹, represents a relationship of monogamous, fulfilled conjugal love in sharp contrast to the untrammeled, arduous amours of chivalric *minnedienst* widely sought in courtly society (precisely the kind of *minne* that brings disaster on the Grail realm). In readjusting the meta-narrative chronology to make the girls into peers, as it were, Wolfram is suggesting that the »model« of *minne* Condwiramurs stands for – the symbolic valence of her figure already firmly established for the audience from the Grail romance – also represents a possibility for Sigune's future life.

But the association is made only to be called into question: Sigune leaves Condwiramurs for Herzeloyde. Although she has no actual choice in the matter (her benefactor Tampunteire has died), the termination of her symbolic »Erziehungsverwandschaft« (BERTAU)[60] with Condwiramurs is nonetheless strangely one-sided: Condwiramurs weeps for Sigune, but we hear nothing about Sigune's emotions at parting from her playmate. Since it is already evident that Sigune, not Condwiramurs, is the major focus of the story, we cannot assume the narrator is passing over her reaction in silence. Rather, Sigune's lack of emotion is, I believe, her actual reaction to Condwiramurs' lamentation. And since this passage is immediately followed by the first stanza of the doll episode, we are naturally inclined evaluate Sigune's words to her father in this light: Sigune reveals no reciprocal emotional investment in her *gesellekeit* with her companion because she is entirely focused on her ambitious plans for the future.

In other words, we get the impression that the model of *minne* represented by Condwiramurs will not play a role in Sigune's life. The narrator establishes the connection only to cut it, prefiguring Sigune's choice – I shall discuss what I mean by this word in greater detail at a later point – of a life dedicated to a kind of *minne* quite different from that represented by Condwiramurs. In lamenting the loss of her *gesellekeit* with Sigune, Condwiramurs, in addition to her private grief, also symbolically prefigures the ultimate tragic consequences of this parting of the ways.

59 BFJ, pp. 209–210.

60 KARL BERTAU, Neun Versuche über Subjektivität und Ursprünglichkeit in der Geschichte, Munich 1983, p. 225–226.

In leaving Conwiramurs, the model of *minne* Sigune »chooses« is that represented by her aunt. The affinity between the two is highlighted in the way Herzeloyde »thinks« of Sigune and »devotes all her thoughts« to securing her guardianship. In the preceding biographical sketch of Herzeloyde, the narrator invokes an image from Book II of ›Parzival‹ encapsulating the full range of symbolic meaning the close association with this figure will have for Sigune: *Kastis Herzelauden nie gewan ze wîbe, / diu an Gahmurets arme lac mit ir magetlîchem lîbe* (27, 1–2). On the one hand, Herzeloyde is a virgin widow at the time Sigune comes to her, foreshadowing the fact – already explicit in ›Parzival‹ – that virgin love and virgin widowhood are destined to be a permanent, defining, and ultimately quasi-transcendental condition for Sigune.[61] The narrator himself will remind us of this fact at the conclusion of Sigune's socialization: [*ih wil*] *iu künden von magetlîcher minne* (37, 4). Secondly, the relationship between Herzeloyde and Gahmuret synopsized in 27, 1–2 represents a model of *minne* whose contrast with the Condwiramurs-Parzival model (or vice-versa, to be more accurate) is one of the most important themes in ›Parzival‹. In relocating to Herzeloyde at Kanvoleiz, Sigune, metaphorically turning her back on the alternative Condwiramurs represents, migrates to the symbolic capital of high courtly love service, the *minne* that will be decisive in her life.

This symbolic nature of her travels is further underscored in the way Sigune talks about her *verte*, »journey«. Once she has her dolls, as she tells her father, »*so bin ich zu der ferte wol berichtet*« (30, 3). *verte* has always been interpreted here as referring to the physical journey to Kanvoleiz, and *berihtet*, accordingly, as »provisioned« or »equipped«, i.e., with her dolls. But this meaning is actually quite unusual;[62] *berihten* more commonly means »to put in order«, »to make right« or »correct«, or »to form or shape«.[63] In other words, in addition to discussing a detail of the trip, Sigune, on the »anagogical« level of the text, is telling her father that her journey to Kan-

61 ›Parzival‹, 805. 1: *Diu* [*Sigune*] *magtuomlîche minne im* [*Schionatulander*] *gap*.

62 Wolframs von Eschenbach ›Parzival‹ und ›Titurel‹. Zweiter Teil: Kommentar, ed. ERNST MARTIN, Halle a. S. 1903, p. 540.

63 As Rennewart to Willehalm: »*ir muget mich wol berihten, swenne ich in swacher vuore bin*« (Wolfram von Eschenbach, ›Willehalm‹, ed. WERNER SCHRÖDER, DIETER KARTSCHOKE, Berlin, New York 1989), 194. 20–21). In stanza 20 of the ›Jüngerer Titurel‹, Albrecht qua Wolfram promises to redress the complaints of those who accuse him of »confusing and leading astray their paths« (19) by »straightening that which is twisted« : *ich wil die krumb an allen orten slihten, / wan sumeliche jehende sint, ich kunne iz selbe nicht verrichten* (19, 3–4). The Leithandschrift (A) actually has *berihten*, which WERNER WOLF altered to *verrichten* from other mss. See WERNER WOLF, ed., Albrechts von Scharfenberg Jüngerer Titurel, v. 1, p. 5.

voleiz represents her correct path in life, that her physical journey is in accord with her existential *verte*.

The metaphorical reading of Sigune's story immediately prior to her socialization provides an important connection between the two ›Titurel‹ fragments. The idea of the existential *verte* will reappear in the symbolic name of the hound, Gardeviaz, and in the command *hüete der verte!* on his leash, and the motif of a choice between two contrasting love relationships – between love defined primarily through free marriage and love defined primarily through long-term service – will return to Sigune in the text on the leash. These are the motifs that dominate the second fragment and its interpretation. They are adumbrated in Sigune's fateful *verte* from Belrapeire to Kanvoleiz.

IV

What role do the dolls play in Sigune's thinking? How, exactly, are they linked to the »many knights« she predicts will enter her service? There is an alternative to the conventional reading of *tocken* as love-tokens. This is that Sigune is referring not to love service gifts, but to games with dolls, role-playing games in which children mimic adult behavior. Sigune intends to practice for her *minnefrouwe*-future by playing courtly dollhouse, so to speak. In order to achieve the proper mimesis of the »many knights« in her service, she asks her father for a *schrîn vollen tocken*.[64]

Games with dolls highlight, in concrete and dynamic fashion, Sigune's beginning identification with external codes of courtly behavior. As »transitional objects« (in the discourse of child psychology), dolls point the way from the solipsistic imaginary of infancy towards socialized identity. What HEINZLE sees as simple allusion we might think of as an al-lusion, a »playing towards« the external conditions of the love service relationship, whereby the external nature of the phenomenon is already beginning to break down in a process of identification. In playing with dolls, Sigune is far from acting in a childish fashion or in contrast to her adult-sounding language. Her role-playing games show her actively negotiating between the worlds of infant and adult.

This interpretation may seem unhistorical at first. Indeed, it flies directly in the face of JAMES SCHULTZ'S recent arguments concerning the role of children's games in general, and dolls in particular, in medieval German courtly narrative. In his wide-ranging survey of literary images and discourses of childhood in the German Middle Ages, SCHULTZ argues that »the writers of M[iddle] H[igh] G[erman] childhood narratives were indifferent to the charms of children's games and unaware of the developmental importance of children's relations to their peers«. He draws a sharp contrast between the medieval German and the modern views:

> Children's pursuit of pleasure almost always takes the form of play. Nowadays we attach great importance to play, regarding it as »a form of learning« that »serves a critical function during development«. Dr. Spock holds that »play is serious business«, in which children are »learning about the world« and »sorting out their feelings«. For MHG writers, however, »childish games« are nothing more that a particularly characteristic form of »childish behavior«. They are just the opposite of »serious business«.[65]

According to this view, dolls, like other children's games or toys, serve no other purpose in courtly narrative than to highlight the childish nature of children's activities in contrast to adult behavior. SCHULTZ provides several examples. In Wolfram's ›Willehalm‹, the seriousness of the heathen military assault upon Orange is contrasted to games with dolls: »[the heathens] weren't playing with dolls; / it was a matter of life and death on both sides«.[66] In ›Virginal‹, Hildebrant pokes fun at the young Dietrich von Bern in front of the ladies: »Now look, my dear aunt, how frightened the boy is! He thinks he's back in Verona playing dolls with the children«.[67] In Ottokar von Steiermark's ›Österreichische Reimchronik‹, »childish talk« means, for the young son of Wenzel of Bohemia, talking about hunting birds, and for the daughter of Rudolf of Habsburg, describing her dolls.[68] Ottokar, in fact, contrasts the behavior of his two (married!) children with the protagonists of Wolfram's ›Titurel‹: »They did not yearn for each other, as Schionatulander did for his lady, the lovely Sigune, in their childhood years. Their wit was too small for that«.[69] We might summarize the viewpoint behind these traditional accounts

64 BRACKERT also interprets the dolls in terms of role-playing of a kind, as »replacements for the lack of love« characteristic of Sigune's childhood (Sinnspuren, p. 172). See also BFJ, p. 218.

65 SCHULTZ, p. 50 (see also p. 250). The quotes are from MELVIN KONNER, Childhood, Boston 1991, p. 305; BENJAMIN SPOCK, Dr. Spock's Baby and Child Care, New York [40]1985, pp. 376, 460; Bruder Philipp's ›Marienleben‹, v. 3975 (*kintlîchiu spil*), v. 3972 (*kintlîch site*).

66 *sine* [the heathens] *spielten niht der tocken: / ez galt ze bêder sît daz leben* (›Willehalm‹, 222. 18–19). Cited from SCHULZ, p. 51, n. 54.

67 ›Virginal‹, *»nu sich, vil zartiu muome mîn, / wie der junge sî erschrocken. / er wænet dâ ze Berne sîn / mit kinden spilen der tocken«* (203, 7–10). Cited from SCHULZ, p. 51, n. 54.

68 *daz si an witzen und an jâren / beidiu kint wâren, / dem teten si gelîch: / si reten kintlîch. / ir wirte dô diu meit / von iren tocken seit, / wie die wâren gestalt. / da enkegen er ir vor zalt, / waz sîn sprinz hiur het gevangen* (Ottokar von Steiermark, ›Österreichische Reimchronik‹, ed. JOSEPH SEEMÜLLER, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Deutsche Chroniken V, 2 vols., Hanover 1890–1893, vv. 17981–989). Cited from SCHULZ, p. 50.

69 *si liezen wênic sich belangen / senlîchen nâch einander / als Schionatulander / tet nâch sîner froun, / der klâren Sigoun, / in ir kintlichen jâren, / darzuo disiu wâren / bî ze kranken witzen* (vv. 17990–997).

with an observation of Bartholomaeus Anglicus, a well-known contemporaneous encyclopedist, on child psychology: children »often have bad habits, thinking only of the present, having absolutely no thought to the future; they love games and other vanities, refusing to strive toward what is profitable and useful«.[70]

In ›Titurel‹, however, the representation of the protagonists' *kindlîchiu jâr* is much different than conventional images of medieval childhood. (Ottokar von Steiermark, for one, was aware of this: he clearly considers the children Sigune and Schionatulander an exception to the rule). Sigune's reference to dolls has nothing to do with childishness. Her thinking is in no way oriented toward the present, but toward the future: »*es lebt manig ritter, der sich in meinen dienst noch verphlichtet*«. Sigune's father Kyot attaches great importance to her talk of dolls, understanding her words not as senseless, childish prattle, but as a meaningful attempt to use adult language and mimic adult behavior. Accordingly, he praises her ambition and *versunnenheit*, calling her a *frouwe* (31, 1–2).

How do we evaluate this unusual episode in terms of what SCHULTZ calls the Middle High German knowledge of childhood? Did Wolfram alone of his contemporaries have a more modern sense of the connection between the playful behavior of children and the serious world of adults? It is difficult to controvert SCHULTZ'S findings within the corpus of medieval German narrative literature, which he has investigated comprehensively and systematically. Outside this purview, however, there are striking examples of positive assessments of children's play. Hagiographic literature knows of several saints who, as children, anticipated their later saintly activities in their games and play. St. Athanasius, the fourth century bishop of Alexandria and Anti-Arian, reportedly played baptism as a child:

> Tempore, quo apud Alexandriam Petri martyris diem Alexander episcopus agebat, cum post expleta sollemnia conventuros ad convivium suum clericos expectaret in loco mari vicino, videt eminus puerorum super oram maris ludum imitantium, ut fieri solet, episcopum atque ea, quae in ecclesiis geri mos est. [...] tum abire eos et conprehensos ad se perducere omnes pueros imperat. cumque adessent, quis eis ludus et quid egissent vel quomodo, perconatur. illi, ut talis habet aetas, pavidi negare primo, dein rem gestam per ordinem pandunt et baptizatos a se esse quosdam catechumenos confitentur per Athanasium, qui ludi illius puerilis episcopus fuerat simulatus.[71]
>
> Once when Bishop Alexander was celebrating the day of Peter Martyr in Alexandria, he was waiting in a place near the sea after the ceremonies were over for the clergy to gather for a banquet. There he saw from a distance some boys on the seashore playing a game in which, as they often do, they were mimicking a bishop and the things customarily done in church. [...] Then he commanded [the clergy] to go and get all the boys and bring them to him. When they arrived, he asked them what game they were playing and what they had done and how. At first they were afraid, as is usual at that age, and refused, but then they disclosed in due order what they had done, admitting that some catechumens had been baptized by them at the hands of Athanasius, who had played the part of bishop in their childish game.[72]

In his play, Athanasius anticipates two aspects of his adult life: his career as a bishop, and the orthodoxy he would later champion against the Arians.[73] The probably fictive and symbolic nature of the episode only adds to its significance in terms of the historic-cultural evaluation of children's games.[74] The hagiographer who invented the account obviously felt he could appeal to a common-sense, universal insight (*ut pueri fieri solet*; *ut talis habet aetas*) into children and their pursuits.[75] Thus, the negative judgment on children's games synopsized by Bartholomaeus Anglicus, which also represented the views of Greco-Roman antiquity,[76] cannot have been the only possible view. In certain cases, children's activities could point to and prefigure the serious business of adult life. Even Bartholomaeus does not write *semper malos mores habent*, but *sæpius*, testifying to a tacit awareness of alternatives.

70 Bartholomaeus Anglicus, ›De proprietatibus rerum‹, ed. GEORGE BARTHOLD, Frankfurt a. M. 1964 (reprint of 1601 edition Apud Wolfgangum Richterum), Book VI, ch. 5, p. 239: *Item paruuli pueri sępius malus malos habent mores, sola enim præsentia cogitant, & de futuris nihil penitus curant, ludos & vanitates amant, lucris & vtilitatibus intendere recusant* [...].

71 Eusebius Werke, v. 2, part 2 (containing ›Die Lateinische Übersetzung des Rufinus‹), ed. EDUARD SCHWARTZ/THEODOR MOMMSEN, Leipzig 1908 (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunterte), pp. 980–981. See also the ›Vita Athanasii‹ in Acta Sanctorum, May, v. 1, p. 188.

72 Rufinus of Aquileia, The Church History of Rufinus of Aquileia, Books 10 and 11, trans. PHILIP R. AMIDON, New York 1997, pp. 26–27.

73 In the ensuing passages it is revealed to Alexander, after careful scrutiny, that Athanasius has been baptizing his companions according to the correct rite (*videt secundum religionis nostrae ritum cuncta constare*).

74 See MARTIN TETZ, Athanasiana. Zu Leben und Lehre des Athanasius, ed. WILHELM GEERLINGS/DIETMAR WYRWA. Berlin 1995 (Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche, v. 78), p. 2.

75 On the origins of the account see TIMOTHY BARNES, Athanasius and Constantius. Theology and Politics in the Constantinian Empire, Cambridge (Mass.) 1993, pp. 10, 241.

76 Bartholomaeus bases his encyclopedia primarily on classical and early medieval sources. In the chapters on children (pp. 237–241) he cites Aristotle, Seneca, Constantinus, Augustine, and Isidore.

There are many other examples of young saints playing such games, mostly from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[77] Frederick of Frisia (died 1175, vita written 1238) »never mixed with his playmates in their frolicking and games, but sedulously meditated upon the Dominican oration, or, from loamy earth, constructed churches and altars, striving to imitate, in his own modest way and as well as he could, everything that occurs in church«.[78] Similarly the young Ambrosius Sansedonius (died 1287): while some of his playmates »were making houses out of mud, others camps, others horses, others human figures, Ambrose made altars and placed crosses on them, then washed his hands, joined them together, and knelt as if in prayer before the altar«.[79] Jacobus Venetus (1231–1314), who was »aged in heart, even though he was of a boy's age«, gave up the »vanities of boyhood«, avoiding the »dissolute games« of the »dissolute children«; nevertheless he loved one game: playing the celebrant of the mass, »prefiguring the future priest of Christ, as Athanasius had done«.[80]

In perhaps the finest example of this type, from the life of Saint Walthenus of Scotland (died 1159 or 1160, vita written c. 1207–1214), the hagiologic paradigm-shift in the interpretation of childhood is thematized in the narrative itself:

> Cum fratres illi in puerili ætate constituti essent, sapiebant, agebant, ludebant ut parvuli: prior natu Simon collectis arbusculis seu ramusculis, secundum modulum suum, castellum construere consueverat; & ascendens canabum, velut sonipedem suum, & virgulam quasi lanceam accipiens & vibrans, cum coætaneis suis circa fictitii & imaginarii castelli custodiam & defensionem solicitus, militiam simulabat. Walthenus vero

77 SHULAMITH SHAHAR'S Childhood in the Middle Ages (London, New York 1990, pp. 103–104, 291) alludes to the first three of the four examples that follow, which are taken from the Acta Sanctorum. The translations are mine.

78 *Alijs suis coœuis ludentibus* [...] *lasciuientibus cum istis se numquam miscuit: sed Dominicam Orationem vel sedulus ruminauit, vel de argillosa terra basilicas erexit, altaria construxit, omnemque morem Ecclesiasticum iuxta puerilem ætatem, quoad potuit, pro modulo suo studuit imitari* (Acta Sanctorum, March, v. 1, pp. 287).

79 [...] *quidam autem eorum domos ex luto fabricabant, alij castra, nonnulli equos, aliqui homines: Ambrosius vero altaria, & cruces super ea ponens, lotis manibus, genibus flexis, ipsis etiam manibus iunctis, ante altare quasi oraturus persistebat* (Acta Sanctorum, March, v. 3, p. 182).

80 *Licet autem puerilis esset ætatis, erat tamen in mente ejus veneranda senectus, quam in sermonis & operis puritate monstrabat, maturis moribus, puerorum abdicans vanitates. Dissolutorum namque puerorum consortia deserens cum melioribus & honestis conversabatur, ludos dissolutos in sua abhorrens infantia. In uno solo ludo erat solitus delectari, ut puerilem scilicet Missam sicut noverat cum pueris decantaret, prout in ecclesia conspiciebat fieri; Christi Sacerdotem futurum in puerili ludo, ut alter Athanasius, præfigurans* (Acta Sanctorum, May, v. 7, p. 453).

> puerulus ex virgulis vel lapillis quasi ecclesias, seque presbyterum tamquam Missam celebrantem expansis manibus præsentabat: & quia verba proferre non noverat, sonos cantum similantes edere solebat. Cumque parvuli hujusmodi lusui sæpius indulgerent, pluresque ad aspectum & risum provocarent, quadam vice quidam religiosus & sapiens, adstans & aspiciens cum ceteris, ait ad intuentes: Quid vobis videtur de hoc ludo parvulorum? Illi fatebantur, simplicem esse, tantummodo quid sit inter dextram & sinistram ignorantium. Et ille: Non sic, inquit, non sic: est enim ludus iste quoddam præludium, vitam utriusque præsagiens & exitum: primus namque militiæ vitam suam initiabit; secundus religiose vivens, dies suos in bonum consummabit. Nullum verbum istorum in terram cecidit, sed de utroque, quod conjecturando sive vaticinando prædixit, evenit.[81]
>
> When the brothers were children, their understanding was that of children, and they acted and played accordingly. Simon, the first born, was in the habit of collecting branches and twigs and building, in his own modest fashion, a castle. Mounting a small structure as his steed, taking up and brandishing a stick as his lance, he simulated warfare against his playmates, who guarded and defended the imaginary castle. Walthenus, for his part, using sticks and stones for his church, presented himself with hands spread wide as a priest celebrating the mass. Not knowing what words to speak, he would make sounds imitating the chant. Since the boys often engaged in such amusements, they provoked many people to look and laugh. On one such occasion, a wise man of the church happened to be present, standing and observing with the rest. He said to the bystanders: »What do you think of the play of these children?« They replied that they though it was simple-minded, as if the children did not know their left from their right hands. At this, he responded: »No indeed, no indeed! This play is a kind of foreshadowing, presaging the lives and life-courses of these two children. The first is beginning his military life; the second is living piously, spending his days doing good«. No word of those passed away unheeded. Whatever he predicted – conjecturing or prophesying – concerning these two came to pass.

This remarkable account demonstrates a sophisticated revision and critique of the traditional topology and understanding of children's games in medieval hagiography. It begins with a gesture derived from a central biblical passage concerning the distinction between childish and adult behavior, I Corinthians 11: 13.[82] Whereas the traditional vita shows the saintly child putting into the earliest possible practice the Pauline *evacuare quae parvuli erant* by rejecting the games of other children and immediately pursuing serious adult business (usually sacred ritual and learning),[83] the author of the ›Vita S. Waltheni‹

81 Acta Sanctorum, Aug., v. 1, p. 252.

82 *cum essem parvulus, loquebar et parvulus, sapiebam ut parvulus, cogitabam et parvulus. quando factus sum vir, evacuavi quae erant parvuli.*

83 See GOODICH, p. 88.

demonstrates how the mature man of Pauline anthropology is already prefiguratively present in childhood: the adult careers of Simon and Walthenus are already manifest in their boyish games. The amused bystanders represent, as it were, the »traditional« knowledge of childhood in the Middle Ages, such as SCHULTZ describes for German literature, in which children's pursuits are, by definition, senseless and meaningless.[84] Their laughter is analogous to that of the observer Ottokar von Steiermark posits in his account of the royal Habsburg-Bohemian child-couple and their amusements.[85]

But the wise man of the church in the ›Vita Waltheni‹ delivers a strong corrective to this view. Children are not simple-minded and ignorant; their most childish activities are replete with meaning and direction.[86] Nor do the games of the saintly child have a monopoly on significance vis-à-vis those of his playmates, as in traditional hagiography. The author of the ›Vita Waltheni‹ draws no essential contrast between the activities of the religious and the secular child. In both cases, games function as a *praeludium* and *praesagium* of future life-courses, each with their own merits, validity, and place in society.

Accounts such as these, I argue, are the proper context within which to interpret stanzas 30–31 of Wolfram's ›Titurel‹.[87] Sigune's games with dolls are

84 The quasi-biblical dimension the bystanders ascribe to childhood ignorance (the citizens of Nineveh are those who originally *nesciunt quid sit inter dexteram et sinistram suam*; see Jonah 4: 11) lends an ironic twist to their own ignorance as revealed by the wise man. In his reply, *nullum verbum istorum in terram cecidit* paraphrases Wisdom 1: 8–11.

85 ›Österreichische Reimchronik‹, vv. 17979–80: *swer daz* [talk of the children about their games] *solde hân vernomen, der wære lachens wol bekomen.*

86 The only other examples I have been able to find of text-immanent misunderstanding of childhood *praefiguratio* are in lives of St. Ambrose derived/adapted from Jacob de Voraigne's ›Legenda Aurea‹ (c. 1266). The latter reads: *Postea cum [Ambrosius] adoleuisset et videret matrem er sororem sacram virginem manus sacerdotibus osculari, ipse ludens sorori dextram offerebat asserens et sibi id ab ea fieri oportere; illa vero ut adolescentem et nescientem quid diceret respuebat* (Iacopo de Varazze, ›Legenda Aurea‹, ed. GIOVANNI PAOLO MAGGIONI, Tavarnuzze-Firenze 1998, p. 379. See also Die ›Elsässische Legenda Aurea‹, Band 1. Das Normalcorpus, ed. ULLA WILLIAMS/WERNER WILLIAMS-KRAPP, Tübingen 1980 (Texte und Textgeschichte 3, 10, 21), p. 283. Curiously, the version of Ambrose's childhood in the ›Passional‹, the source of which was the ›Legenda Aurea‹, eliminates the idea of play. When the child Ambrose sees his sister kissing the local bishop's hand, he presents his *hendelin* to her and demands the same, whereupon *si pruvetez vur ein einvalt / an deme kinde unde sprach / »tu hin, habe din gemach! / ein kint bistu und damite / volget dir din kindes site, / der dir sulche rede git«. / sus bleib ez wesen in der zit* (p. 241, 68–74).

87 The literary – not to speak of the cultural-historical – status of these accounts is not easy to assess. I have not found a scholarly discussion of any one of the above examples. They seem to express a partial revision of the earlier, monastically-influenced *vita* in the direction of the more humanistic culture associated with the »twelfth-century renaissance«. Unfortunately, few of the histories of medieval childhood are sensitive to historical periodicity within the Middle Ages. They are usually structured according to theme or childhood life-stages, citing examples from a broad time period with little period context (DANIÈLE ALEXANDRE-BIDON/DIDIER LETT, Children in the Middle Ages, trans. JODY GLADDING, Notre Dame [Indiana] 1999 [thematic approach, chapter headings such as »The Christian Child«, »Difficult Living Conditions«, »The Child in the Castle«]; PIERRE RICHÉ/DANIÈLE ALEXANDRE-BIDON, L'enfance au Moyen Age. Paris 1994 [life stages]; SHULAMITH SHAHAR [footnote 78][life-stages]; PHILIPPE ARIES, L'enfant et la vie familiale sous l'ancien régime. Paris 1960 [thematic, and mostly drawn from the early modern and later periods of the ancien régime]). Even hagiographic scholarship is silent: one of the most detailed recent studies of the period in question, GOODICH's Vita Perfecta [footnote 77], which has a substantial section on saints as children, finds little to say about any changes in the representation of childhood vis-à-vis the older narrative tradition, even though he addresses other aspects of »the changing character of childrearing« in the high Middle Ages: »[T]o a great extent, the childhood of the thirteenth century saint often resembled the stereotypical descriptions of his ancient predecessors, who, like Benedict, showed a propensity for piety from the very beginning: ›from childhood, he possessed the heart of an old man, and despite his age he was not in the least disposed to sensual pleasure‹« (p. 99; the quote is from Gregory the Great's life of St. Benedict, Dialogi, II, 126–127: [...] *ab ipso pueritiae suae tempore cor gerens senile. Aetatem quippe moribus transiens, nulli animum voluptati dedit*). All of GOODICH's examples of saints and games draw from this older, monastic Gregorian-Pauline tradition (see p. 88). Similarly DONALD WEINSTEIN/RUDOLPH M. BELL, Saints and Society. The Two Worlds of Western Christendom, 1000–1700, Chicago, London 1982, pp. 19–47, esp. pp. 29–30. See also DIDIER LETT, L'enfant des miracles, Paris 1997, pp. 95–96. Hopefully, the current debate over childhood in the Middle Ages will redress this lack. See BARBARA HANAWALT, Medievalists and the Study of Childhood, Speculum 77 (2002), no. 2, pp. 440–460.

a quasi-hagiographic *praeludium* of her future as a courtly lady. They are not an indication of childhood foolishness or deficiency, but demonstrate an awareness and sensibility – Kyot calls it *versunnenheit* – of her path in life. This is the key to the transformation of the *tocken*-motif vis-à-vis Book VII of ›Parzival‹, where the doll clearly represents an artifact of childhood simple-mindedness that Obilot – a sort of secularized romance version of the *puella senex* in the older hagiographic tradition – is anxious to leave behind in her headlong rush into the world of adult relations. As we recall, Obilot rejects the doll as inappropriate for the role to which she aspires. Sigune's active play with dolls, in contrast, is analogous to the new valorization of childhood games in thirteenth-century hagiography.

There are also examples of non-hagiographic childhood narratives that borrow the hagiographic motif of *præfiguratio* in a way very similar to Wolf-

ram. In his autobiography, Gerald of Wales (1145–1223), Wolfram's contemporary, provides the following account of his childhood pastimes:

> Qui cum ex fratribus quatuor germanis pariter et uterinus natu minor existeret, tribus aliis nunc castra nunc oppida nunc palatia puerilibus, ut solet haec aetas, praeludiis in sabulo vel pulvere protrahentibus construentibus, modulo suo, solus hic simili praeludio semper ecclesias eligere et monasteria construere tota intentione satagebat. Quod dum pater eius saepius intuendo cum admiratione considerasset, ductus ad hoc quasi prognostico quodam, ipsum literis et liberalibus disciplinis applicandum praesaga mente decrevit; eumque ludendo et applaudendo suum episcopum vocare consuevit.[88]
>
> [Gerald] was the youngest of four brothers, lawfully born of the same womb; and when the other three, preluding the pursuits of manhood in their childish play, were tracing or building, in sand or dust, now towns, now palaces, he himself, in like prophetic play, was ever busy with all his might in designing churches or building monasteries. And his father, who often saw him thus engaged, after much pondering, not unmixed with wonder, being moved by this omen, resolved with wise forethought to set him to study letters and the liberal arts, and would oft in approving jest call him »his bishop«.[89]

As in the standard childhood narrative of medieval Latin hagiography, the child Gerald sets himself apart from the amusements of his companions. However, his behavior is not that of the topological *puer senex* who flees in pious abhorrence from the *malos mores, ludos et vanitates* of his playmates – who already is, in any sense that matters, an adult.[90] As in Rufinus's account of Athanasius's childhood, Gerald considers it natural and obvious (*ut solet haec aetas*) that children's play mimics adult behavior, even the play of children not destined for holiness and therefore outside of the prophetic-symbolic trajectory of the saint's career. Gerald differentiates himself from his playmates only in the specific object of his efforts (ecclesiastical instead of secular architecture), not in the essential nature of his play, which is *praeludium* in both cases, a purposeful, forward-looking imitation and adumbration of sensible adult activity. Above that of his siblings, however, Gerald's play does merit the additional distinction of »prophecy« (*prognosticum*).

88 Giraldi Cambrensis opera, ed. J. S. BREWER, London 1861, pp. 21–22. The (fragmentary) autobiography ›De rebus a se gestis‹ dates from c. 1208.

89 The Autobiography of Giraldus Cambrensis, ed. and trans. H. E. BUTLER, London 1937, p. 35.

90 See GOODICH, Vita Perfecta. The Ideal of Sainthood in the Thirteenth Century. Stuttgart 1982, pp. 82–99, esp. p. 88; DIETER VON DER NAHMER, Die Lateinische Heiligenvita. Eine Einführung in die lateinische Hagiographie, Darmstadt 1994, pp. 76–79.

Nonetheless, Gerald never in fact becomes a saint. He does not even become the bishop and church-builder his childhood seems to promise. This fact is probably reflected in the playful nature – *ludendo et applaudendo* – of his father's calling him his bishop. This passage is a very close parallel 31, 2 of ›Titurel‹, in which Kyot playfully and encouragingly calls his ambitious five-year old daughter *frouwe*, something she will never, in fact, become.

This does not mean, of course, that Wolfram used any of the above Latin texts as sources for his representation of Sigune's games. But it does mean that Wolfram will have been receptive to literary and cultural influences from well outside of the Middle High German knowledge of childhood, if we think of the latter as the relatively tradition-based and self-referential »single discursive formation« identified by SCHULTZ.[91] To be fair, SCHULTZ writes at the beginning of his study that he does not offer readings of individual texts, but rather intends to sketch the »cultural knowledge of childhood in relation to which the individual childhood narrative would have been meaningful«.[92] In the case of Wolfram's ›Titurel‹, I believe, it is precisely in the radical undermining of this accepted cultural knowledge that Sigune's childhood narrative becomes meaningful and, as a literary construction, aesthetically significant.

The importance of hagiography in Wolfram's cultural-literary background, as well as the general similarity between his narratives and medieval religious legend, has long been established.[93] Many commentators have pointed out the saint-like quality of Sigune's career in ›Parzival‹, where she is represented as a sort of love saint, a »Minneheilige«, progressing through successive stages of pious self-abnegation and withdrawal from the world to a state (at least in her own understanding) of spiritual transcendence through earthy love: »this ring of true marriage [to Schionatulander] will lead me to God«.[94] This religious discourse is taken up again in ›Titurel‹. The simultaneously sacred and secular love is thematized anew in the digression that preludes the love confession: »Love dwells here on earth, and in heaven it

91 SCHULTZ, p. 17.

92 SCHULTZ, p. 17.

93 BUMKE, Die Wolfram von Eschenbach-Forschung seit 1945, Munich 1970, p. 339. Among the hagiographic influences on ›Parzival‹ are the Brandan legend (see SAMUEL SINGER, Zu Wolframs ›Parzival‹, in: Abhandlungen zur germanischen Philologie. Festgabe für Richard Heinzel, Halle, 1898, pp. 353–436, esp. p. 370); the Gregorius legend of Hartmann von Aue (see HERMANN SCHNEIDER, ›Parzival‹-Studien, in: Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Kl. 1944/46, no. 4, pp. 1–70); and eucharistic legends (see PAULUS WESSELS, Wolfram zwischen Dogma und Legende, PBB (Tübingen Series) 77 (1955), pp. 112–135).

94 *»der rehten ê diz vingerlîn / für got sol mîn geleite sîn«* (›Parzival‹, 440. 13–14).

leads the way in purity to God«.[95] Above all, the notion of Sigune's eternally *magtuomlîche minne*, »virgin love«, strongly reminiscent of female saints, assumes a central thematic position in ›Titurel‹, as announced by the narrator addressing his audience about the subject of his narrative: »I want to tell you a story of virgin love«.[96]

The nature of Sigune's spirituality prompted BERNARD RAHN to argue that ›Titurel‹ as a whole belongs to the genre of the saint's life. RAHN invented for the poem the curious term »ritterliche Legende«, chivalric hagiography. Unfortunately, his arguments exhausted themselves more in demonstrating the inapplicability of any other genre criteria than in establishing proof positive for his case, which remains vague: that ›Titurel‹ shares with hagiography »the idealizing features« of *minne*, the main quality of which is that it »leads to heaven while remaining anchored and rooted in this world«; that like the saint's life, Sigune's story (RAHN renames the text ›Die Sigune‹) is »oriented toward the goal of final redemption«; and that above the »disastrous commingling of love and anguish« stands the assurance that Sigune's »›virgin love‹ can reconcile this opposition and lead to an eternal goal«.[97]

I do not wish to go as far as RAHN and make claims about the genre of ›Titurel‹ as a whole. In terms of Sigune's narrative introduction, however, the notion of chivalric hagiography nicely describes the ligature of the hagiographic motif of *praeludium* and to Sigune's secular life course as a courtly lady. Thus Sigune's secular path, predestined to end in the hagiologic mode, begins with a poetological allusion to a popular motif of current hagiography.

As we have seen above, the journey from Belrapeire to Kanvoleiz represents much more than a geographical change of residence. It is also an metaphorical *verte*, symbolizing Sigune's passage from one possible future to another, from one possible existential project of *minne* to another. In traveling to Kanvoleiz, Sigune leaves behind the symbolic world of love defined primarily through marriage, represented by Condwiramurs, and enters the domain of high courtly love service. And her play with dolls is an important part of this journey. As she tells her father, she will be *zer verte wol berihtet* when she has a box full of *tocken* (30, 3). As in the ›Vita Waltheni‹, where imitative play reveals the child's »life-course« (*exitum*), Sigune words reveal, at the anagogical level, that her doll-play will put her on the right path in life.

95 *minne hât ûf erde und ûf himele für got geleite* (›Titurel‹, 51, 2).

96 [*ich wil*] *iu künden von magetlîcher minne* (37, 4; H: *magtumlicher minne*). See also ›Parzival‹, 804. 30–805. 2.

97 BERNARD RAHN, Wolframs Sigunendichtung. Eine Interpretation der Titurelfragmente, Zurich 1958, pp. 96.

V

The most unusual aspect of ›Titurel‹'s unconventional beginning is that this prefiguration is a complete and utter failure. It is not a hagiographic motif, but the radical subversion of a hagiographic motif. Sigune never becomes a *frouwe*; she remains and dies a *maget*. She will, to be sure, manage to obligate a knight in her service, but the consequences of this *verphlihten* will be the very thing that destroys her future as a courtly lady and compels her to take a drastically different *verte* than the one she, and the rest of her friends and relatives, envisioned for her since her girlhood.

The contrast between Sigune and Obilot, SCHULTZ'S representative medieval German child, is once again instructive:

> Since we do not get to see how Obilot behaves after she comes of age, we cannot tell whether Gawan's prediction [that she will become a famous courtly lady] comes true. And yet it must, since it relies on two principles that are unassailable within the world of MHG narrative [: inborn, immutable individual nature, and the revelation of this nature in a child's behavior] [...]. While we would expect the amount of disruption in a MHG childhood to have catastrophic consequences, in the world of MHG narrative this is seldom the case. The children's internal equilibrium is guaranteed by the immutability of the individual nature, which renders it immune to the effects of external trauma, while their external success is guaranteed by a fictional world that compensates them for the dislocations they experience. [...] Thus, no matter how great the disruptions they endure, the changing relations of a MHG childhood always lead them to the place that is theirs by nature.[98]

It would not be sufficient to say that these conclusions are invalid in Sigune's case. Her life undoes every one of them so radically that the interpreter is practically forced to conclude that Wolfram intended her story as a counterprogram to the Middle High German knowledge of childhood, such as SCHULTZ defines it. The external trauma and disruption in Sigune's life have catastrophic consequences; they cause her to lose her internal equilibrium, derail her from her path, and ultimately prevent her from reaching the place that is hers by nature, such as it is defined by herself, her family, and social world at the outset of her life.

Not only does the fictional world not guarantee Sigune's success; the guarantees of courtly society reveal themselves to be fictions. The text's »revelation of inborn, immutable nature« (i.e., *praefiguratio*) is shown to be an enabling plot-internal narrative, a story courtly society tells to itself about itself. Because Sigune's ultimate fate is clear to the audience of ›Titurel‹ from the start, the prognosis of her future success as a *frouwe* is always already stripped of its teleological positivism and foregrounded as a construct,

98 SCHULTZ, pp. 252–254.

an ideological discourse operative only in the world of the narrative. It is not the narrator, but only the characters themselves, who engage in optimistic *præfiguratio* concerning Sigune. In fact, as we shall see in the next chapter, the narrator has a perspective on Sigune's socialization quite different from the one dominating the plot-internal discussion around her. This discrepancy, I believe, is one of the main reasons ›Titurel‹ has no prologue. First, however, let us examine the implications Wolfram's use of *præfiguratio* has for our understanding of the problematic text-critical status of stanzas 30–31.

VI

Stanzas 30–31 appear only in manuscript H and the ›Jüngerer Titurel‹. 31 also appears in M.[99] Manuscript G, the basis of most of the editions, presents the entirety of Sigune's childhood (G 22–31) in the same distanced, compressed narrative style that describes her mother's life (G 13–21). There is no explicit mention of a journey to Kanvoleiz. Herzeloyde desires that Sigune be brought to her from Belrapeire, and, after the farewell with Condwiramurs in the following stanza, she is already »gr[owing] up at her aunt's court«.[100] In H, stanzas 30–31 interrupt this terse progression, zooming in on the five-year old talking with her father about dolls and knights, then just as suddenly zooming out to resume the distanced overview style for the description of Sigune's later life at Kanvoleiz.

The manuscript discrepancy and the non-sequitur abruptness of the episode, as well as several other incongruities, led a number of earlier critics and editors to consider the stanzas inauthentic.[101] ERICH FRANZ believed to detect the hand of a post-Wolfram interpolator in the disjunctive psychological representation of Sigune, who »as a five-year-old girl talks with more sense, or at least more calculation, than does the much older Sigune in the long conversation with Schionatulander«.[102] The sudden reappearance of Sigune's father Kyot is also difficult to account for. His farewell to his daughter five years prior seemed to have the pathos of finality; Kyot had, after all, aban-

99 The version in M is fragmentary, as are many of the 46 stanzas it preserves. See HEINZLE I, p. 53; BFJ, p. 161. BUMKE, Titurelüberlieferung und Titurelforschung. Vorüberlegungen zu einer neuen Ausgabe von Wolframs Titurelfragmenten. ZfdA 102 (1973), p. 167: »We can presume that H and M agreed as to the sections of the text they contained«.

100 G 29: *Diu küngin Herzelaude an Sigûnen dâhte / si warp mit al ir sinnen, daz man die von Brâbarz ir brâhte. / Kondwîrâmûrs begunde weinen, / daz si gesellekeit und der stæten liebe an ir solte vereinen.* G 30: *Kîôtes kint Sigûne alsus wuohs bî ir muomen.*

101 See HEINZLE I, pp. 53–54.

102 ERICH FRANZ, Beiträge zur Titurelforschung, Leipzig 1904, quoted from HEINZLE I, p. 53.

doned the secular life, renounced his fief to his daughter, and, we presume, gone into the monastery.[103] This problem was noticed already by Albrecht, who circumnavigated it by adding two stanzas between 29–30 in which Sigune travels first back to Katelangen, where the doll-scene takes place, then on to Kanvoleiz accompanied by her father.[104]

The arguments for inauthenticity have generally been rejected in more recent criticism.[105] Narrative disjunction and incongruity characterize many parts of ›Titurel‹; indeed, they represent an important part of its unique narrative aesthetic. Accordingly, they are very difficult to use as decisive criteria for text-critical claims. Beyond this minimalist philological position, however, two more substantive interpretations have been advanced. WOLFGANG MOHR saw a »unified thematic conception« behind the stanzas in question (including stanza 36). He identified them as »genre stanzas«, the role of which was to »add life to the stations along Sigune's path of development from a child playing with dolls who considers herself a *frouwe* to a young girl«.[106] According to BRACKERT / FUCHS-JOLIE, stanzas 31–32 introduce a »dialogic conception« that will later come to dominate the first fragment after stanza 56.

If stanzas 30–31 are authentic, then we must wonder why they do not appear in G. As BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE emphasize in the new edition, there is evidence to suggest that the version of ›Titurel‹ in G represents a shortened version of an originally longer manuscript. The scribe who wrote it down (the so-called »Redactor 1«) was also responsible for approximately half of ›Parzival‹ in G (1. 1–434. 20), the only part of the text to show abridgement in this manuscript.[107] Although his treatment of ›Parzival‹ is still quite conservative, other non-Wolfram texts copied by the same redactor (Gottfried's ›Tristan‹ and Ulrich von Türheim's ›Tristan‹-continuation, among others) in other manuscripts reveal radical interventions. According to THOMAS KLEIN, it is difficult to imagine that Redactor 1, contrary to his usual practice, made no

103 *Der künec Tampunteire Sigûnen die kleinen / zuo sîner tohter fuorte. dô Kîôt si kuste, man sach dâ vil geweinen* (25, 1–2); *sîner kleinen tohter bat* [*Kyot*][*sîn lant*] *lîhen. / er begunde sich des swertes, helmes und schiltes verzîhen* (22, 3–4).

104 *Kyot der vreuden weise sin tochter wolte bringen / von Brubarz gen Waleise. kintlicher, suezer jamer gunde twingen / Kundwiramurs, do Sigune von ir wolte. / si gebart so senicliche, daz man noch kint darumbe tiuren solte. / si fuor gen Katelange, Sygune diu seldenriche. / do entwelte si nicht lange, unz si wart bereitet werdicliche / nach fursten kindes wis vil richer zierde, / als iz Kyot wol kunde, wan er bekant wol riche kondiwierde* (›Jüngerer Titurel‹, 687–688).

105 BFJ, p. 216.

106 MOHR, Wolfram von Eschenbach. ›Titurel‹. Lieder, p. 127.

107 BFJ, p. 19.

abridgements to ›Titurel‹.[108] But is it possible to identify a positive reason for or logic behind his elimination of stanzas 30–31?

KLEIN argues that Redactor 1's style of intervention suggests a particular aesthetic intent: to delete or tone down »offensive or even just embarassing passages« and generally to abridge »everything unexpected, extraordinary, or garish, both formally and in terms of content [...]«.[109] As we have seen, stanzas 31–32 of ›Titurel‹ would qualify as unexpected content in several ways. They underscore the introduction of a female protagonist long before the conventional moment of puberty; they reintroduce a character (Kyot) who, shortly before, seemed to have left Sigune's life forever; and, most significantly, they radically violate the teleology of romance by prefiguring, in quasi-sacral topoi, a future life set up from the very beginning never to happen. Although ›Titurel‹ as a whole contains many incongruities and contradictions, it is difficult to identify any other stanzas that concentrate as many difficulties into such a short space as 31–32. The justifications for deletion advanced by earlier philologists like FRANZ had, in all probability, their counterpart among the thirteenth-century redactors of Wolfram's manuscripts.

As far as I can determine, however, no scholar has yet investigated Redactor 1's specific abridgements of ›Parzival‹ in G for evidence concerning his possible treatment of ›Titurel‹. All of the examples Klein discusses come from non-Wolfram texts. GESA BONATH, in his two-volume study of the ›Parzival‹ manuscript transmission, characterizes Redactor 1's linguistic interventions in terms of »smoothing out the style«, »simplification«, and »trivialization«.[110] On the level of content, however, BONATH found only one abridgement he considered to indicate a possible »critical thought« on the part of Redactor 1 vis-à-vis Wolfram's narrative style: the elimination of the »hyperbolic« description of Gahmuret's amorous sufferings for Belakane in 35. 23–36. 2.[111]

In terms of a comparison to stanzas 31–32 in ›Titurel‹, I propose that two further deletions from ›Parzival‹ may be of note. From the episode where Parzival receives the coat of Repanse de Schoye at Muntsalvæsche, Redactor 1 eliminates the following exchange between the chamberlain and the hero:

> »[...] wan iu ist niht kleider noch gesniten.
> jâ mohte ich sis mit êren biten:
> wande ir sît ein werder man,

108 THOMAS KLEIN, Die Parzivalhandschrift Cgm 19 und ihr Umkreis, Wolfram-Studien 12 (1992), pp. 32–66, here 63.

109 KLEIN, pp. 63–64.

110 GESA BONATH, Untersuchungen zur Überlieferung des Parzival Wolframs von Eschenbach, Lübeck and Hamburg, v. 1, 1970, pp. 29–36.

111 BONATH, Untersuchungen, v. 2, 1971, p. 276. All of Redactor 1's abridgements are listed and summarized on pp. 274–275.

> ob ichz geprüevet rehte hân«.
> »got lôn iu, hêrre, daz irs jeht.
> ob ir mich ze rehte speht,
> sô hât mîn lîp gelücke erholt:
> diu gotes kraft gît sölhen solt.« (228. 17–24)
>
> »[...] since clothing has not yet been made for you. I could ask this of her with good conscience, for if I have judged you rightly, you are a worthy man«. »May God reward you, Sir, that you say so. If you are right in your judgment, then I have been fortunate indeed. Such fortune is the gift of God.«

The second passage in question is in Book VII, where Lippaut, who is desperately trying to secure Gawan's service in his conflict with Meljanz, tells his daughter Obilot that he had seen Gawan in a dream: »*nie wort ich dennoch zim gesprach: in mîme slâfe i'n hînte sach*« (374. 5–6). These two lines are missing in G.

I do not wish to argue that these passages are much more than incidental details of plot Redactor 1 simply skipped in his rush to »finish the writing as quickly as possible«.[112] Yet they must have contained something to prompt him to consider them more dispensable than any number of even more incidental passages he might have chosen. There is, I believe, one feature that connects them to ›Titurel‹-stanzas 31–32 – an element of false prefiguration. The chamberlain at Munsalvæsche is optimistic that he is dealing with a »worthy man«, and Parzival takes his words as an assurance that God is guiding his fortune (*gelücke*) to success. The ensuing debacle at Muntsalvæsche reveals the falseness of these securities, at least in the near term. Lippaut claims to his daughter that he prophetically dreamed of Gawan the previous night (*hînte*) before he spoke with him that day. Yet earlier that day, having been taken in by the false rumors deliberately spread by Obie, Lippaut had believed Gawan to be a swindler and counterfeiter. Although he changes his opinion as soon as he sees Gawan, it is the latter's knightly appearance and bearing that convinces him, not the memory of a dream, of which Lippaut makes no mention in the whole episode, nor later to his wife.[113] Accordingly, his »dream« sounds like a fiction improvised on the spot to encourage his daughter in her plan to win Gawan as her knight. Perhaps this is a version of the topos of a maiden's prophetic dream of her future husband (such as Kriemhild's dream of the falcon at the beginning of the ›Nibelungenlied‹).[114]

The invented dream was a stock ruse of the wily servant in Roman New Comedy.[115] A more contemporaneous medieval parallel can be seen in the

112 BONATH, Untersuchungen, v. 2, p. 276.

113 ›Parzival‹, 362. 20–368. 9; 374. 7–24.

114 ›Nibelungenlied‹, B version, st. 13–19.

115 See Plautus, ›Miles gloriosus‹, 237–240, 254, 380–86, and ›Mostellaria‹, 388–390, 489–505 (T. Macci Plavti Comœdiae, ed. WALLACE MARTIN LINDSAY, Ox-

way some twelfth-century Byzantine novelists revise the motif of the prophetic dream vis-à-vis the earlier Greek romance tradition within which they are working. Whereas the ancient Greek novel usually includes a narration or description of the god's dream intervention (for example, Artemis appearing to Leukippe and demanding she remain a virgin in Achilles Tatius' ›Leukippe and Kleitophon‹), Byzantine writers like Podromos and Eugenianos conspicuously leave the theophanic element out, transforming the dream into a mere character claim about a dream, often under circumstances suggesting spontaneous confabulation. These authors »fail to include their models most crucial element [...] [b]y their substitution of human factors and reason for a pagan god's intervention«.[116]

Wolfram, too, substitutes human factors for divine interventions. In his recent BAKHTINIAN interpretation of ›Parzival‹, ARTHUR GROOS has identified the discrepancy between divine providence and its human interpretation and manipulation as an important »destabilizing« gesture in Wolfram's »decentered« and »decentering« narrative style.[117] The most prominent example of this discrepancy is Trevrizent's retraction at the end of ›Parzival‹ of claims he had made earlier in the text. In Book XI, Trevrizent gives Parzival the – theologically very secure and orthodox – warning that he will not »be able to wrest anything from God with anger«.[118] The Grail, too, »may not be won by fighting«, but only »by one who is known in heaven and appointed to the Grail«.[119] By the end of the text, however, the hermit sees himself forced to admit that Parzival has, miraculously, compelled (*ab erzürnet*) his will from God,[120] as well as achieved the Grail by fighting: »now everything has turned out differently for you«.[121] But Trevrizent does not simply confess he was wrong; he also tells Parzival that he »lied concerning how things stood with the Grail« as a »diversionary ruse« (*ableitens list*).[122]

It is perhaps not possible to decide which of Trevrizent's original statements concerning the Grail were »lies« and which were made in good faith. In this case, the *praefiguratio* – Trevrizent's claim concerning the divine

ford 1989 [16th edition], v. 2; thanks to Keith Dix of the University of Georgia Classics Department for these references).

116 SUZANNE MACALISTER, Dreams and Suicides. The Greek Novel from Antiquity to the Byzantine Empire, London/New York, 1996, pp. 123–126, here p. 126.

117 GROOS, Romancing the Grail, pp. 220–241.

118 ›Parzival‹, 463. 1: »*Irn megt im ab erzürnen niht*«.

119 468. 12–14: »*jane mac den grâl nieman bejagn, / wan der ze himel ist sô bekant / daz er zem grâle sî benant*«.

120 798. 2–5: »*grœzer wunder selten ie geschach, / sît ir ab got erzürnet hât / daz sîn endelôsiu Trinitât / iwers willen werhaft worden ist*«.

121 798. 24–27: »*ez was ie ungewonheit, / daz den grâl ze keinen zîten / iemen möhte erstrîten: / ich het iuch gern dâ von genomn. / nu ist ez anders umb iuch komn*«.

122 798. 6–7: »*ich louc durch ableitens list / vome grâl, wiez umb in stüende*«.

foreknowledge and appointment of the Grail-winner – seems to have been sincere, since he tells Parzival that »it was never a custom« (literally: »it was always an *ungewonheit*, un-custom«) that the Grail could be won by force. This indicates that he now sees himself corrected after having been sincerely in error. Nonetheless, it seems equally possible to imagine that the Trevrizent of Book IX knew nothing more definite about the Grail than that its attainment through human effort was an *ungewonheit*, in which case the categorical nature of his claim (»*jane mac den grâl nieman bejagn, / wan der ze himel ist sô bekant*«) can be recognized in retrospect as the result of a certain manipulation or »spin«.

Both of Redactor 1's deletions from ›Parzival‹ discussed above are minor examples of the same kind of teleological instability writ large in Trevrizent's retractions. The first is bona fide false *præfiguratio*: Parzival's disastrous failure at Munsalvæsche puts the lie to his self-assurance of immediate divine guidance of the night before. On the narrative level, it calls into question the simplistic teleological positivism implicit in *gelücke* and the notion of »payment« (*solt*) owing to the hero bestowed by *gotes kraft*. Lippaut's improvised dream, on the other hand, represents a stratagem akin to Trevrizent's *ableitens list*, a deliberately manipulated claim of *præfiguratio*. Instead of diverting his daughter away from Gawan, however, Lippaut wishes to encourage her in her courtly pursuit of him. Obviously, a private interview between a pre-pubescent girl and a mature knight and complete stranger could hardly have been considered socially unproblematic. Whether for her or for himself or for both, Lippaut's »dream« – a kind of *zuoleitens list*, so to speak – provides a prophetic-sounding pretext for an otherwise rather risqué scenario.

The precise nature of Redactor 1's discomfort with these passages cannot, of course, be ascertained. But I think it at least possible that the reason may have been, if not theological, at least theologically aesthetic, so to speak. In manuscript *GG^{m}, for example, a different redactor has deleted several passages that treat of eschatological themes in a pithily humorous and, doctrinally speaking, marginally unorthodox manner[123] False and manipulated discourses of *præfiguratio* may have rubbed not only modern critics the wrong way (»character inconsistency«),[124] but also medieval clerical redactors, and in minor passages were easily abridged out.

123 See BONATH, vol. 2, pp. 251–252: ›Parzival‹ 116. 17–18 (*swer [armuot] durch triwe lîdet* [like Herzeloyde], */ hellefiwer die sêle mîdet)*, 312. 24–25 (*ir* [i.e., Cundrîe] *wâren ouch die liste bî /von astronomîe*), 743. 21–22 (*mit rehter kiusche erworben kint, / ich wæn diu smannes sælde sint*); possibly also 317. 1–2.

124 In addition to FRANZ [footnote 100], compare also PETER WAPNEWSKI's appeal for the deletion of all 30 lines of Trevrizent's »Retraction« (WAPNEWSKI, Wolframs ›Parzival‹: Studien zur Religiosität und Form. Heidelberg 1955, pp. 172–173).

Thus I believe we may discern a logic connecting Redactor 1's deletions from ›Parzival‹ to his presumed elimination of stanzas 30–31 from ›Titurel‹. In addition to the theological-aesthetic difficulties of a quasi-hagiographic *præfiguratio* radically contradicting the facts of the plot, stanzas 30–31 have the additional weakness (in the mind of our conventionally-minded redactor) of containing a great deal of information about a young girl in a story supposed to about a male hero. As we shall see in the next chapter, the G manuscript lacks two further stanzas that deal with Sigune's early socialization, each of which present further difficulties in terms of character representation and narrative aesthetics.

Chapter 3. *sælde* and socialization

I

Despite the great freedom Wolfram takes with the conventional romance prologue in ›Parzival‹ (his intimation of characters of a morally/ethically »mixed« and »magpie-like« nature,[125] his warning that the narrative will both »flee and pursue, dodge from and turn back to« the reader),[126] one thing not in question is the traditional guarantee of character *sælde*, that is, of a benign telos for the plot and protagonist. It is true that, in contrast to conventional romance,[127] this guarantee is not expressly thematized until the very end of the narrative:

> [...] Parzival [...], den ich hân brâht
> dar sîn doch sælde hete erdâht. (827.17–18)
>
> [...] Parzival, whom I have brought to the place which, of course, his fortune had intended.

Yet the word *doch*, which translates here as »obviously« or »of course«, tells us – not, perhaps, without ironic humor, given the programmatic chaos of the narrative – that the workings of Parzival's salvation will be understood to have been operative from the very beginning of the story, to have been part of the objective platform of the genre, which the narrator represents himself here as having successfully carried out. For the prologue already makes it very clear that everything will turn out well for Parzival in the end:

> ein mære wil ich iu niuwen,
> daz seit von grôzen triuwen,
> wîplîches wîbes reht,
> und mannes manheit alsô sleht,
> diu sich gein herte nie gebouc.
> sîn herze in dar an niht betrouc,
> er stahel, swa er ze strîte quam,
> sîn hant dâ sigelîchen nam
> vil manegen lobelîchen prîs.

125 ›Parzival‹ 1. 4–6.
126 ›Parzival‹ 2. 9–11.
127 Both of Hartmann's Arthurian romances begin with a strong suggestion of character *sælde*: ›Erec‹, v. 2–4 (*diz was Êrec fil de roi Lac / der vrümekeit und sælden pflac, / durch den diu rede erhaben ist*). In ›Iwein‹, the guarantee is programmatic: *swer an rehte güete / wendet sîn gemüete, / dem volget sælde und êre.* (v. 1–3).

er küene, træclîche wîs,
den helt ich alsus grüeze [...] (4. 9–19)

I mean to tell you once again a story that speaks of great faithfulness, of the ways of womanly women and of a man's manhood so forthright that never against hardness was it broken. Never did his heart betray him, he all steel, when he came to combat, for there his victorious hand took many a prize of praise. A brave man slowly wise – thus I hail my hero [...].

Thus the frequent references to Parzival's *tumpheit* are informed in advance with a plot-external assurance of his ultimate arrival at *wîsheit*. His many failures are relativized in advance by the assurance of his final success, however long – *træclîche* – it takes him to achieve. Despite its many unpredictable »turns of chance«, the Grail romance is governed by the narrator's guarantee – or the narrator's assurance of the genre's guarantee – of the hero's *sælde*.

In ›Titurel‹, there are several references to Sigune's *sælde* throughout her early socialization. But the interpretive situation is radically different than in the Grail romance. Given the foreknowledge of Sigune's failure as a courtly lady, the idea of her *sælde* is automatically a complex interpretive problem. On the face of it, her life is an abrogation of *sælde*, at least as that concept is conventionally understood as the benign telos guiding the character to the »place that is hers by nature«, to use SCHULTZ'S words. As such, *sælde* is intimately linked to *præfiguratio*, something the doll scene makes clear: when Kyot hears his daughter speak so confidently and optimistically about her future, he tells her that his »worries may rest, now that your *sælde* is awakening« (31, 3). As we have seen, the *præfiguratio* of Sigune's future life course as a courtly lady has no external, poetological-generic force. It is not the direct word of the narrator, but is restricted to the character zone. Theoretically, we would expect the same to be true of her *sælde*. A narrator claim like *ich hân Sigûne brâht dar ir doch sælde hete erdâht* would be inconceivable.

The narrative does, in fact, begin with a foundational guarantee of Sigune's success and *sælde*. But it is old Titurel himself, whose valedictory address to the Grail family forms the whole first part of the text, who provides this guarantee. He assures the Grail family that they and all of his descendents will inherit the *sælde* that has guided his life, which will preserve them from harm (or which, alternately, they will not be able to harm):

»Mîn sælde, mîn kiusche, mit sinnen mîn stæte,
unt op mîn hant mit gâbe unt in stürmen ie hôhen prîs getæte,
des mac niht mîn iunger art ferderben.
iâ muoz al mîn geslähte imer wâre minne mit triwen erben«. (4)

»My good fortune, my purity, my constancy of mind, and if my hand ever gained high renown by bestowing gifts or in battle – because of all

this, my young heirs can come to no harm. Indeed, all my descendants must evermore inherit true love with real devotion«.[128]

It is true that the melancholy circumstances of Titurel's infirm senescence place his words »far from all triumphal certainty of salvation«.[129] But he is nonetheless certain of his *sælde* and its lasting legacy. It is not accurate to say that the Grail does not function in Titurel's speech as a »secure, quasi-transcendental guarantee of the epic world«. That is, in fact, precisely its role – from the point of view of Titurel himself. The knowledge that Grail-genealogy will ultimately provide no security is restricted to Wolfram's audience. We have no reason to suspect the Grail family itself is metaphysically shaken at the beginning of the text. The *iâmer* expressed in 11, 2 is the personal sadness of the Grail knights towards the loss of their liege-lord; it does not reflect a general awareness among the Grail family of the problematic nature of Titurel's assurances. The first twelve-stanza block comes to an end with a smooth transfer of the Grail-rule to the next generation (12, 3–4).

In substituting Titurel's speech for an authorial prologue, Wolfram disestablishes the positive teleology of romance as a poetological or narrator-discourse, relegating it to a purely characterological role. In ›Titurel‹, *sælde* is nothing more than Grail family ideology. It is true that the narrator himself uses the term in reference to Sigune. From the beginning, however, the passages in which he does so are all characterized by disjunctures in the narrative voice which call into question the notion of a singular narrator.

The first reference to Sigune's *sælde* occurs in 19, 2, on the occasion of her birth. I cite here the surrounding stanzas to provide the context:

Gewan ie fürste lieber wîp, waz der dolte
der herzenlîchen liebe! alsus diu minne mit in bêden wolte!
owê des, nu nâhet im sîn trûren.
sus nimet diu werlt ein ende: unser aller süeze an dem orte ie muoz sûren. (17)

[Kyot's] wîp in ze rehter zît gewerte eins kindes.
daz mich got erlâze in mînem hûs eines solhen ingesindes,
daz ich als tiure müese gelten!
die wîle ih hân die sinne, sô wirt es von mir gewünschet selten. (18)

Diu süeze Schoysîâne unt diu stæte
gebar mit tôde eine tohter, diu vil sælden hæte.

128 The conventional interpretation of 4, 3, »my young kin will not be able to destroy all that«, reads *verderben* as a transitive weak verb with a short */e/* derived from primary umlaut, consonant with *erben* in the following line. My reading is based on the intransitive form, *verdërben*, with the */ë/* derived from Germanic */ë/*. For examples of Wolfram rhyming *e* with *ë*, see KONRAD ZWIERZINA, Beobachtungen zum Reimgebrauch Hartmanns und Wolframs, Abhandlungen zur germanischen Philologie. Festgabe für Richard Heinzel, 1898, p. 495.

129 WYSS, p. 261.

an der wart al wîplich êre enstanden.
diu phlac sô vil triwen, die man noch saget in mangen landen. (19)

Sus was des fürsten leit mit liebe underscheiden.
sîn iungiu tohter lebte unt ir muoter was tôt. daz het er an in beiden.
Schoysîânen tôt half im ûz borgen
die flust an rehten fröuden unt gewin imer mêre an den sorgen. (20)

If any prince won for himself a dearer wife, what heartfelt love he must have known! That is just what love intended for these two. But alas, sorrow is drawing near to him now. This is how things end in the world: all our sweetness must always turn bitter at the last. In due time his wife presented him with a child. May God spare me from having in my house such a denizen, if I should have to pay so dearly for him! As long as I have my wits about me I'll never wish for that. Sweet Schoysiane, radiant and constant as she was, died in giving birth to a daughter, who had great fortune [*sælden*]. All maidenly honor had its source in her. She had so much loyalty that they still speak about it in many lands. Thus was the sorrow of the prince mingled with joy. His young daughter lived, and her mother was dead. Schoysiane's death helped him to purchase his loss of true joys and lasting gain of sorrows.

At first glance, the whole passage seems to be in the voice of the narrator. A closer look, however, reveals a marked incongruity. In stanza 18 the narrator, immediately upon announcing the birth of Schoysiane's child, interjects a strongly-worded personal repudiation of the »great cost« her birth involves, a statement not free from hints of a personal animus against the child herself. Immediately in the next stanza, however, the newborn Sigune is suddenly the object of great praise. BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE describe the incongruity of this shift: »[c]ontrary to our expectations of a stringent narrative logic, this anticipated and as yet unexplained sorrow, hardly is it made concrete, is quickly transformed into the unconditional, hyperbolic praise of the very person who seems to be responsible for it«. This »combination of great sorrow and euphoric praise«, »manipulating and irritating the audience at the same time«, results in a »fragmentation of the narrative flow«.[130]

This lack of a coherent narratorial perspective calls the straightforward representation of Sigune's *sælde* into question. Stanza 19 speaks of Sigune's *sælden* in a manner seemingly as sanguine and confident as, for example, Hartmann in his first (extant) words about Erec: *diz was Êrec fil de roi Lac, der vrümekeit und sælden pflac* (vv. 2–3). The stanzas immediately prior, however, suggest a different view. As BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE point out, the precise nature of the sorrow caused by Sigune's birth is not clear at first; only in 19 does it become evident that Schoysiane's death is meant and that Kyot is the one who »pays the price«. Although an audience familiar with ›Parzival‹ will already know that Schoysiane dies giving birth to Sigune,[131] it is equally probable that the reader would be reminded of Sigune's future here, and would think first of the high price another figure in her life will have to pay for the fact of her existence – Schionatulander. This impression must be even stronger in light of the fact that the whole section dealing with Sigune's birth is introduced in 17 with an adumbration, as far-reaching as it is vague, of the ultimate bitter issue of all earthly delights. As DIETLINDE LABUSCH has written, this statement could »stand as a maxim over the whole of the poem«, referring not only to the sorrow in Sigune's family history, but also to the misery her own life is destined to work in the world.[132] In other words, it would be hard to think of a statement in greater contradiction to the benign telos nominally operative in the genre of romance. Stanzas 18 and 19 contain fundamentally incompatible visions of Sigune's *sælde*.

Scholars have frequently drawn attention to the incongruities in the narrative voice of these and other passages dealing with Sigune's childhood I shall be investigating in later chapters. Whereas critics of the older generations often simply eliminated incongruous stanzas as inauthentic or heavily edited what they believed to be their corruptions, many modern scholars now gravitate to the other extreme, interpreting ›Titurel‹ in terms of a negative or deconstructive narrative project, in which incoherence itself is part and parcel of the text's poetics. Thus ULLRICH WYSS speaks of narrative »set pieces« characterizing the first fragment, that is, incongruous narratorial poses with no clear referentiality or that deliberately lead the reader astray, gestures that »only intend themselves«, foregrounding their role as »mere inventory items in the repertoire of narrative technique«.[133] Similarly, VOLKER MERTENS interprets the plurality of contrasting and incompatible narrative voices as a complex »deconstructive« game: »no [ ] author-figure is visible as a fixture behind the plurality of narrative roles. Hence the impossibility of locating a particular meaning in the text«.[134]

In my view, the stanzas in question, beginning with 18–19, represent a hybrid and dialogical construction of narrator discourse, the contrasting voices of which are each grounded in a coherent narrator-perspective. There are, in fact, two different narrators in ›Titurel‹. The first is the »personal« narrator, or author-as-narrator, who speaks in stanza 18, 2–4. The second is what I will call the »voice of the court« or the court-as-narrator, which is the perspective of 19. This stanza reflects the way in which the birth of Sigune is narrated or

130 BFJ, p. 198.

131 ›Parzival‹ 477. 2–3 and 800. 6–8.

132 DIETLINDE LABUSCH, Studien zu Wolframs Sigune, Diss. Frankfurt 1959, p. 9.

133 Quoted from BFJ, pp. 226, 207.

134 MERTENS, Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion heldenepischen Erzählens. ›Nibelungenlied‹ – ›Klage‹ – ›Titurel‹, PBB 118 (1996), pp. 359–78, here p. 376 (stanzas 17–19 are discussed on p. 372–73). MERTENS sees an antinomy between a »heroic« narrator role and a »personal« and »courtly« narrator role.

interpreted in the language and ideology of the society depicted in the text. For the court-as-narrator of Sigune's life, there is every reason to talk of her *sælde*, just as Kyot has every reason to see a benign destiny at work in his daughter's precocious attitude towards her dolls.

We can be more precise about this court-as-narrator. As BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE show, stanza 19 is lexically and conceptually closely connected with stanza 4. At her birth, the child Sigune is praised in the vocabulary Titurel had invoked for the Grail-dynasty as a whole, despite the fact that Schoysiane's death actually »disavows [Titurel's] claim of dynastic and heritable love-*sælde*«. The very qualities Titurel thematizes in his speech, *sælde, êre,* and *triuwe*, »are transferred, it seems, naturally and without any problem to the next daughter-generation«.[135]

This link between stanzas 4 and 19 undermines the sense of 19 as the direct word and viewpoint of the personal narrator. His opinion, contained in stanzas 17–18, is ominous in tone and reflects a personalized, idiosyncratic view of Sigune. The voice praising Sigune's birth, on the other hand, forms a kind of third-person reflection and derivation of old Titurel's speech about the future of the Grail family. Stanza 19 represents »Grail family ideology« and its interpretation of Sigune's birth.

Three further linguistic features in stanzas 19–20 underscore this interpretation. The first is the verb *hæte* at the end of 19, 2. This is a highly unusual form for Wolfram, who almost always uses a form of *heten* for both the indicative and subjunctive preterite (of which *hæte* can theoretically be either).[136] HEINZLE and BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE interpret its usage in 19, 2 as the indicative preterite, chosen by the poet simply for purposes of rhyme.[137] However, in the one passage in ›Parzival‹ containing the form *hæte*, upon which they base this interpretation (703. 6–8: Gramoflanz *begunde ez sêre leiden / daz er sich versûmet hæte. / waz der helt dô tæte?*), it is not certain that the usage is indicative (»daß er sich versäumt hatte«); it could also be interpreted as a subjunctive of indirect thought-discourse, emphasizing Gramoflanz's subjective attitude of anger and sorrow (»es begann ihm leidzutun, daß er sich versäumt hätte).[138]

135 BFJ consider *al wîplich êre* a feminine equivalent to the masculine *hôher prîs in stürmen* of Titurel's speech (p. 200).

136 Typical subjunctive uses for example in Hartmann von Aue, ›Erec‹, vv. 357–358, 3057, 6787–6789.

137 See HEINZLE I, p. 39 and BFJ, p. 200. BFJ refer to HERMANN PAUL et al., Mittelhochdeutsche Grammatik, Tübingen 1998 (24th edition), p. 275.

138 ZWIERZINA (p. 491) identifies it as subjunctive. Indeed, the entire passage strongly emphasizes Gramoflanz's mental attitude: *Ouch rou den künec Gramoflanz / daz ein ander man vür seinen kranz / des tages hete gevochten: / da getorsten noch enmohten / die sîn daz niht gescheiden. / er begundez sêre leiden / daz er sich versûmet hæte. / waz der helt dô tæte?* (703. 1–7).

In any case, the form *hæte* is not unambiguous, and so it is suggestive that the ›Titurel‹-narrator employs it in a sentence and in a context that address a central – perhaps the central – thematic ambivalence of the text: the radical disjunction between the text-internal attitude towards Sigune's future prospects and the text-external knowledge of their failure. As we saw in the previous chapter, this discrepancy only emerges in its full clarity in the later doll-scene. Nonetheless it is intimated in the grammatical uncertainty of the claim in 19, 2 that Sigune possessed great *sælden*. For the audience familiar with ›Parzival‹, three different grammars of Sigune's future resonate here simultaneously. The first is in the firm indicative of Titurel's self-assurance that the Grail-inheritance of *sælde* will continue: »Schoysiane bore a daughter who had great *sælden*«, i.e., because all of Titurel's family must inherit the qualities that have guided his existence. The second possible version is the subjunctive of indirect discourse, given that only Titurel, and not the narrator, has guaranteed Sigune the beneficent telos of *sælde*: »Schoysiane bore a daughter, who [according to the beliefs and claims of the Grail family about themselves] had great *sælden*« (In modern German, this would be the subjunctive 1: »eine Tochter, die große *sælden* habe«). The third version is the conditional: »Schoysiane bore a daughter, who would have great *sælden*«, i.e., the audience knows that she in fact does not, but does not know under what condition she might have had it.

A further indication that 19 represents something other than the direct discourse of the narrator is the fact that both the H manuscript and the ›Jüngerer Titurel‹ correct *wîplich êre* to *magtlîch êre* in 19, 2. The reason they have done so, I believe, is because the redactors misunderstood stanza 19 as the viewpoint of the personal narrator and interpreted the claim that »all womanly honor became manifest in Sigune« as an auctorial, plot-external truth-claim about the overall meaning and destination of Sigune's life. Given that Sigune never in fact becomes a *wîp*, and since the personal narrator shortly announces in programmatic fashion that the story will be about »virgin love«, *magetlîche minne* (37, 4), such a claim would be difficult to understand as an auctorial statement. Thus, it was »corrected« with the word *magetlîch* from the later passage. The concept of *wîplich êre* in G, however, as BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE point out, can be understood to place Sigune's life within Titurel's valedictory overview of the Grail family and its heritable legacy of feminine and masculine virtue: as the »key term and epitome of womanly *tugent*«, it corresponds to »the masculine *hôhen prîs in stürmen*« of Titurel's speech.[139] Thus it is not a statement of the narrator himself about Sigune, but part of the figural discourse surrounding the members of the Grail family, i.e., more Grail family ideology.

139 BFJ, p. 200.

The final piece of evidence is found in the first line of the next stanza: *sus was des fürsten leid mit liebe underscheiden* (20, 1). The word *sus*, »in this manner«, conveys the impression that the contents of 19 are not merely descriptive, but are a reflection of Kyot's emotional state, such as it is then described in 20. That is, 19 represents the *liebe* that is mixed with the Kyot's *leit.* Thus either they stand for his own thoughts about his daughter, or else they can be understood as the kinds of things that were said about Sigune at her birth by people in Kyot's environment.

The substitution of a conventional narrator-prologue with Titurel's valedictory address means that all references to Sigune's *sælde* are speech acts in the character zone or functions of the plot-internal discourse of the characters about themselves.[140] They cannot be related to any objective overview of the meaning of Sigune's life vouchsafed to the audience by the author-narrator. It is as if the »laws« of romance narrative (so clearly evident in the ›Parzival‹-narrator's claim that he has brought his hero to the place his *sælde* had intended for him) have been removed as a poetological framework and incorporated as a kind of ideology into the characterological world. Titurel speaks of the future of his family as if he himself were an omniscient narrator secure in the knowledge of the genre-programmed happy end of his family romance: »all my descendants must evermore inherit true love«.

By the same token, when Kyot tells Sigune that she is *versunnen*, a *frouwe*, and that her *sælde* is awakening, he speaks to her as if she were a literary character whose story is on track. This is another aspect of the way in which, as we saw in chapter one, elements of the narratorial discourse from the Grail romance re-emerge in ›Titurel‹ at the level of the characters and plot. The personal narrator of the text has relinquished the persona of the teleologically positive romance storyteller to Titurel, Kyot, and other figures who guide and interpret the lives of the protagonists – the »voice of the court«, against which the author-as-narrator stands in sharp contrast. As we shall see in the next section, the dialogic narrativity evident in 18–19 characterizes the entire description of Sigune's upbringing at Kanvoleiz.

II

The doll-scene is programmatic. Sigune's whole socialization assumes the character of role-playing her future. To a degree this was already true of her »model«, Obilot in Book VII of ›Parzival‹. However, as in the cross-textual comparison of the *tocken*-motif, the similarities only reveal the greater significance of the differences. In ›Parzival‹, Gawan role-plays Obilot's wish to be his lady, accepting her token (not a doll, but a sleeve) and going forth to battle in her service.[141] Even as he plays her game, however, the knight draws

140 Further references to *sælde* in Titurel's address: 3, 3; 5, 2; 10, 3.

141 375. 11–30.

Obilot's attention to reality, reminding her twice that she is not yet old enough to really be the part she is playing:

> »doch lât mich dienst unde sinne
> kêren gegen iuwerre minne:
> ê daz ir minne megt gegebn,
> ir müezet fünf jâr ê lebn.
> deist iwerr minne zît ein zal«. (370. 13–17)
>
> [...]
>
> »sult ir werden alt,
> trüeg dan niht wan sper der walt
> als erz am andern holze hât,
> daz wurd iu zwein [i.e., Obilot and Clauditte] ein ringiu sât«. (372. 5–8)
>
> »Even if I turned my thoughts and my service to winning your love, you would have to be five years older before you can give a man love. That will be the right number of years for your love«. [...] »Should you grow to womanhood, even if the forest grew nothing but spears, as it now grows only wood, the crop would not be enough for you two«.

In ›Titurel‹, Sigune is not confronted with such reminders, nor anything that calls into question the verisimilitude of her self-image as courtly lady. Quite the opposite: her desire to acquire the service of knights receives immediate confirmation and unquestioning approval from the adult world. Her father Kyot, as we have seen, not only lauds her ambition, he also refers to her as already a full-fledged feudal lady, telling her that only a geographic inconvenience (not, like Gawan tells Obilot, the fact that she is too young) stands in the way of her general public recognition as *frouwe* through knightly combat:

> »Wol mich so werdes kindes, das ist also versuonnen!
> got muoss Kathelangen also herer frawen an dir lannge gunnen.
> mein sorge slaffet, so dein sælde wachet.
> und were Swartzwalde hie ze lannde, er wurd ze scheften gar durch dich gemachet«. (31)

Here Kyot role-plays the community of his daughter's future laudators, participating in and encouraging her »playing towards« the love service relationship. *Versunnen* already at five years old, Sigune is granted a developmental shortcut of the kind that was denied Parzival, who, characterized at the beginning of his own story as *træclîche wîs* and *tump*, is forced to earn his *versunnenheit* over many long years of trial and error.[142] Such, at least, is the message Sigune receives about herself from her courtly surroundings. Of

142 ›Parzival‹, 4. 18 (*er küene, træclîche wîs*) and 161. 7–8 (*sît dô er sich baz versan, / ungerne hete erz do getân* [i.e., kill Ither]. On the importance of *sich versinnen* in ›Parzival‹, see MOHR, Parzivals ritterliche Schuld, Wirkendes Wort 2 (1951/52), pp. 148–160.

course, the humor and hyperbole of this passage are obvious. We recall the father of Gerald of Wales, *ludendo et applaudendo* at his young son's make-believe. Nonetheless, we must imagine that Sigune herself overhears the playful, ironic tone of her father, that she takes such praise very seriously and – despite the initial awareness of her own immaturity contained in *noch verphlihten* – regards herself already as a *minnefrouwe*. And she is soon treated as such by courtly society in general:

> Kîôtes kint Sigûne alsus wuohs bî ir muomen.
> er kôs si für des meien blic, swer si sach, bî den tounazzen bluomen.
> ûz ir herzen blüete sælde und êre.
> lât ir lîp in diu lobes iâr volwahsen! ich sol ir lobes sagen mêre. (32)
>
> Was man an rainem weibe sol ze gantzen tugenden messen,
> an jr vil suessem leibe was des nindert hares gross vergessen.
> sy rainer frucht, gar lauter, valsches aine,
> der werden Schoysianen kint, gleicher art, die keusche iunge raine! (33)
>
> Thus did Kyot's child Sigune grow up at her aunt's. Whoever saw her preferred her to the radiance of Maytime amid the dewy flowers. Up from her heart grew fortune and honor together. Let her grow up to the years when praise is due! I will sing her praises even more. Of all that may be reckoned as being in a pure woman's favor, not so much as a hair's breadth of it was omitted from her lovely body. She was a stainless fruit, completely pure and without fault, noble child of worthy Schoysiane and of quality identical, the chaste young pure girl!

We are dealing here with the same juxtaposition of incongruous narrators we saw in 18–19: lavish praise of Sigune on the one hand, and, on the other, a personal narrator distancing himself from that praise. If, in the view of the personal narrator in 32, 4, Sigune must first »grow up to the years when praise is due«, then the language of encomium describing her in the flanking passages clearly cannot be interpreted as his direct word. This is also the case in stanza 33, where the metaphors of Sigune's praise become emphatically physical in their suggestiveness: the corporeal-sexual connotation of *wîp* is highlighted by the internal rhyme with *lîp*; *nindert hâres grôz* gauges the abstract standards of *tugent* and the breadth in meaning of *lîp* according to bodily measurements. Such language seems to represent a direct contradiction to the narrator's exhortation to »let her grow up«, i.e., to let her actual physical body catch up with the language surrounding it. (This incongruence was one of the main reasons 33 was athetized in several earlier editions of ›Titurel‹).[143]

The court-as-narrator emerges more clearly in these passages than in 18–19. The articulator of Sigune's praise is the grammatical general subject: *swer si sach* and *man*. The image of *sælde* and *êre* blooming forth from her

143 Discussed in HEINZLE I, p. 58.

heart, a function of the flower imagery of the previous line, reveals that the Grail family *sælde*-ideology of Sigune's birth has been taken up by Herzeloyde's court at Kanvoleiz. The same is true of stanza 33, which, in comparing Sigune to a sexually mature *wîp*, recalls the Grail family legacy of *al wîplich êre* Sigune is to manifest – a legacy further emphasized in the reference to Sigune as the »child of Schoysiane« and to the (otherwise rather obvious) fact that she is *glîcher art* as her mother.

Such language of praise, making Sigune into the perfect courtly woman beginning at at five years of age, can only be understood as a sort of social fantasy about the kind of woman she is supposedly fated to become. As before her father Kyot, so now the court at large at Kanvoleiz participates in Sigune's role playing, urging further precocious identifications upon her, sanctioned by Titurel's guarantee of *sælde*, the security of her future as a courtly *frouwe*. As we have seen in the last chapter, merely the description of a female childhood before the age of puberty is unusual. The conventional approach is represented by Schoysiane and Herzeloyde, who only enter the story when they – in marked contrast to Sigune – are already *volwahsen* for courtly love (13, 2). We are left in no doubt about Sigune's real physical immaturity: as the narrator tells us, she has not yet grown into the years appropriate for her praise. Not until stanza 36, which provides a very clear description of her pubescence, has that moment arrived. Thus the praise of Sigune in 32 and *a fortiori* in 33 is narratively clearly marked as incongruous with its object.

In ›Parzival‹, the ambitious Obilot is never fully indulged in her premature aspirations to courtly ladyship. Gawan sets her straight about her age from the beginning, and unsentimentally abandons her at the end of Book VII, breaking her heart.[144] Sigune, in contrast, hears no voice from within her own environment disturbing her fantasy of *versunnenheit* and physical (pre)maturity. It is only the narrator himself who does this.

What we are dealing with here in the dialogically-narrated representation of Sigune's socialization is an early version of what BAKHTIN identifies as one of the main stylistic principles of the »novelistic« narrator, the discursive »objectification« of a »common language« and the creation of distance between the common language and the »direct authorial word«:

> [The] usually parodic stylization of generic, professional and other strata of language is sometimes interrupted by the direct authorial word (usually an expression of pathos, of Sentimental or idyllic sensibility), which directly embodies (without any refracting) semantic and axiological intentions of the author. But the primary source of language usage in the comic novel is a highly specific treatment of »common language«. This »common language« – usually the average norm of spoken and written

144 ›Parzival‹, 397. 15–19

> language for a given social group – is taken by the author precisely as the common view, as the verbal approach to people and things normal for a given sphere in society, as the going point of view and the going value. To one degree or another, the author distances himself from this common language, he steps back and objectifies it, forcing his own intentions to refract and diffuse themselves through the medium of this common view that has become embodied in language (a view that is always superficial and frequently hypocritical).[145]

It is precisely in this way that the personal narrator of 32, 4 (as well as 18, 2–4) distances himself from the common, conventionalized courtly language of Sigune's praise and its »going point of view and going value«. His note of caution in 32, 4 represents what we might call the conservative voice of literary convention: »Let Sigune enter the story at the right place, at puberty!« (The fact that this comment is placed in the poetologically loaded position of the fourth line of ›Titurel‹'s quasi-heroic stanza, the traditional place for foreshadowing of future catastrophe, lends it additional symbolic weight, although there is no explicit adumbration here). This comment strongly resembles what JAMES SCHULTZ identifies as the characteristically dismissive attitude of medieval historians toward the childhood of their famous subjects, typified by Ottokar of Steiermark on a future king of Hungary: *von dem ich iezuo niht mê /tihten will noch schrîben: /er muoz alsô belîben, /unz daz er wirt elter.*[146]

This dismissive attitude, which we have already seen in 18, 2–3, also provides a key to stanzas 34–35, in which the personal narrator turns to Herzeloyde:

> Nu suollen wir gedencken Hertzelauden der rainen.
> diu kund jr lob nicht krencken. mit warhait wil ich die lieben mainen,
> sy ursprung aller weiblichen eren,
> sy kunde wol verdienen, das man jr lob muoss in den lannden meren. (34)
>
> Diu magetlîche witewe, daz kint Frimutelles,
> swâ man bî ir iungen zît der frouwen lop sprach, sone erhal niht so helles.
> ir lop gie für in mangiu rîche,
> unze ir minne wart gedient vor Kanuoleiz mit den speren hurteclîche. (35)
>
> Now we should also take thought of Herzeloyde the pure. She could not detract from her renown. I truly speak of this dear woman. The fountainhead of all womanly honor, she truly deserved having her praise increased throughout the lands. The virgin widow, the child of Frimutel – wherever praise of women was spoken in her early years, no other's praise resounded so loud and clear. Her praise went out into many kingdoms, until the day her love was earned with the onslaught of spears before Kanvoleiz.

145 BAKHTIN, Dialogic Imagination, p. 302.
146 Ottokar von Steiermark, ›Österreichische Reimchronik‹, vv. 11652–55. Quoted from SCHULTZ, p. 3.

The seemingly sudden change of person from Sigune to Herzeloyde, which was frequently rejected as an »unexplainable leap« and considered an argument for »inelegant, late interpolation«,[147] represents the narrator's direct appeal to the audience (to whom he has already turned in 32, 4) against the court's misplaced praise of Sigune. In effect, he is saying: »It is too early to praise Sigune like this. Instead, we should [*nu suollen wir*] turn to Herzeloyde, who is at the correct age to receive such praise«.

The whole rhetorical character of stanzas 34–35 underscores Herzeloyde's right to such praise vis-à-vis the implied referent Sigune, who does not yet really have such a right: *mit warheit* – in contrast to the court's praise of Sigune, which cannot really be »true«. *Si kunde wol verdienen* – in comparison to Sigune, who as a child is not yet in a position to »earn« praise. The second half of the line is a direct exhortation to the court: it is obliged to (*man muoz*) increase Herzeloyde's praise – i.e., it ought not to increase Sigune's praise. In 35, 2, the narrator concedes the tendency of the court (*man*) to praise women »in their young years«, but still Herzeloyde will win the competition. *ir lop gie für*: her praise »went forth« into the lands – but it also »went before« the praise of Sigune. The final line of the stanza may be taken at face value, or it may be understood proleptically, in the loaded position of the epic fourth line: Herzeloyde's praise will lead directly to her *minne* being successfully earned – in contrast to the *minne* that Sigune's praise will eventuate, which will never in fact be earned.

The text-critically problematic passage *diu kund ir lop niht krenken* (34, 2) can also be understood in this light. The pronoun *diu* is only found in manuscript M and in the ›Jüngerer Titurel‹, the variant in H reading *der kund ir lop niht krenken*. BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE have adopted the latter, interpreting *der* as a dative of reference for Herzeloyde: »der konnte ihr Ruhm niht gering werden« (»her praise could not grow weaker for her«).[148] This explanation may have the benefit of being the grammatical *lectio difficilior*. However, the nominative form *diu* makes more sense in terms of the dialogic contest between the narrator and the court about the appropriate praise of Sigune and Herzeloyde: »That one [i.e. Sigune] could not weaken her [i.e. Herzeloyde's] praise«. As BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE themselves point out, the motif of one woman's praise in a zero-sum competition with that of other women appears elsewhere in Titurel.[149]

I believe the notion of a dialogic competition also helps explain the problem of the internal rhymes in stanzas 33–34. I interpret these as a rhetorical

147 BFJ, p. 223.
148 BFJ, p. 223
149 BFJ, p. 223 (*Urrepanse de schoyen lop mac ander lop niht gestillen* [10, 4]).

device marking the passages as »social heteroglossia« of a twofold function: First, they set the stanzas formally apart from the direct speech and point of view of the personal narrator. Just as, in BAKHTIN'S analysis of Pushkin's ›Eugene Onegin‹, the narrator employs Onegin's own stylized romantic idiom in his authorial speech,[150] so too do stanzas 33–34 of ›Titurel‹ represent the poetic »image of another's outlook on the world«, that is, the outlook of the court. Secondly, they emphasize the conventionalized, artificial quality and the aestheticizing ethos of the court language of Sigune's praise. (As we shall see, both this aestheticization as well as its critique will play a role in dialogue between Sigune and Herzeloyde later in the text). That the narrator himself employs internal rhyme in his rejoinder to the court (34) may be understood both as a parody of court language and an attempt on the narrator's part to »beat the court at its own game« in the praise of the »right« courtly lady, Herzeloyde.

It is noteworthy that this rhythmic surplus has an effect precisely the opposite of the discursive leveling tendency BAKHTIN ascribed to poetic rhythm in general:

> The very rhythm of poetic genres does not promote any appreciable degree of stratification. Rhythm, by creating an unmediated involvement between every aspect of the accentual system of the whole, [...] destroys in embryo those social worlds of speech and of persons that are potentially embedded in the word. [...] Rhythm serves to strengthen and concentrate further the unity and hermetic quality of the surface of poetic style, and of the unitary language that this style posits.[151]

In ›Titurel‹, the internal rhymes are the very agent of rhetorical differentiation, marking out the social world whose language they represent from the direct speech of the narrator and his point of view about Sigune. Only in Albrecht's ›Jüngerer Titurel‹ do internal rhymes become generalized over the whole text, and here the result is very much »to strengthen and concentrate further the unity and hermetic quality« (especially the latter) of the ›Titurel‹-stanza as a poetic form.

When Sigune reaches puberty (36), the narrator conspicuously fails of his promise to »praise her more« when she grows up:

> Nu hœret frömde wuonder von der maget Sigaunen.
> do sich ir prüstel dræten und jr rayd fal har beguonde braunen,
> da huep sich in jr hertzen hochgemüete.
> sy begunde stoltzen und losen und tet das doch mit weiplicher güete. (36)
>
> Now hear of strange wonders about the maid Sigune: when her little breasts became rounded and her blonde curls began to turn brown, then

150 *Bakhtin*, Dialogic Imagination, p. 45.
151 *Bakhtin*, Dialogic Imagination, p. 298.

> pride rose in her heart and she began to be haughty and frivolous, yet she did so with womanly goodness.

The narrator is ambivalent about the physical and psychological changes Sigune is undergoing, which he announces to the audience as *vremdiu wunder*, »wondrous things« or »strange miracles«. This designation has led to much scholarly puzzlement.[152] According to ULRICH WYSS, it is a »pompous declaration leading nowhere«, for what follows – the changes to Sigune's body – are »nothing surprising, but simple nature«. This passage is, for WYSS, one of a large number of non-referential narratorial gestures in ›Titurel‹, »mere inventory items« in a narrative largely about narrative itself.[153]

But there is something about Sigune's pubescence that is indeed very *vremde*. Although the actual physical changes affecting her in 36, 2 are perfectly natural, the preceding dialogue between the narrator and the court has shown that the relationship Sigune has hitherto experienced between her physical person (that of a child) and the praise directed at it (as if to a *frouwe* and a *wîp*), is not natural at all. This relationship has, in fact, been turned on its head, against the will of the narrator.[154]

I see two ways of interpreting *vremdiu wunder* in light of the previous stanzas. They are predicated on two different syntaxes. The first, like most of the translations, reads the adverb *dô* beginning the second line as »when«, and places a comma after the second line:

> Now listen to amazing things about the maid Sigune: when her little breasts began to get rounder, and her blond curls began to turn brown, then high-spiritedness grew up in her heart. She began to act proudly and impertinently, and yet did so with womanly goodness.

With this syntax, the logical referent of *vremdiu wunder* is not actually the physical changes described in the second line, but the changes to Sigune's personality described in the third and fourth. Read in this way, it is a bitingly sarcastic comment. The »amazing things« about Sigune are not amazing at all, but all too predictable: In effect, the narrator is saying: »But of course Sigune develops into an uppity young woman! After all, what kinds of things has the court been telling her since she was a little girl? How could she have turned out otherwise?«

The alternative interpretation involves placing a period or semicolon behind the second line, interpreting *do* as »then« or »at that moment«:

152 Discussed in HEINZLE I, p. 61 and BFJ, p. 226.
153 See above, p. 63.
154 On *vremdiu wunder* as reflecting a negative narratorial attitude see WALTHER JOHANNES SCHRÖDER, Vindære wilder mære: Zum Literaturstreit zwischen Gottfried und Wolfram, in: PBB 80 (1958), pp. 269–287, here pp. 278–79 (»uncredible, fabricated tales«).

> Now listen to amazing things about the maid Sigune: at that moment, her little breasts began to get rounder, and her blond curls began to turn brown. At that point, high-spiritedness grew up in her heart.

In this version, the referent of the *vremdiu wunder* is the second line, the physical transformation of Sigune's pubescence. In this reading, the narrator's point in 32, 4 and in the stanzas praising Herzeloyde is that there is a proper cause/effect relationship between the courtly female body and the praise of the same. The female body should be the cause, praise should be the effect. Stanza 36 expresses the suspicion that the court, in its proleptic excess of encomia, has made praise into the cause, and Sigune's actual puberty into the effect. Proclaiming the perfect courtly woman already within the five-year-old child, the language of the court has effected a »strange miracle«, a *vremdez wunder*: the physical changes of Sigune's real puberty become the incarnation of a courtly »logos«, so to speak, a kind of displaced or »verfremdet« transsubstantiation. *Dô huop sich in ir herzen hochgemüete*, a subtle reformulation of 32, 3, signals the point where the contents of courtly encomia fold over into Sigune's own subjectivity.

Admittedly, I have stacked the linguistic deck in my English translations. The terms *hochgemüete, stolzen,* and *lôsen* are all bivalent. I have chosen to emphasize the negative end of the semantic spectrum: »arrogance«, »to act pridefully«, »to be impertinent«. They can equally be translated positively as »courtly high-spiritedness«, »to act with self-confidence«, and »to be ebullient«. The same is true of the particle *doch* in the fourth line, which can function merely as an intensifier (»indeed«, »in truth«) in addition to the adversative meaning (»however«) I have used above. Thus, a translation diametrically opposite to the ones above is perfectly possible (»High spiritedness arose in Sigune's heart. She began act in a self-confident and ebullient way, and did so, indeed, with womanly goodness«). According to JOACHIM BUMKE, all these words »have been deliberately chosen such that their meaning remains ambivalent«.[155]

Nonetheless, if Sigune's *stolzen und lôsen* was meant positively, then the observation that she »did so, indeed, with womanly goodness« would be redundant. The ascription of *güete,* even without the adversative reading of *doch*, only makes sense if we interpret Sigune's behavior as somehow implicitly negative. In other words, there is obviously some meaningful difference between *stolzen und lôsen* as an objective act and »doing that« with a particular intentionality or subjectivity, that is, »with womanly goodness«.[156]

In the commentary of the new edition, BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE have recently discussed the problem of the ambiguity of these lines with considerable balance and nuance: The reader can »mistrust the primary meanings [of

155 See BFJ, pp. 226–227.

156 BUMKE makes the same point (III, p. 410).

hôchgemüete, stolzen und lôsen] and see here not only the liberated, self-conscious awakening of courtly high spirits«. The editors refer to an additional »change« in Sigune implied in stanza 36: a change vis-à-vis her *kiusche* that figured in the encomium of stanza 33. *kiusche,* they point out, connotes »self-restraint« and »humility«. Nonetheless, they continue, it would be going too far to speak of a »sudden change in personality« on the part of Sigune, given that the doll-scene has already shown that she »has not hitherto been lacking in proud self-confidence« and has demonstrated »a questionable attitude, at least in the way she formulates it, about the ethos of courtly love and chivalry«. This same problematic is actualized in the ambivalent vocabulary of 36. Despite the stanza's negative resonances, however, BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE see here no critique of Sigune: the »ambivalence and danger of such conventionalized love service comportment« does not enter into the sphere of »the personal responsibility of the acting figures«, on whose part any »subjective inappropriate behavior« the narrator is at pains to disavow.[157]

In his simultaneously negative portrayal of her objective behavior and the exculpation of her subjective character, the narrator concludes the representation of Sigune's courtly socialization with the focus on the discourse of the court. However we wish to interpret her behavior at the end of ›Titurel‹'s second fragment, it is clear that Sigune's famously problematic view of herself is not the product of sudden whimsy, but has been programmed by the socio-literary mannerism of her courtly upbringing. What will appear in the second ›Titurel‹-fragment as a disastrous caprice of self-indulgence (an interpretation of *minnedienst* to include the fetching of dogs' leashes) is shown here in the static, discursive underpinnings of its social determination, prefigured in the stylized misassociation of word and body that permeates the fast-track, narcissistic upbringing of the *minnefrouwe.*

In order to shed more contemporaneous light on the dialogic conception sketched above, it is instructive to briefly investigate the modifications the H manuscript of Albrecht's ›Jüngerer Titurel‹ makes to the stanzas in question, which it preserves in a form closer to ›Titurel‹ than the A manuscript:[158]

> Kyotes kint Sygune alsus wuohs bi ir muomen.
> für mayenblikez lune kos man si bi tounazzen blumen.

157 BFJ, pp. 226–227.

158 Compare ›Titurel‹ 36 (*si begunde stolzen und lôsen*) and ›Jüngerer Titurel‹ H 655, 4 (*si begunde stoltzen und losen*) with ›Jüngerer Titurel‹ A 694, 4 (*si chunde loblich stoltzen*). The latter is clearly a de-problematized derivative. (›Jüngerer Titurel‹ H quoted from WERNER SCHRÖDER, ed., Die Heidelberger Handschrift H [cpg 141] des ›Jüngeren Titurel‹. Bereinigter Text des ersten Teilstücks [Strophe H 1–661, 4] mit den Varianten der Redaktion R [Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse, Jahrgang 1994, Nr. 1], Stuttgart 1994).

vzz ir hertze bluote seld vnd ere.
kumt si ze lobez iaren, so wil ich noch ir lobez künden mere.

(H 654, BFJ 32)

Nu prüeuent an der stæten, der claren magt Sygunen:
do sich ir brüstel dræten, vnd ir raid val har begunde brunen,
do huob sich in ir hertze hoh gemüete.
si begunde stoltzen vnd losen, vnd tet daz doch mit wiplicher güete.

(H 655, BFJ 36)

Swaz mægde oder wibe ie ward gen lob gemezzen,
an ir vil kiuschem libe ward dez niendert siden groz vergezzen:
si raine fruht, durch luihtig, valsches ane.
sælig si diu muoter, div si gebar! daz waz Tschoisiane

(H 656, BFJ 33)[159]

There is only one significant change here vis-à-vis Wolfram's ›Titurel‹, but the result is striking. The description of Sigune's pubescence is placed immediately after the narrator's condition about her age, effectively fulfilling it and eliminating any grounds for difference between narrator and court over the issue of Sigune's praise. As the reformulation in H 656, 4 in the adhortative subjunctive (»Blessed be her mother!«) clearly demonstrates, the voice of this praise is changed to the voice of the personal narrator. The addition of *mægde* in H 656, 1 eliminates the problematic direct comparison between Sigune and *wîp* contained in Wolfram's ›Titurel‹ (on which the ›Titurel‹ manuscripts themselves already diverge in stanza 19). And of course, it goes without saying that there is no longer anything strange or ironic, much less »miraculous«, about Sigune's puberty. Albrecht has made out of Wolfram's *hæret vremdiu wunder!* a simple request to *prüeven* the natural rightness of it all. In short, all of the dialogic aspects explored above are skillfully eliminated with a few simple modifications. But these modifications attest to the great problems ›Titurel‹'s dialogic narrativity created for some of its medieval readers.

The previous chapter showed how Sigune's childhood experience, though in some ways similar to the figure of Obilot in ›Parzival‹, is really quite different. The real figure of contrast in ›Titurel‹ is not Obilot, but rather Parzival. Sigune's socialization, as represented in the H manuscript of ›Titurel‹, contrasts diametrically with that of her cousin in the Grail romance. Parzival's socialization (or rather lack thereof) reveals him to be a kind of »natural« subject, manifesting his noble *art* naively and instinctively in complete isolation from both the court and – as a result of his mother's stern censorship of her servants' language – all courtly discourse concerning knights and chivalry. Sigune, in contrast, experiences an immersion program in courtly language. Surrounded from earliest childhood with both the discourse of

159 ›Jüngerer Titurel‹ H, p. 182 (mutational superscripts subsumed).

minnedienst and the certainty of her future within it, she represents the other extreme of the nature/nurture spectrum. She is a subject of courtly culture and nurture.

It would obviously be going too far to claim that Wolfram represents Sigune as entirely a product of her environment, in the sense of modern sociological theories positing the radical constructedness of the subject. Her preoccupation with *minnedienst* at five years old still implies – as with hunting and birdsong in Parzival's case – an *a priori*, genealogical inclination toward her connate path in life. Nonetheless her inclinations – unlike those of Parzival – are immediately received and uncritically countenanced by her social environment. Her individual desire to be a *minnefrouwe* is fully absorbed and immersed in the generalized production of courtly femininity through discursive images of literary convention. Parzival must make his long way toward *versunnenheit* by developing autonomy vis-à-vis – and at times actual disregard for – the discourse of courtly behavior (»*irn sult niht vil gevrâgen*!«).[160] Sigune appears to the court as *versunnen* at five years old, precisely because she demonstrates no individual autonomy, playing the part of the conventional courtly lady to the letter. But it would also be wrong to argue that her characterological disposition to play this role absolutely locks her into her fate. As we shall see, she will be confronted with alternatives at several points in her later life.

III

In contrast to Sigune, we learn almost nothing of Schionatulander's infancy or childhood, only that he had been given by a noble family into the keeping of the French queen Anphlise, who then, after a certain period of time, entrusted him to Gahmuret. What we learn of Schionatulander's socialization occurs later in his life than is the case with Sigune. He is already a young squire by the time Gahmuret takes him on his first trip to the Orient,[161] where he is supposed to »learn how to be a man« by witnessing deeds of bravery: *swâ kint genendekeit erspehent, daz sol helfen, op se imer gemannen* (40, 4). The proverbial nature of this expression reminds us of the discourse surrounding Sigune at Herzeloyde's court (32–33: *swer si sach, swas man an reinem wîbe*). Schionatulander's upbringing, too, is guided by the conventional wisdom of chivalric society. And again, it is difficult to overhear a certain skepticism on the part of the personal narrator vis-à-vis the didactic optimism of courtly nurture. *Daz sol helfen* leaves us in doubt about whether he shares the general opinion about »becoming a man«, and *op se imer gemannen* suggests ominously – and in the always potentially ominous fourth line – that not everyone does, in fact, reach this stage.

160 ›Parzival‹, 171. 17.
161 Compare MERTENS, Wolfram von Eschenbach: ›Titurel‹, p. 205.

Gahmuret's journey to the east is part of his courtly *minnedienst* for Anphlise. She has just knighted him, and now he must earn her favor on the battlefield. This means that Schionatulander observes no mere knightly deeds, but also and above all their particular social context and motivation within a love relationship. Yet he has also experienced Gahmuret's and Anphlise's relationship at close hand: we learn later in the text (54) that Schionatulander had acted as messenger in the couple's secret romantic exchanges. In this capacity, he has become *wîse von manger süezen botschaft*, observing amorous behavior in the »literary« form of love communiqués. These were obviously some sort of text, possibly written letters but probably in oral form: songs, poems, or other words Schionatulander committed to memory – internalized – and secretly (*tougenlîche*) conveyed to his guardian. That they were written and sealed letters would not accord well with the fact that Schionatulander becomes »knowledgeable« (*wîse*) by means of them. It is clear he knew their content and could observe and learn from their effects on Gahmuret.

Schionatulander also frequently notices how Gahmuret is able to unburden himself of his amorous cares »so manfully«:

> Schoynatulander vil dicke wart innen
> wie sîner muomen sun Gahmuret kunde sprechen mit manlîchen sinnen
> und wie sich der von kumber kunde scheiden. (55, 1–3)[162]
>
> Schionatulander often noticed how his cousin Gahmuret could speak with manly sense and how he could ease himself from love's pain.

inne werden here contains a valence similar to that of Sigune's role playing with dolls. No mere neutral constatation, Schionatulander's observations are part of process of interiorization, of *Verinnerlichung*. At the point where he is about to make his own, personal confession of love to Sigune, the narrator underscores the connection to the verbal discourse of his role-model. In effect, Schionatulander ventriloquizes his language and feelings, patterning them directly on his experiences of Gahmuret and Anphlise.

Despite the similarities, there are two crucial differences between Sigune's and Schionatulander's upbringing and socialization. The most striking is the difference in what we might call their respective general relationship to courtly discourse. Sigune experiences literary language in unmediated fashion, without reference to people and relationships apart or at a distance from herself. Discursive images of the *minnefrouwe* are presented as containing the immediate truth of Sigune's own existence. That is to say, of her own body. In ontological terms we might say that Sigune's relationship to courtly discourse is a »substantial« one, revealing no difference between language

162 The variant in H (*wie wol er kunde sprechñ kunde mit syannen*) though obviously corrupt and displaced (H 15!) emphasizes the aesthetic-instrumental aspect of Gahmuret's *sprechen* more than G.

and body. In fact, since the court praises her as *wîp* (33) before her actual puberty (36), ontic priority is assigned to language, Sigune's body assuming the status of a derivation from or transsubstantiation (*vremdiu wunder*) of conventional literary images of the courtly lady. Albrecht obviously found this problematic, and so recast the stanzaic order to reflect what he believed to be a more natural relationship between Sigune's womanhood and its praise.

Precisely the opposite is true of Schionatulander, for whom courtly discourse is first and foremost an object or instrument. We hear nothing of his physical body as a child and its ontogenetic relationship to literary language. His significant experiences in this regard come later than Sigune's, after his puberty. In comparison to her experience, however, the non-representation of Schionatulander's early boyhood implies that he enters the world of courtly language as a more constituted subject. Courtly *minne*-discourse is not seen to affect his physical development. In his first experiences with it, in fact, the language of love has initially nothing directly to do with him. Instead, he acts as its medium for others, Gahmuret and Anphlise. He internalizes but does not incorporate or embody it, becoming, not the substance of courtly discourse itself, as Sigune does, but *wîse* about how one employs such language as a tool. In other words, Schionatulander cultivates an »accidental« relationship to courtly discourse, one that has no effect on his substance as such. For him, conventional courtly language merely modifies emotions and influences relationships. He goes through a process of distanced observation and apprenticeship in the language of *minnedienst* before he himself undertakes to use it with Sigune. This »accidental«, instrumental attitude will have a great impact on how Schionatulander views the text on the leash and how he responds to Sigune's desire for it. It will also loom large in the great love-confession scene in the middle of the first fragment, as we shall see.

The second major social difference concerns the children's relationship to their respective guardians and role models. As far as we can tell, Sigune the child does not experience a social status corresponding to her real age and experience. From the beginning, she is caught up in an obfuscation of the categories that separate girl-child from woman, a process that precludes any »reality-check« in the matter of her true age (such as Obilot so painfully receives from Gawan at the end of Book VII of ›Parzival‹). In the proleptic voice and gaze of courtly convention, there is no difference between the small child Sigune and a *wîp* or *frouwe*. Herzeloyde, for example, first enters the five-year old's life not as a guardian or even a role model, but as a competitor.

Schionatulander, in contrast, has a clearly articulated, low place in the chivalric hierarchy: that of the unknighted squire, the uninitiated neophyte. Moreover, his role model is clearly much further advanced in this hierarchy than he is. There is no competition between the two. Schionatulander is nei-

ther subjected to, nor the subject of, nor »subjectivized« according to proleptic stylizations of his career-path. There are clear, ritual boundaries between squire and knight: Schionatulander has yet to *gemannen*, and the conditional aspect of *ob si imer gemannen* makes it clear that the passage from child to man is a serious social boundry, the crossing of which is fraught with risk.

The most important difference in Schionatulander's socialization, however, concerns his role model's own relationship to courtly discourse. It is significant that Schionatulander's introduction in ›Titurel‹ is prefaced by a synopsis of Gahmuret's love life, such as we know it from ›Parzival‹:

> Wie Gahmuret schiet von Belakânen
> unt wie er werdeclîche erwarp die swester Schoysîânen
> unde wie er sich enbrach der Franzoisine,
> des wil ih hie geswîgen unt iu künden von magetlîcher minne. (37)
>
> How Gahmuret left Belakane, and how he worthily won the sister of Schoysiane, and how he broke away from the Frenchwoman – all that I will pass over in silence here, and tell you of virgin love.

Gahmuret is simultaneously the exemplary literary *minneritter* and, in »real life«, the unpredictable apostate of conventional *minnedienst*. His serial monogamy, conspicuously »passed over in silence« by the narrator, disturbs the fictive absolutism of the literary gender hierarchy. The sexual politics of literary convention imply not simply masculine submission in service to the lady, but also a quantitative difference between men and women – feminine singularity vs. masculine plurality. This is the version of *minnedienst* that defines ›Titurel‹, first appearing in Sigune's reference to dolls: »*es lebt manig ritter, der sich in meinen dienst noch verphlihtet*«.[163]

Despite the ›Parzival‹-narrator's many claims to the contrary,[164] Gahmuret's behavior in the Grail romance glaringly contradicts the conventional assumptions of love service. He is less the representative of courtly love

163 In ›Parzival‹, the prime example of the lady who mobilizes a crowd of knightly servitors is, of course, Orgeluse, the central female figure in the Gawan books: »*nâch minne ich manegen dienen liez, / dem ich doch lônes niht gehiez*« (618. 17–18); [...] *der herzoginne von Lôgroys / dient manc rîter kurtoys* [...] (632. 15–17); *diu rede* [i.e., that Gawan has earned the love of Orgeluse] *dûhte swære / ir soldier, die manec sper/ê brâchen durch ir minne ger* (730. 20–22). See also BUMKE II, p. 116.

164 The conspicuous absence in ›Parzival‹ of any comment calling into question Gahmuret's *triuwe* or *stæte* is, on both the narratorial and figural levels, a manifestation of what HAUG calls the »questionlessness« of the Gahmuret-world, its radical non-reflexivity. See Brechungen auf dem Weg zur Individualität. Kleine Schriften zur Literatur des Mittelalters, Tübingen 1997, p. 131. Gahmuret's de facto *unstæte* is one of the aspects of his character symbolically recuperated in Parzival's uncompromised monogamy. Compare ›Parzival‹, 732. 4–14; 733. 10–15; 802. 6–8.

discourse than its autonomous and idiosyncratic manipulator. By invoking Gahmuret's Valentinoesque biography, the narrator of ›Titurel‹ places Schionatulander's *gemannen* literally under the aegis of an authority who has achieved a considerable degree of operative distance vis-à-vis the amorous fictions of the court and the blithe exigencies of their gender politics. Gahmuret's behavior, by »pluralizing« the courtly female and co-opting her privilege of irrational caprice (for example in his summary abandonment of Belakane), subverts courtly sexual politics. Far from being a mere transition,[165] stanza 37 symbolically places Schionatulander into the care of a *minnedienst*-renegade.[166]

By the time he confesses his feelings to Sigune, Schionatulander will have observed, aided, and abetted Gahmuret in at least two of his three romantic relationships. When the narrative shifts from the children's isolated biographies to the beginnings of their acquaintance at Herzeloyde's court, the narrator proclaims *Owol dich, Ganvoleiz, wie man sprichet dîne stæte unt herzenlîche liebe* [...]*!* (46,1–2). Whatever sentimentality we hear in these lines with regard to the faithful love of Sigune and Schionatulander, we must not overhear the sardonic undertone apropos of Gahmuret's faithfulness in his relationships. For him, Kanvoleiz marks the third shift in his erotic allegiances.

The double standard in Gahmuret's character – simultaneously symbolic paragon of and real-world defector from *minnedienst* – allows Schionatulander to gain distance from courtly love both as discourse and phenomenon. At least such a position becomes theoretically available to him in the course of his socialization. Sigune, it will be evident, lacks anything of the kind in hers. We will now see how these differences play out in the great love dialogue that forms the centerpiece of ›Titurel‹'s first fragment.

165 HEINZLE I, pp. 63–64.

166 For further criticism of Gahmuret, see BLAKE LEE SPAHR, Gahmurets Erection: Rising to Adventure, Monatshefte 83 (1991), pp. 403–13.

Chapter 4. Secrecy and subjectivity[167]

I

Recent ›Titurel‹ scholarship has generally focused on the awkwardness, inexperience, and lack of autonomy Sigune and Schionatulander seem to demonstrate in their conversation with each other. According to JOACHIM BUMKE, the first fragment »places special emphasis on the discrepancy between the intensity of the [characters'] childlike feelings of love and their inexperience in dealing with them«.[168] For some scholars, there are in fact no longer any real »characters« in the text; the true »subject« of ›Titurel‹ is language itself, and the only significant development in the narrative is that within the narrative voice itself with respect to the tradition of courtly romance. In the view of CHRISTIAN KIENING and SUSANNE KÖBELE, little personal subjectivity is present in the whole conversation, even when the lovers turn from the general nature of love to a discussion of their own relationship.[169] The metaphors of love operate quasi-autonomously in the language of the unconfident interlocutors, who are more the objects of the discourse they invoke than the subjects of the language they employ.[170] For HELMUT BRACKERT und STEPHAN FUCHS-JOLIE, »their conversation reveals itself to be helpless, since it is completely unable to grasp the chasm between what is said and what is left unsaid, i.e., the lethal consequentiality of the words«.[171]

There are two problems with readings of this kind. The first is that they assume the two protagonists are basically at the same level, or operating from the same subjective position, with respect to both their feelings and their relationship to the language of feeling.[172] This is not the case. As the preceding chapter has shown, Sigune and Schionatulander have undergone very different socializations, leading them into fundamentally contrasting experi-

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167 This chapter is a expanded and altered version of my article Geheimnis and Subjekt in Wolframs ›Titurel‹, PBB 125 (2003), Heft 2, pp. 268–291.

168 BUMKE I, p. 277.

169 KIENING/KÖBELE, Wilde Minne, pp. 244, note 37 (»Even when Sigune and Schionatulander are talking about their own *minne*, as opposed to only *minne* in general, there is still no ›I‹ present; rather, Sigune makes herself into the object of *minne*«).

170 KIENING/KÖBELE, Wilde Minne, p. 247–248.

171 BFJ, p. 441.

172 Compare also BFJ's interpretive synopsis (pp. 252–5), which treats language as the »the real theme« (p. 253) of the conversation and does not distinguish between Sigune's and Schionatulander's use of it.

ences of courtly language and contrasting identities within language. Schionatulander has been able to cultivate a distanced, instrumental, »accidental« relationship to courtly love language, whereas Sigune has been, so to speak, cultivated within that language and has developed a quasi-physical, »substantial«, identificatory relationship with it. This difference will play an important role in the leash episode at the end of the text, where a text-dismissive Schionatulander attempts to persuade the text-obsessed Sigune that the *âventiure* on the leash is not important. But it is already a key element in the love conversation, as we shall see shortly.

The second problem with the non-autonomy thesis is more complicated, and has to do with the implications for the representation of character subjectivity of the innovative structural arrangement of Sigune's and Schionatulander's conversation. Simply put: in reversing the conventional order of literary love-conversations, in which lovers' amorous encounters are preceded by a kind of didactic, »birds and bees« dialogue between parent and child, Wolfram strongly valorizes the subjective autonomy of his protagonists vis-à-vis the literary tradition. Before they receive any explicit guidance from the adult world, Sigune and Schionatulander have already become, in effect, sophisticated young autodidacts of love, socially far more autonomous not only than Kriemhild, Lavinia, or Eneas, for example, but also more so than Parzival.

But that is the short answer. And, as we shall see, there are several passages in the text that do seem to provide a basis for the non-autonomy thesis. Let us first examine the structural innovation in more detail. It begins with a further literary innovation, a transformation of the conventional motif of amorous secrecy.

II

The secrecy of Sigune's and Schionatulander's relationship proceeds from an unusual motivation – namely from no clear motivation at all. That is: there is no external reason for it, in the form of any of the traditional adversaries forcing lovers to dissimulate their relationships or emotions, the *nîdære*, *merkære*, and *huote*, common both to lyrical and epic representations of courtly love.[173] There is no oppositional third party at work in ›Titurel‹. Nor

173 GÜNTER SCHWEIKLE, Minnesang, Stuttgart, Weimar, 1995, p. 199; LILLI SEIBOLD, Studien über die Huote, Berlin, 1932; STEPHANIE CAIN VAN D'ELDEN, Dark Figures of Minnesang: The *merkære* and the *huote*, in: The Dark figure in Medieval German and Germanic Literature, ed. EDWARD R. HAYMES and STEPHANIE CAIN VAN D'ELDEN, Göppingen, 1986, pp. 66–88. For examples from narrative literature, see Heinrich von Veldeke, ›Eneit‹, v. 1644 (Dido would gladly be with Eneas *wan dorch die merkâre*); Gottfried von Strassburg, ›Tristan‹, vv. 8316ff. (Marke's counsellors as *nîdære*) and vv. 17849–910 (*diu vrô-zene huote* [...] *vîendin der minne*); Wolfram von Eschenbach, ›Parzival‹, 297, 5–15 (Keie as *merkære*); critique of *bæse nîdære* in the prologue to Ulrich von Zazikhoven's ›Lanzelet‹ (vv. 19–26).

is there any occasion for one, for this relationship is in no way transgressive. Neither party is married, nor promised to another, and there are no insuperable differences in social class or status between them. And although Sigune and Schionatulander fall in love while still quite young, nowhere is it claimed that they are actually too young for love.[174] Rather, the cause of the lovers' secrecy is abstract and complex:

> Ir schämliche zucht und der art jr geschlächtes
> – sy waren aus lautterlicher mynne erporn – der zwang si jr rechtes,
> daz sy aussen taugenlich jr minne halen
> an jren claren leiben, und ynne an den hertzen verqualen. (53)
>
> Their good breeding and the nature of their lineage – they were born of pure love – constrained them to proper conduct, so that outwardly they hid their love on their beautiful bodies and inwardly suffered torment in their hearts.

As so frequently with the text's aesthetically most unconventional and difficult stanzas, 53 is missing in G.[175] The unconventional thing about it is that it contains, as far as I have been able to determine, the first explicitly psychological explanation of love secrecy in medieval German literature, at least in narrative texts. All earlier and contemporaneous stories representing an otherwise legitimate or non-forbidden love affair as a secret love simply posit secrecy as something self-evident, needing no justification.[176] The lack of explanation itself has a particular literary function. It is a pregnant silence. To represent love as an emotion first manifest in secret is to emphasize its spontaneous personal quality, its *Innerlichkeit*. Unexplained secrecy interiorizes the experience of love and valorizes the psychological dimension of the characters experiencing it. Secrecy is immanent in psychological love, and as such it needs no explanation to unfold its meaning in narrative.

But in ›Titurel‹, secrecy does have an explanation. It has a twofold cause: *zuht* and *art*, the former referring to Sigune's and Schionatulander's courtly upbringing, the latter to familial heritage. Through the mediation of a verb in

174 On the passage *Owê des, si sint noch ze tump ze solcher angest* (48, 1), see p. 91. See also MERTENS, Wolfram von Eschenbach: ›Titurel‹, p. 205 (»not younger than fifteen years of age«)

175 In H, too, the stanza is both incomplete (the third line reads *daz sy aussñ*) and appears in the wrong place in the text (stanza 13, right after Titurel's speech, before either Sigune or Schionatulander has been born or mentioned). The placement of the stanza and completion of the third line have been adopted by all ›Titurel‹ editors from Albrechts ›Jüngerer Titurel‹. See BFJ, p. 248.

176 For example the relationship between Riwalin and Blanscheflur in Gottfried's ›Tristan‹, in which the reason for the secrecy is difficult to understand.

the singular (*twanc*), however, the two factors are brought together into a unity of nurture and nature, a unity possessing a single *reht*. The concept of *reht* makes it clear that Sigune's and Schionatulander's secretive behavior is to be understood as an ethically/morally positive phenomenon, not merely in the subjective perspective of the narrator, but above all by the standards of the society in which the lovers live. This means that the forces informing and conditioning amorous secrecy in ›Titurel‹ are not initially psychological, but rather trans-personal, social forces.

This is a highly ambivalent narrative gesture. On the one hand, the conversation between Sigune and Schionatulander following stanza 53 undertakes, as has often been noted, a striking revision of the traditional structural location of lovers' conversations within larger courtly narratives. In Heinrich von Veldeke's ›Eneide‹ and the ›Nibelungenlied‹, frequently cited as literary models for the love-dialogues in ›Titurel‹, the lovers' confession is preceded by an didactic interview between the heroine and her mother, in which the former demonstrates ignorance of the phenomenon of love and is enlightened by the parent.[177] In ›Titurel‹, the lovers' confession comes first (56–72), their conversations with their guardians not until significantly later (99–136). Moreover, the subject of the later interviews is not, as in the literary tradition, basic instruction in matters of love, but, as we shall see, advice of a higher order and, above all, the approbation (*urloup*) of society for the relationship. This innovative structural arrangement foregrounds the dimension of character subjectivity, emphasizing the the lovers' personal initiative, individual self-consciousness, and inner authenticity of feeling – producing, in effect, a stronger and deeper psychologization of love vis-à-vis the literary tradition of amorous confessions.[178]

On the other hand, however, this deepened representation of subjectivity is prefaced in stanza 53 by a discussion of the objective societal factors bringing it about. As a consequence of *schemelîchiu zuht*, it is clear that Schionatulander's and Sigune's love secrecy is not only no real secret, but it is part of the program of correct (*reht*) child socialization and thus a kind of open secret under the purview of the court.[179] This move seems, in turn, to depersonalize and de-psychologize the representation of love vis-à-vis the more »spontaneous« secrecy of the narrative tradition.

177 Heinrich von Veldeke, ›Eneit‹ (vv. 9470–9990); ›Nibelungenlied‹ (B, st. 14–19).

178 The extent to which ›Titurel‹ was influenced by ›Flore und Blanscheflur‹, in the original French or in the German adaptation by Konrad Fleck (c. 1220), will be discussed in a separate section below (pp. 115–119).

179 The connection between secrecy and *zuht* is emphasized several times in the text: 103, 3: »*ich hal dur zuht vor dir al mînen smerzen*« (Schionatulander to Gahmuret); und 119, 2: »*hâstu mich deste unwerder iht* [if I tell you about my suffering], *sô kan dîn zuht sich an mir gar versünden*«. (Sigune to Herzeloyde).

This de-personalization is underscored by two further narrator commentaries prior to stanza 53. Right from the very beginning at Kanvoleiz, Sigune's and Schionatulander's relationship is placed under the searching eyes of courtly society: »This love began so purely that all the world could find none of its own gloom in it« (46, 3–4: *diu [minne] ergie sô lûterlîche, al diu werlt möht ir tuopheit dar under niht finden*).[180] At this point in the story, we would be inclined interpret this passage exclusively in terms of commonplace rhetoric about the innocent love of children, or in terms of a theory of love-secrecy that places idealized lovers in strict opposition to society at large, in the manner outlined by PETER DRONKE: »The secrecy of *amour courtois* springs [not so much from the illegitimate nature of love, but] rather from the universal notion of love as a mystery not to be profaned by the outside world, not to be shared by any but lover and beloved«.[181] As so often in the fourth stanza-line, however, the seeming cliché in 46, 4 foreshadows what is to come. The idea of public scrutiny will loom large in the last part of the first fragment, in the lengthy, searching conversations each of the lovers has with their respective guardians just prior to the official approval of their relationship »before all the world«. (136, 4)

The second passage of narrator commentary bearing on stanza 53 comes from the digression on *minne* interrupting the narrative right after the introduction of the lovers at Kanvoleiz. Here the narrator tells us that it is simply impossible not to take notice of young lovers:

> Ôwe, minne, waz touc dîn kraft under kinder?
> wan einer der niht ougen hât, der möhte dich spehen, wær er blinder. (49, 1–2)
>
> Alas, Love, what good is your power among children? For even one who has no eyes could perceive you, a blind person.

The secrecy Sigune and Schionatulander strive for has, in effect, already been »deconstructed« on the narratorial level by the time it makes its appearance in the story in 53. Moreover, this paradoxical representation of love secrecy is not confined to the relationship between different textual levels; it also evident in the lovers themselves in a directly corporeal-physiognomic way. Sigune and Schionatulander disclose their secret in the very act of concealment: *sy aussen taugenlich jr minne halen / an jren claren leiben*, »They hid their love outwardly in secret on their lovely bodies« (53, 3–4).

In place of the paradoxical Middle High German construction *ûzen tougenlîche* (»outwardly in secret«), most modern translations add a syntax of separation between inside and outside, as if the passage might read *von* or

180 PASSAGE and JOHNSON/GIBBS interpret *ergân* duratively: »[...] love [...] proceeded so clear and pure [...]«; »[Love] developed with such purity [...]«.

181 PETER DRONKE. Medieval Latin and the Rise of the European Love-Lyric, v. 1, Oxford, 1968, p. 48.

nach ûzen hâlen.[182] After all, does not secretive behavior strive to conceal things from the outside, or from the eyes of society?[183] Doubtless, Sigune and Schionatulander are seeking to do this. Yet the narrative commentary preceding their endeavors, as we have seen, has already rendered their secret transparent. The expression *ûzen tougenlîche* condenses with sophisticated irony the incongruous characterological and narratological perspectives on amorous secrecy. The fact that the *innen-ûzen* dimension is eliminated in all of the surviving manuscripts of Albrecht's ›Jüngerer Titurel‹ attests to the aes-

182 »[...] they did not reveal their love outwardly in their handsome features but inwardly were tormented with pain in their hearts« (JOHNSON/GIBBS, p. 17); »[...] sie heimlich allen Augen wehrten der Liebe äußere Zeichen« (MOHR, Wolfram von Eschenbach, ›Titurel‹. Lieder, p. 23); »[...] no sign gave they, no outward token / of the hidden love that wrung their innocent hearts with pangs unspoken« (MARGARET RICHEY, Schionatulander and Sigune. An Episode from the Story of Parzival and the Graal as related by Wolfram von Eschenbach, Edinburgh, London, 1960, p. 45); »[...] sie außen sich der Minne erwehrten / vor der Merker Augen, / und in den Herzen innen sich verzehrten« (KARL SIMROCK, transl., Parzival and Titurel. Rittergedichte von Wolfram von Eschenbach, Stuttgart, Tübingen, 1849, p. 450); »[...] so daß sie nach außen an ihrer strahlenden Erscheinung alle Zeichen ihrer Liebe verbargen« (BFJ, p. 93). The translations that come closest to preserving the paradoxical nature of the construction are: »[...] äußerlich sie heimlich still verhehlten / ihre Lieb' in allen Gebehrden, / während innen im Herzen der Liebe Sorgen sie quälten« (SAN-MARTE [ALBERT SCHULTZ], ed. and transl., Lieder, Wilhelm von Orange und Titurel von Wolfram von Eschenbach und der jüngere Titurel von Albrecht, Magdeburg, 1841, p. 69) and »[...] outwardly they hid their love in secrecy while inwardly they suffered torment in their hearts« (CHARLES PASSAGE, Titurel. Wolfram von Eschenbach, New York, 1984, p. 16).

183 The expected syntax is found in Hartmann, ›Gregorius‹, vv. 2323–2325 ([...] [*er*] *wânde sîniu tougen / vor al der werlde wol bewarn*); Gottfried, ›Tristan‹, vv. 1825–1826 ([...] [*si*] *burgen ez vil tougen den liuten von den ougen*); Reinmar, I, 3, 1–2 ([...] *in nît, den nieman kan / verheln vor den liuten sich*); ›Prosa-Lancelot‹, II, p. 77, v. 18 (»[...] *ich wil es wol verhelen vor alle der werlt*«); Konrad von Würzburg, ›Engelhard‹, v. 6238 (*diz dinc er vor den liuten barc*); Ulrich von Liechtenstein, ›Frauendienst‹, st. 214, 4 ([...] *und wil daz vor den liuten heln*; see also st. 717, 5). The prepositional phrase von ûzen is very rare in Middle High German. I have been able to identify only four instances: a sense of omnipresent directionality in Heinrich von Veldeke, ›Eneit‹, v. 9998 (*van bûten und van binnen*) (»everywhere«, »to everywhere«), and Gottfried von Straßburg, ›Tristan‹, v. 16995–997 ([...] *ein heftelîn, / daz gie von ûzen dar în / und leite sî dar unde dan*) and 17035–037 (*Daz tougenlîche heftelîn, / daz von ûzen hin în / zer vallen was geleitet hin*), in which it is used in a technical-mechanical description where the strict separation between inside and the outside carries important symbolic significance (see also Albrecht, ›Jüngerer Titurel‹, st. 437, 1, 4, where von ûzen is used in the architectural description of the Grail temple).

thetic unusualness of Wolfram's choice of language.[184] The attribution of the adjective *clâr* (»luminous«, »bright«) to the lovers' bodies further underscores the transparent nature of their covert endeavors.[185]

We encounter a second example of such oxymoronic body language shortly before Schionatulander's conversation with Gahmuret during the voyage to the orient:

> Schoynatulander vil nœte truoc verborgen,
> ê daz der werde Gahmuret wurde innen al spehende der helbæren sorgen,
> daz sîn liebester mâc sus ranc mit kumber.
> er kal et al die mânen, swie sich diu zît huop, den winder unt den sumer. (93)
>
> Schionatulander endured many pains in secret before the noble Gahmuret, watchful as he was, noticed those hidden sorrows and how his dearest kinsman was wrestling with love's torment. He suffered every moon as the seasons changed, winter and summer alike.

The unusual word *helbære* must have sounded curious to Wolfram's audience, for whom the connection between the suffix *–bære* and the linguistically still productive verb *bern* will have been clear:[186] *helbære sorgen* are, paradoxically, »anxieties that bring forth secrecy« or »cause secrecy to appear«. The concrete valence of *–bære*, »physically appearing«, emerges clearly from the narrative context. Both times the word *helbære* is used, it is directly connected to Gahmuret's visual perception of Schionatulander's physical appearance: *Gahmuret wurde innen al spehende der helbæren sorgen*, and very similarly four stanzas later: *Gahmuret wart innen der helbæren swære, / daz der iunge talfîn ûz Grâsivalden was fröuden alsô lære* (97, 1). The fact that the word is found nowhere else in recorded Middle High German makes it likely that it is a poetic term coined by the poet,[187] cor-

184 St. 716: *Ir schamlich zuht gebaren und diu art ir geslechtes, / (luterlich si waren uz minne erborn) di twanc si ouch ir rechtes, / daz si vil tougenlich ir minne halen, / so lange, daz si an libes clarheit und an herzen sich verqualen* (A); [...] *daz si ir minne so tavgenleichen halen . vntz daz si an ir liebe chlar . vnd auch an dem hertzen sich verqualen* (X).

185 To be sure, Wolfram uses the word *clâr* so often that it is usually little more than a »generally emphatic epithet« and inconspicuous synonym for »beautiful« (HEINZLE I, p. 39). Sometimes, however, the literal meaning is used with calculated effect. Thus in ›Willehalm‹, the retinue of König Loys reports to the sovereign about the arrival of Willehalm, looking the worse for wear: »*ouch ist im ninder alsô glanz / sîn bart, sîn vel, noch sîn hâr, / daz man in dürfe nennen clâr*« (128. 20–22).

186 *bern* = to produce, bear fruit/blossom; to bring forth; to appear.

187 In Albrechts ›Jüngerer Titurel‹, the word *helbære* appears only in the former stanza (here 767). See below, footnote 222.

responding to his well-known use of etymologies reflecting concrete-sensual meaning and experience.[188]

Accordingly, *helbære sorgen* represent another construction like *ûzen tougenlîche*,[189] bringing together and sublating the text's seemingly incommensurable perspectives on amorous secrecy: on the one hand, the efforts of Sigune and Schionatulander to hide their *minne*, and on the other hand, the narrator-commentary claiming that even a blind person must notice *minne under kinder* and that *al diu werlt*, in effect, is watching. Here, amorous secrecy is as much a sociological as psychological phenomenon, and it is a trans-subjective, social force (*zuht, art, twanc si ir rehtes*) before it enters the psyche of the characters. The inner world of Sigune's and Schionatulander's secret love is the »inner world of the outer world«, i.e., the dialectic inverse of the external world of courtly society.[190]

This depiction of secrecy represents a surprisingly modern view of the process of subjectivization. The experience of private, psychological character-interiority is grounded in, and proceeds from, a discourse of socialization. The role of secrecy itself is, as ULRICH WYSS has noted, to mystify this connection between the societal and the personal: »[f]or the sake of its ideological consecration, the ritual of courtly love, which may be learned in the process of socialization at court, must at the same time be ascribed to the spontaneous behavior of the participants«.[191] Secrecy is, seemingly for the first time in medieval German literature, explicitly represented as a social space of interiorization, where the public discourse of courtly love is transformed into the authentic, spontaneous emotion of love. This transformation is the subject of the following section.

III

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the argument that Sigune and Schionatulander are represented as non-autonomous in their relation to language seems to be supported by several passages in the text. Two comments by the narrator emphasize the contrast between the emotional experience of

188 Compare MOHR, Zwei Kleinigkeiten zu Wolfram, PBB 81 (1959), pp. 348–351 and Wolfram von Eschenbach. Aufsätze, Göppingen 1979, pp. 228–236; OTTO SPRINGER, Etymologiches Spiel in Wolframs ›Parzival‹, PBB 87 (1965), pp. 166–181. In his review of HEINZLE I, PETRUS TAX (Seminar 10 [1974], p. 72) draws attention to the unusual word *halhafft* in H 49 (44 in HEINZLE I), that also may derive from *heln/hâle*.

189 On oxymora in ›Titurel‹ compare WEHRLI, Wolframs ›Titurel‹, p. 21. See also WIEBKE FREYTAG, Das Oxymoron bei Wolfram, Gottfried und anderen Dichtern des Mittelalters, Munich 1972.

190 As noted by WYSS, pp. 270.

191 WYSS, pp. 269.

the lovers and their youth and immaturity. In the first two stanzas of the digression on *minne* (48–52), the narrator complains that Sigune and Schionatulander, being »children«, are »too inexperienced« for the anxiety of love: *Owê des, si sint noch ze tump ze solher angest* (48, 1); *Owê, minne, waz touc dîn kraft under kinder?* (49, 1). We also learn that Schionatulander was *danoch nicht starc an sînem sinne* (»not yet strong in understanding«) when he falls in love with Sigune (47, 3). Finally, at the end of the first fragment, Herzeloyde will tell Sigune that she has become the *âmîe* of Schionatulander *alze fruo*, »all too early« (132, 1).

All these passages must be handled with skepticism. The *minne*-digression, to be sure, commences in a plaintive register. But it is difficult to see exactly what the lamentation is all about. The second line of stanza 48, although announcing an explanation of the cause of the problem just described (*wan, swâ diu minne* [...]), actually does nothing of the kind. Instead, it promptly morphs into what seems more like the praise of a virtue:

> Owê des, si sint noch ze tump ze solher angest.
> wan, swâ diu minne in der iugent begriffen wirt, diu wert aller langest!
> op daz alter minnen sich geloubet,
> dannoch diu iugent wont in der minne bant, minne ist krefte unberoubet. (48)
>
> Alas that they are still too inexperienced for such anxiety. For, wherever
> Love is caught in youth, there it lasts longest! Age may renounce Love,
> but youth dwells in Love's bonds, Love's power undiminished.

It is not easy to understand how the long-lasting nature of youthful love, the supposedly unfortunate consequence of *tumpheit*, might differ from qualities like *triuwe* and *stæte*, which are uniformly positive and praised in the text.[192] The same is true of the ensuing stanza, which offers no other justification for the opening *Owê!* than that love is *alze manger slahte*, »of too many different kinds«. In fact, no single tangible misfortune of too-youthful love is thematized in the entire excursus.

Many scholars have commented on the incommensurability between the representation of *minne* in the excursus and its manifestation in the relationship between Schionatulander and Sigune.[193] This discrepancy is not confined to ›Titurel‹, however. In ›Parzival‹, too, Wolfram's narratorial digressions about love do not harmonize with the contents of the episodes in which they are placed. Quite the opposite is the case. As BUMKE has pointed out, the three great *minne*-digressions in ›Parzival‹ all contain strong criticism of courtly love, yet are located without exception in contexts representing *minne*

192 See 4, 4; 19, 4; 45, 4; 4, 1; 5, 2; 46, 1, etc.

193 See BFJ, pp. 238–239.

in essentially positive terms (Parzival's love-trance in the episode of the blood drops in the snow, Gawan's longing for Orgeluse).[194]

Even the expression *Owê!*, without which the *minne*-excursus would hardly be seen to contain any lament at all, is narratively anything but straightforward. In ›Titurel‹, *ôwê* seems to be used in a manner akin to minnesong, where it is a highly ambivalent expression, not infrequently appearing in passages invoking strongly positive emotions and optimistic thoughts about love. While it is true that this typically occurs when *ôwê* is part of a refrain-like passage, initially grounded in a complaint,[195] this is not always the case, especially among later poets like Heinrich von Morungen, Reinmar der Alte, and Walther von der Vogelweide. In Heinrich von Morungen's ›West ich, ob ez verswîget möhte sîn‹, for example, an unambiguously positive *ôwê* appears in the opening stanza:

> West ich, ob ez verswîget möhte sîn,
> ich lieze iuch sehen mîne schoene vrouwen,
> der enzwei braeche mir daz herze mîn,
> der möhte sî schône drinne schouwèn.
> Si kam her dur diu ganzen ougen
> sunder tür gegangen.
> ôwê, solde ich von ir süezen minne sîn
> als minneclîch enpfangen![196]
>
> If I knew it could be kept quiet, I would let you see my lovely lady. If you were to break open my heart, you could very well see her in there. She came in right through my eyes, without using the door. Alas, if I should be so sweetly taken in by her love!

Only in this poem's second stanza is *ôwê* part of a lament, and the third stanza does not contain it at all, thus rendering the sense of refrain uncertain. In the second, two-stanza version of this poem, ›Der alsô viel geriefe‹ from the Kleine Heidelberger Liederhandschrift, the use of *ôwê* is completely independent of a refrain: the above stanza is the second of two, and the first

194 BUMKE II, p. 130. The contrast WYSS draws between ›Titurel‹ and ›Parzival‹ (where the *minne*-digressions are characterized by »practicability as commenting excursus«) is therefore not fundamental, but only one of degree (Selbstkritik, p. 260).

195 See also Dietmar von Aist, XII, ›Nu ist es an ein ende komen‹ (HUGO MOSER and HELMUT TERVOOREN, eds., Des Minnesangs Frühling (38th edition), Stuttgart 1988 [hereafter MF], p. 65): *der bin ich worden undertân, / als daz schif dem stiurman, / swanne der wâc sîn ünde alsô gar gelâzen hât. / sô hôh ôwî! / si benimet mir mange wilde tât* (1, 3–7); *»nu muoz ich al der welte haben dur sîn willen rât. / sô hôh ôwî! / wol ime, wie er daz gedienet hât!* (2, 5–7); Heinrich von Morungen, XXX, ›Owê! sol mir iemer mê‹ (MF, p. 276): *Owê! Si kuste âne zal in dem slâfe mich* (3, 1–3).

196 MF, p. 245.

does not contain it. Its presence can only be interpreted in terms of content and not of form.[197]

The way the *ôwê* is used in the *minne*-digression in ›Titurel‹ calls to mind the *ôwê*-refrains and the bivalent emotionality in minnesong. It is another of the quasi-lyrical heteroglossia that pervade the text, from the conventionalized language of the court surrounding Sigune during her socialization at Kanvoleiz to the remarkably lyrical language of Sigune herself (stanzas 122–124), which will be examined in the next chapter.

Like the narrator's statements about the problems of youthful *minne*, Herzeloyde's complaint that Sigune's love is *alze fruo* proves equally difficult to make concrete:

> »Ich klage et, daz du bist alze fruo sîn âmîe.
> du wil den kumber erben, des Mahaude phlac bî dem talfîne Kurzkrîe.
> dicke ir ougen habent an im erfunden,
> daz er den brîs in mangen landen hielt under helme ûf gebunden«. (132)
>
> »I only lament that you have become [Schionatulander's] lover too soon. You will inherit the sorrow Mahaude felt for the Dauphin Gurzgri. Many a time her eyes saw how he won the prize in many lands as he fought under helmet«.

Neither in Herzeloyde's explanation, nor anywhere else in ›Titurel‹ or ›Parzival‹, is there any suggestion that the tragic outcome of the relationship between Schionatulander's parents has anything to do with insufficient age or experience.[198] As we shall see shortly, Herzeloyde's comments to Sigune are ambivalent in other respects, too, and they ultimately reveal more about the speaker's own relationship to courtly love than that of Sigune.

The negativity of the passage claiming that Schionatulander was *danoch nicht starc an sînem sinne* (47, 3) is of a different kind. This, too, is narrator commentary, and thus might be expected to be untrustworthy. Unlike the assertions of the *minne*-excursus, however, it represents a direct characterization that must be accepted as a factual description of Schionatulander. Since the statement is placed just before the *minne*-excursus, for which it functions as a sort of springboard, the connection between Schionatulander's

197 Further examples: Heinrich von Morungen, XII, ›Ist ir liep mîn leit‹ (MF, p. 256): *Sîst noch hiute vor den ougen mîn, alse sî was dô, / dô si minneclîche mir zuo sprach / und ich si ane sach. / ôwê, solte ich iemer stên alsô* (1, 5–8; see also 2, 6–8); Reinmar der Alte, XVIII, ›Mir ist ein nôt‹ (MF, p. 329): *sô gedenke ich, »ôwê, wie getuon ich wol!«*; Walther von der Vogelweide, ›Ir vil minneclîchen ougenblicke‹ (L 112, 17–34): *ôwê, sold ich si dicke / sehen, der ich mich für eigen gihe!* (1, 3–4); ›Uns hât der winter geschadet über al‹ (Fassung E, L 167, 1–115): *tuot man, daz man mir gelobet hât, / ôwê, wie hôhe denne mîn herze stât!* (L 167, 14–15). See also possibly L 69, 14 (Walther von der Vogelweide, Werke. Band 2: Liedlyrik, ed. GÜNTHER SCHWEIKLE, Stuttgart 1998).

198 Compare ›Titurel‹, 41–44, 89 and ›Parzival‹, 178. 15–24.

niht starke sinne and the narratorial reflection on *tumpheit* would seem to be clear. It seems obvious that these terms can be applied directly to the love confession immediately following the excursus. In awkward and comically precocious love-language, which they hardly understand or control, Schionatulander and Sigune are seen to demonstrate their *tumpheit* and *swache sinne*. Their decisions proceed, Parzival-like, from a misunderstanding and misapplication of »courtly protocol«, or an inability to control the discourse networks of courtly language. That is the standard view.

The example of Parzival suggests a completely different interpretation. The description of Schionatulander in 47, 3 invokes one of the central aspects of narrative romance structure à la Chrétien de Troyes: the traditional starting point of the hero in the inexperience of youth. Shortly beforehand, the narrator had announced that Schionatulander will become *dirre âventiure hêrre* (39, 4). When we now learn that he is *danoch niht starc an sînem sinne*, we feel securely situated within the basic starting coordinates of romance narrative. Schionatulander will take the path of the traditional Arthurian hero: in a brilliant coup he will achieve an initial success (lady, kingdom, recognition of the court). Then he will lose everything in a moment of crisis, since he does not possess *sin* enough to hold on to what he has achieved. In this particular case, of course, ›Titurel‹'s audience will already have known that something goes wrong with the traditional »second cycle« of trial and adventure, through which the Arthurian hero regains what he had lost and develops or is transformed in such a way that he can now hold onto it. Nonetheless, the expectation of his metamorphosis is clearly reflected in the text: Schionatulander is »not yet« (*danoch*) strong in mind, implying that he will be at some point. This comment is analogous to proleptic narrator assurances of the improvement of the flawed hero in earlier Arthurian romances.[199] The knowledge of Schionatulander's disaster in ›Parzival‹, far from destroying the genre expectation, will rather have heightened the audience's awareness of the narratorial coordinates in which his story is situated.[200]

Placed in this structural field, the love confession appears in a different light than the one suggested by the *minne*-excursus. It assumes the place of the first, rapid success of the hero, in which he demonstrates that he already

199 See Hartmann, ›Iwein‹, vv. 3027–8 (*sô was her Îwein âne strît / ein degen vordes und baz sît*); ›Parzival‹ 161. 7–8 (*sît dô er sich baz versan, / ungerne hete erz dô getân*).

200 My starting point for this analysis was CHRISTA ORTMANN, ›Titurel‹ im ›Parzival‹-Kontext. Zur Frage nach einer möglichen Strukturdeutung der Fragmente, Wolfram-Studien 6 (1980), pp. 25–47. The author argues in detail only about the first twelve stanzas; the rest of ›Titurel‹ is treated in very general terms. In her view, the first fragment represents the successful first »Bewährungs-*âventiure*«, approved by the court, the second fragment the moment of crisis (compare the table on pp. 43–44).

possesses all the qualities necessary to emerge as an autonomous subject into courtly society. And in fact, immediately before the conversation, Schionatulander's behavior and actions are suddenly commented very differently than in 47–49. Now he seems to reveal the very opposite of *swache sinne* and *tumpheit*:

> Schoynatulander moht ouch sîn wîse
> von manger süezen botschaft, die diu Franzoyse küngîn Anphlîse
> tougenlîche enbôt dem Anschevîne:
> die erwarb er unt wande in vil dicke ir sorge. nu wende ouch die sîne! (54)
>
> Schoynatulander vil dicke wart innen
> wie sîner muomen sun Gahmuret kunde sprechen mit manlîchen sinnen,
> unde wie sich der von kumber kunde scheiden:
> des iach im vil der tiuschen diet, als tæten ouch die werden heiden. (55)
>
> Schionatulander also had occasion to learn from many a sweet message the French queen Anphlise secretly sent to the Angevin. These he delivered, and often averted their sorrow – avert now his own! Schionatulander also very often had occasion to observe how Gahmuret, the son of his mother's sister, could speak well with manly sense and shed his cares. Many Germans said as much about him, as did the worthy heathens.

Apparently, Schionatulander's *niht starken sinne* and their consequences are to be revealed only in the longer term. His words to Sigune are to be taken as *wîse* and *mit sinnen*, at least in the provisional or proximate sense of the initially successful Arthurian hero – like Hartmann's Erec, for example, who behaves as a *vol karger man* during the first course of his adventures prior to his *verlegen* at Karnant.[201] His conversation with Sigune, in effect, is Schionatulander's first knightly *âventiure*, as the narrator makes explicitly clear in the stanza immediately preceding his first words:

> Alle die minne phlagen unt minne an sich leiten,
> nu hœret magetlîche sorge unt manheit mit den arbeiten.
> dâ von ih wil âventiure künden
> den rehten, die durch herzeliebe ie senende nôt erfunden. (59)[202]
>
> All those who ever loved and were loved, listen now to maidenly worries and manhood in travail. Of these things I will tell an adventure to the worthy, those who have experienced the longing of love in their hearts.

The same thing might have been said of Erec's battle with Iders at Tulmein with Enite looking on.

201 Hartmann, ›Erec‹, v. 2381.

202 Against G, in which it interrupts the conversation shortly after it has begun, I follow the traditional editorial practice of placing this stanza at the beginning of the conversation. See BFJ, p. 262.

IV

At the end of Schionatulander's and Sigune's conversation, the narrator comments: *Diz was der anevanc ir gesellesche̊fte mit worten* (73, 1–2). Many scholars detect a note of reservation or negative judgment here: »This was the beginning of their relationship, but only in words«, i.e., not in deeds, not a *gesellesche̊fte mit werken*.[203] This view usually stands in the service of some version of the non-autonomy thesis. According to SIEGFRIED CHRISTOPH, for example, the narrator's observation reveals that »Schionatulander and Sigune, unfortunately, believe that courtly rhetoric and etiquette represent and exclusive and absolute ›modus operandi‹ to guide their relationship«. KIENING/KÖBELE point on this occasion to an »insecure and non-autonomous speaking about love«, of which, in their view, the conversation is largely composed.[204]

But there is no word for »only« in 73, 1–2. The negative value judgment implicit in »only words« is an interpretive construction. And it is hard to reconcile with the content of stanza 59, which introduces the conversation not as »only words« or as prolegomena to an important event, but as an event in its own right, an *âventiure* in which acts of »manly travail« and »feminine worry« are already occurring. What the narrator's comment in 73, 1–2 means, I believe, is that we are to interpret Sigune's and Schionatulander's conversation as a kind of »discursive« event. Indeed, much is accomplished by means of words. Schionatulander confesses his love, overcomes a good deal of resistance in convincing Sigune to admit her own feelings, and then together they decide the form their *minne* will take and the conditions of its ultimate fulfillment. The event-like significance of the confession is the transformation of thoughts into words, of secrecy into communication. The contrast implicit in 73, 1–2 is not yet between *worten* and the *werken* that are supposed to follow (it will be on a later occasion, in the very similar narratorial comments in stanza 175, 1–2) but between *worten* and what has proceeded them: thoughts, *gedanken*.

The translation of secret thoughts and emotions into commensurate language, of non-communicative into communicative love, is the most important aspect of Sigune's and Schionatulanders' conversation. This process is initiated and guided by Schionatulander, and it is one to which Sigune is initially resistant. Although this is true of both manuscript versions, which differ in the stanzaic order and in several points of content, the centrality of the transition between thoughts and words is somewhat more pronounced in H. Here the conversation culminates in two pairs of stanzas (H 64–67) that temporarily interrupt the single-stanza back and forth of the rest of the exchange. The

203 The translation is that of GIBBS/JOHNSON, p. 73. HEINZLE I, p. 117.

204 SIEGFRIED R. CHRISTOPH, Wolfram von Eschenbach's Couples, Amsterdam 1981, p. 183. KIENING/KÖBELE, p. 248.

whole dialogue is sixteen stanzas long; Sigune's stanza-pair forms the last two stanzas of the first group of eight, Schionatulander's the first two stanzas of the second group of eight.[205] Their thematic centrality lies in the fact that before this part of their talk, Sigune is unwilling to confess her love, whereas thereafter she suddenly does. I include here the flanking stanzas[206]:

Schionatulander:

»Ich weiz wol, du bist landes und liute grôziu frouwe.
des beger ich alles niht, wan daz dîn herze dur diu ougen mich anschouwe,
alsô daz ez den kumber mîn bedenke.
tuo der minne ir reht, ê die minne uns beide die sinne verkrenke!«

(H 63, G 56, BFJ 62)

Sigune:

»Swer sô minne hât, daz sîn minne ist gewære
gegen einem als lieben friunde, als du mir bist, der mac wol leben âne swære.
wirt aber von mir genant iemer minne,
got weiz wol, daz ich niht erkenne weder minnen flust noch ir gewinne«.[207]

(H 64, G 57, BFJ 63)

Ist minne ein ›si‹ oder ein ›er‹? magst du mir minne bediuten?
und ist minne ein ›si‹, kumet mir minne, wie sol ich si triuten?

205 Manuscript H comes to an end after only twelve stanzas of the conversation (H 68, G 61, BFJ 67); the sixteen-stanza length is a conjecture based on G. I follow H as far as it goes because of its importance in the rest of my study, but also because of what BERND SCHIROK has shown to be its »unity in the thought process« vis-à-vis G (Leuvense Bijdragen 63 [1974], pp. 370–71; see also further comments in support of H in HEINZLE II, p. 492). In the commentary to their new edition, BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE provide structural arguments on behalf of the schema in G (BFJ, pp. 253), citing the existence of discrete »modes of speaking«. I find these artificial. It is claimed, for example, that stanzas 56–63 represent a section of »formal, courtly use of language« contrasting with two other sections of the dialogue, which represent »allegorization« and »emotionality« (*Betroffenheit*), respectively. But I do not see how Schionatulander's passionate declaration in 62, 2–4, for example, is »formal« in nature. It seems much more representative of »emotionality«, especially since his exhortation in 62, 4 is very similar to 67, 4. BFJ do admit that the dominant modes they identify are »in no way proportionally balanced or sharply separated«, but the schema they propose seems too sophisticated and refined to be convincing without sharp distinction and balanced proportions.

206 H manuscript quoted and normalized from HEINZLE I.

207 Sigune's resistance is more sharply formulated in G 57: »*Swer sô minne hât, daz sîn minne ist gevære / deheinem als lieben friunt, als du mir bist, daz wort im gebære / wirt von mir nimer benennet minne*«.

muoz ich [si] behalten bî den tocken?
fliuget minne ungerne ûf die hant durch die wilde? ich kan minne wol locken«.[208]

(H 65, G 58, BFJ 64)

Schionatulander:

»Frouwe, ih hân vernomen von frouwen und von mannen,
minne kan den iungen, den alten sô schuzlîchen spannen,
daz si mit gedanken sêre schiuzet.
si triffet âne wenken, daz loufet, kriuchet, fliuget oder fliuzet.

(H 66, G 59, BFJ 65)

Dâ erkantest du, süeziu maget, minne wol von mæren.
minne ist an gedanken; daz mac ich wol mit mir selbem bewæren.
des betwinget es die starke liebe.
minne stilt ûz mînem herzen vröude und clâre varwe ez entöhte einem diebe«.[209]

(H 67, G 62, BFJ 68)

Sigune:

»Schîonatulander, mich twingent gedanke
wenn ich dich nicht ensihe, sô bin ich an vröuden diu krancke
unze ich dich aber tougenlîche erblicke.
sus trûre ich in der wochen niht zeinem mâle, ez ergêt mir leider alze dicke«.[210]

(H 68, G 60, BFJ 66)

»I well know that you are a great lady, as far as land and people are concerned. I have no desire for any of that, only that your heart look at me through your gaze in such a way that it take heed of my suffering. Now do right by Love, before Love destroys our minds!« »If somebody loves in such a way that his love for such a close friend, as you are to me, is sincere, he can live without care. But even if I were to use the word ›Love‹, God knows I do not know Love's losses nor Love's joys. Is Love a ›she‹ or a ›he‹? Can you define Love for me? And if Love is a ›she‹, if Love comes to me, how shall I woo it? Should I keep it with my dolls? Does Love not like to fly to the hand, on account of its feral nature? I can certainly attract Love«. »Lady, I have heard from women and men that Love can so draw the bow on young and old that it shoots thoughts painfully. It hits unerringly whatever runs, crawls, flies, or swims. You seem to have learned, sweet maiden, of Love from tales. Love is a matter of thoughts – that I certainly know, from my own experience«. »Schionatulander, thoughts overwhelm me as soon as you are out of my sight, such that I am bereft of joy until I secretly catch sight of you again. I grieve like this more than just once a week – it happens to me, unfortunately, all too often«.

208 In G 58, Sigune asks Schionatulander if love is *ein êre* and/or *ein site* (»something honorable«, »a custom«). There is an obvious lexical connection between *êre/site* and *er/si* (H), but it has proven impossible to determine whether the latter forms derive from the former or the former from the latter (see the discussion in BFJ, p. 275). In my view, this is the only content difference between the two manuscripts versions of the dialogue that could seriously affect interpretation, since the question about the social status and nature of love (especially in tandem with Sigune's sharp critique in G 57) can be interpreted as much more serious than the non-committal, literary play implied in the questions about love's gender in the H manuscript. Nonetheless, as BFJ point out (p. 275), *êre and site* can themselves also be understood as allegorical personifications.

209 In G 62, it is Schionatulander himself who has experience with the *mæren*, and there is a temporal dimension (*ê* vs. *nu*) between the external and the internal experience. *»Iâ erkande ih, süezzie maget, ê wol minne von mæren. / minne ist an gedanken, daz mac ich nu mit mir selbem bewæren«.*

210 HEINZLE I, p. 112.

The differences between Sigune's and Schionatulander's socializations are very clearly at work throughout their conversation. Sigune's resistance to Schionatulander is predicated on her experience of love as a literary phenomenon. Her reference to *tocken* is an allusion to the central fiction of her existence, her self-understanding as a courtly *frouwe* for whom *minne* is, first and foremost, an object or a being to be manipulated, not a passion to be directly experienced nor, indeed, any kind of interiority at all. She tells Schionatulander that she might use the word *minne*, but it does not correspond to anything she has ever felt herself. Then she seeks to steer the conversation in a different direction with literary questions about the nature of love.

But Schionatulander manages to overcome this resistance and bring Sigune to admit that she does indeed have true feelings of love. The subtle nature of the manner in which he does this has not been fully appreciated, nor the extent to which he uses traditional discourse about love as a tool. Instead of continuing to insist in the passionate vein of H 63, Schionatulander temporarily retreats from his inwardness and meets Sigune on her own level. Without actually playing her question-game, he agrees that in order to understand *minne*, one has to begin with the public discourse about what love is, with »literature«, as it were. He first mentions his own experience in the matter: he has learned about love from »women and men«. Then he tells Sigune he understands that she, too, has learned about love from external sources, from *mæren* (H 67), a word denoting a broad range of verbal communications, from oral conversation and gossip to formal narratives, both written and oral. After establishing this common ground, Schionatulander distinguishes between the outside world of public discourse and an internal space of individual cognition and reflection, exhorting his beloved to consider that real love is found in the internal, mental-emotional world (*minne ist an gedanken*), a world with which he has personal experience (*daz mac ich wol mit mir selbem bewæren*). His comment that *minne* is derived from *liebe* seems to be an effort to get around Sigune's semantic objection to the word *minne* (H 64, 3).

In order to make the connection between the external world of love discourse and the internal world of love experience plausible for his companion,

Schionatulander uses a metaphor: the love-goddess shooting *mit gedanken*. The personification of love as an archer is, of course, a common literary device in the Middle Ages, throughout which the antique-classical imagery of love, received primarily through Ovid, was central.[211] Likewise, a period of reflective thought at the beginning of a love relationship is characteristic of much later minnesong and courtly epic.[212] But Wolfram's use of the archer-topos is unusual in two ways. First of all, we are dealing here not with a literary topos per se, but with the narratively displaced representation of a literary topos: Schionatulander is the one who articulates it, not the narrator, and he uses it to describe how courtly society in the textual world – *frouwen und mannen* – talks about itself in the language of literature and poetry. We have already noted this tendency in chapter 3 when we discussed the court's hyperbolic, quasi-literary praise of Sigune. Secondly, as far as I can determine, the image of love shooting with thoughts is used nowhere else in medieval literature.[213] In a sense, this image, too, is a paradox, an impossible hybrid: love considered as thoughts – i.e., in abstract terms – contradicts the externalizing, pictographic operation of symbolic discourse, which reduces an abstract concept to a concrete image or personification (love as an archer-goddess). Love shooting thoughts is a symbol of de-symbolizing internalization.[214]

Julius Schwietering, referring to Wolfram's well-known critique in ›Parzival‹ of Heinrich von Veldeke's Ovidian interpretation of *minne*,[215] speaks of the destructively »abstract« (*unbildlich*) nature of this image, identifying as the intended target Veldeke's »facile love-allegorizations«: »Wolfram, who destroys the image of the archer through abstract elucidation, [...] hides, in a

211 See RENATE KISTLER, Heinrich von Veldeke und Ovid. Tübingen 1993, pp. 4–25.

212 See RÜDIGER SCHNELL, Causa Amoris. Liebeskonzeption und Liebesdarstellung in der mittelalterlichen Literatur. Verona, Munich 1985, pp. 139–140.

213 Another suggestive – though incomparably more brutal – refiguration of the love/archery topos is found in ›Willehalm‹, where Vivianz is run through by Noupatris' lance, which is compared to the *bühse* and *gêr* of *Amor der minnen got* (25. 14–19). Here we would have to speak of the »hyperpictorial« nature of Wolfram's destruction/deconstruction of the Veldeke-imagery. The alternative interpretation of ›Titurel‹ 65, 2 such that the lover himself is the arrow might have a precedent in Origen's references to Isaiah 49, 2 (*Dominus* [...] *posuit me sicut sagittam electam, in faretra sua abscondit me* [...]) in Book III of his Commentary to the Song of Songs and in his second homily on the Sond of Songs (See Origen, The Song of Songs. Commentary and Homilies, ed., Johannes Quasten and Joseph Plumpe, Trans. R.P. Lawson. Westminster, Maryland and London: Newman Press, Longmans, Green and Co., 1957, pp. 198, 297).

214 Very similarly BFJ, p. 282.

215 See ›Parzival‹, 292, 18–25 and 532, 1–10.

very roguish manner, his mockery of Veldeke's allegorical artifices beneath a mask of naïve, childlike wisdom«.[216]

Yet the significance of the passage is not exhausted at the level of authorial polemic, in the extension of the ›Parzival‹-narrator's critique of the »unwholesome« (*ungehiure*) love caused by the arrows and firebrands of Cupid, Amor and Venus.[217] In ›Titurel‹, it is Sigune herself who represents the Veldeke-like standpoint. With her questions about the gender and the creaturely manifestations of *minne*, Sigune is attempting to distract her earnest companion with literary sophistries, with »joyfully ironic doubts about who, among all the arduously conjured male and female love dieties from [Veldeke's] ›Eneide‹, the real Lady Love actually is«.[218] Whatever barb for the Veldeke-school it may contain on the narratorial level, Wolfram's unusual *minne*-topos can also be seen in terms of a clever rhetorical maneuver on the part of Schionatulander. Proceeding from Sigune's own Veldeke-like standpoint, Schionatulander deftly reconfigures her discourse to sublate itself, transporting his beloved from the non-committal play of literary allegory to the inner world of her own psyche. This is another example of the way ›Titurel‹ translates thematic material from the narratorial level in ›Parzival‹ into the characterological world. In ›Parzival‹, Wolfram the narrator critiques Veldeke's love imagery. In ›Titurel‹, Schionatulander takes over the ›Parzival‹-narrator's stance and uses it to critique Sigune's Veldeke-like understanding and lead her into a deeper, more inward experience of love.

This move is strikingly effective. Suddenly abandoning her resistance, Sigune expresses passionate feelings, and in a language of *gedanken* Schionatulander has defined for her. This is the turning point in the conversation, a fact that seems to be reflected in the H manuscript, which contains only one further stanza: Schionatulander tells Sigune that she has no further cause to ask questions about love, since it is clear she already knows the answers. He urges her to take action on her feelings:

> »Sône darft du, süeziu maget, mich niht frâgen von minne.
> sô wirt dir âne frâge wol kunt minnen flust und ir gewinne.
> sich wie der minne ûz fröude in sorge werbe!
> tuo der minne ir reht, ê diu minne uns beide in den herzen verderbe!«
>
> (H 69, BFJ 67)

216 JULIUS SCHWIETERING, Typologisches in mittelalterlicher Dichtung, in: Vom Werden des deutschen Geistes. Festgabe Gustav Ehrismann zum 8. Oktober 1925, dargebracht von Freunden und Schülern, ed. WOLFGANG STAMMLER and PAUL MERKER, Berlin, Leipzig, 1925, pp. 40–55, here p. 45.

217 *Manec mîn meister sprichet sô / daz Amor und Cupîdô / unt der zweier muoter Vênus / den liuten minne gebn alsus / mit geschôze und mit fiure. / diu minne ist ungehiure* (532. 1–6).

218 SCHWIETERING, p. 45.

»You see, sweet maid, you need not ask me of love! Love's losses and gains will be well known to you without asking. See how love turns joy to sorrow; give love its due, before love ruins us both in our hearts!«

This is not the end of the conversation in G. There, Sigune does, in fact, ask several further questions (69–70), and the form the couple ultimately gives to their mutually-recognized *minne*, that of a love service relationship, is more Sigune's choice than Schionatulander's. We will return to this section later.

Readings that interpret the conversation in such a way as to highlight the characters' awkwardness and immature, limited understanding of their emotions and discourses do not do full justice to what Sigune and Schionatulander actually do accomplish. They get together under their own motivation, unescorted by the guiding hand of initiating and authorizing figures so evident in the tradition. They succeed in finding a proper language and in giving their relationship a proper form. Their approach to each other does not proceed in the violent, pseudo-spontaneous manner of the early courtly romances, where the protagonists are suddenly torn out of a willful ignorance of love under assault from the arrows and fires of amour. It is also not a manner of pure natural instinct, as it is for Parzival and Condwiramurs, who, although completely ignorant of love, nonetheless spontaneously do things correctly (at least eventually).

Rather, Schionatulander and Sigune act with consideration, intentionality, and in conscious reference to societal models. This is primarily true of Schionatulander, of course, who guides the conversation. Despite his *herzen nôt*, he proceeds rationally. Faced with Sigune's rejection, he reflects on what he has learned from the communications between Gahmuret and Anphlise, and how Gahmuret verbally handled his emotions. Stanzas 54–55 prefigure what Schionatulander tells Sigune he has learned concerning love *von frouwen und von mannen* and *von mæren*. His own *gedanken* and inner experience of love, as well as those of Sigune, have grown organically from, not in opposition to, this public discourse of *minne*. This representation of the initiation into love breaks radically with the images of sudden seizures of passion and the overthrow of reason in the earlier courtly romances, but is no less convincing an invocation of emotional intensity and authenticity of feeling. Modern readers will probably find it more convincing. The conversation demonstrates, in effect, that Sigune and Schionatulander »begreifen, was sie ergreift«.

It is crucial to stress Sigune's participation in this rational process of love communication. Despite the fact Schionatulander leads, Sigune does follow. She renounces – at least for the time being – the inaccessibility of the »literary« *minnefrouwe* and the preoccupation with love as allegorical play and object-manipulation. She possesses true interiority of love, and confesses it. Schionatulander's experience of the relationship between societal discourse and individual experience is also her experience. Despite what we have seen

of her socialization, the literary *minnefrouwe* is not all there is to Sigune. She can choose to act differently. This will be very important for our understanding of ›Titurel's‹ final scene.

All this is not to say that the love-conversation conveys no awkward and humorous effect, nor to deny that it creates a general impression of two very young and inexperienced adolescents mimicking and ventriloquizing the adult world. It is a question of emphasis and developmental process. I believe that the conversation reveals the characters not as helpless objects of autonomous discursive processes and courtly protocols they cannot control, but as subjects freshly emerging into individual discursive autonomy. By referring *expressis verbis* to conventional modes of discourse and behavior, they show themselves to be conscious of the trans-subjective, societal mediation of their individual emotions, revealing a self-reflexive insight into the process of subjectivization in which they are caught up. And we have every reason to think that medieval readers already interpreted the text in this way. As we saw in chapter two, Ottokar von Steiermark refers to the *kindlîchiu jâr* of Sigune and Schionatulander not by way of comparison, but rather by way of strong contrast to the immaturity of a typical pair of medieval children.[219] In Ottokar's reading, the young lovers of ›Titurel‹ demonstrate the precise opposite of childish *kranke witze*.

But by the same token, just because Sigune and Schionatulander are autonomous subjects able to control courtly discourse and protocol provides no guarantee that they will, in fact, ultimately succeed in doing so.

V

The fact that the confession scene takes place within a secrecy conditioned by the exigencies and the »right« of »good breeding« and »high birth« also attests to the positive character and appropriateness of the lover's behavior.[220] Such a secrecy is, however, by its very nature foreordained for revelation, the lovers' words and decisions pre-appointed for exposure and examination. As we have seen, this is intimated from the beginning, both in the narrative commentary and in the symbolic body-language of the figures. The ensuing interviews between Schionatulander and Gahmuret (97–112) and Sigune and Herzeloyde (116–136) represent the moment in which this secrecy comes to its appointed end.

These interviews reveal a certain ambivalence in the character of the young lover's guardians. Both Gahmuret and Herzeloyde are playing dual

219 *si liezen wênic sich belangen / senlichen nâch einander / als Schionatulander / tet nâch sîner froun, / der klâren Sigoun, / in ir kintlichen jâren, / darzuo disiu wâren / bî ze kranken witzen* (›Österreichische Reimchronik‹, vv. 17990–997).

220 A second, short interview, also in secret, takes place just before Schionatulander departs with Gahmuret for the orient (76–77). I examine it below, pp. 127–128.

roles. On the one hand they are, of course, themselves as individuals, both of whose idiosyncratic biographies are fully known from ›Parzival‹. On the other hand they represent and »stand in for« courtly society as a whole. Their actions and words vis-à-vis Schionatulander and Sigune are simultaneously personal/idiosyncratic and trans-personal/symbolic.

In the case of Gahmuret, this duality is expressed in the strangely convoluted narrative description of his acts of observation:

> Schoynatulander vil nœte truoc verborgen,
> ê daz der werde Gahmuret wurde inne al spehende der helbæren sorgen,
> daz sîn liebester mâc sus ranc mit kumber.
> er kal et al die mânen, swie sich diu zît huop, den winder unt den summer.
>
> Von angeborner art sô wunschlîch geschicke,
> sîn vel, diu liehten ougen, swaz man dâ kôs des antlützes blicke,
> schiet dur nôt von lûterlîchem glanze.
> des twanc in niht ein dürkelz wenken, ez tet starkiu liebe diu ganze.
>
> Gahmuretes herze ouch von minnen getwenget
> was, von der minnen ir hitze, unt ir âsanc im hete under wîlen besenget
> sîn lûter vel, daz ez mit truopheit kunde.
> minne helfe er ein teil hete enphangen, er wesse ouch ir twinclîche stunde.
>
> Swie listec sî diu minne, si muoz sich enblecken:
> swer treit der minne al spehende künstec ougen, dâ kan sich ir kraft niht verdecken.
> si ist ouch ein winkelmez, hœr ich si zîhen:
> si entwirfet unde stricket vil spæhe, noch baz dane spelten unt drîhen.
>
> Gahmuret wart innen der helbæren swære,
> daz der iunge talfîn ûz Grâsivalden was fröuden alsô lære.
> er nam in sunder ûf daz velt von der strâze:
> »wie vert sus Anphlîsen knappe? dîn trûren kumt mir niht ze mâze«. (93–97)

> Schionatulander endured many pains in secret before the noble Gahmuret, watchful as he was, noticed those hidden sorrows and how his dearest kinsman was wrestling with Love's torment. He suffered every moon as the seasons changed, winter and summer alike. His natural good looks, product of his heritage, his complexion, his bright eyes, what could be seen of his glances – all this was separated from radiance by sorrow. It wasn't tattered fickleness that caused that, but the whole cloth of Love. Gahmuret's heart had also been burned by Love, by Love's heat, and its fire had at times singed his pure white skin, such that it became dark. Of Love's succor he had received some share, though he also knew its oppression. As clever as Love is, it must revel itself. He who has all-seeing, practiced eyes, looking upon Love, cannot fail to notice its power. It is also a T-square, I've heard tell, and it sketches and weaves designs better than bobbins and shuttles can do. Gahmuret recognized Schionatulander's secret pain and how the young Dauphin from Graswaldan was so bereft of joys. He took him aside from the street onto the field: »How fares Anphlise's squire? Your sorrow does not sit well with me«.

We have already explored the paradoxically dual quality of Schionatulander's *helbære sorgen*. In fact, the representation of visual perception is paradoxical throughout the whole Gahmuret-Schionatulander episode. Stanza 93 tells us, on the one hand, that Schionatulander manages to conceal his *sorgen* for a considerable period of time before (*ê daz*) Gahmuret perceives what is going on. The length of time is underscored three times: Schionatulander suffers during many moons, the changing of the seasons, and both winter and summer.[221] On the other hand, however, Gahmuret is also described as *al spehende*, »watching closely«, »carefully observing«. It is possible, of course, to interpret this passage to the effect that Gahmuret observes Schionatulander's sufferings for a long time before he decides to intervene.[222] But stanza 97, repeating the same act of recognition (*inne werden*) as in 93, suggests that he takes Schionatulander aside as soon as he notices what is going on. Furthermore, shortly into their conversation, Gahmuret's repeated exhortation, mixed with mild reproach, that Schionatulander »not conceal his secret« implies an impatience to discover the truth that belies any delay – much less such a long one as described in 93, 4 – between his recognition and his intervention.[223]

The next passages are similarly disjunct. Stanza 94 represents Schionatulander's love-suffering in terms of physiognomic changes conspicuous to everybody (*swaz man dâ kôs*). This clearly reminds us of the description of *minne under kinder* in the excursus, which is »obvious even to a blind man«. Yet the next two stanzas go on to explain how only someone with Gahmuret's specialized knowledge and experience possesses the *al spehende künstec ougen* necessary to penetrate the workings of *listec* and *vil spæhe minne*.

It seems that two kinds of perception are at work here. On the one hand normal, empirical observation through the physical eye, a kind of scrutiny Schionatulander manages to avoid for a conspicuously long time, even from Gahmuret, who is in the know concerning the symptoms of love. In contrast,

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221 On the time expression in 93, 4, see BFJ, pp. 331–332.

222 HEINZLE interprets 93, 2 (*wurde inne al spehende*) in the durative sense: »Indem [Gahmuret Schionatulander] ständig beobachtete«. For 96, 2 he provides no separate interpretation, referring to the prior usage (HEINZLE I, pp. 138, 142. See also SCHIROK's review of HEINZLE I, Leuvense Bijdragen, p. 369). BFJ translate both appearances of al spehende intensively: »genau beobacht[end]« and »umsichtig spähend« (pp. 115, 117).

223 »*Du solt mih dîniu tougen niht helen, sît wir sîn sô nâhen gemâge*« (100, 2); »*Hilest du mich dîn tougen, dâ mite ist versêret / mîn herze, daz dîn herze ie was, unt hât sich dîn triuwe geunêret, / ob du mir sô grôze nôt entwildest. / des nemac ich dîner stæte niht getrûwen, daz du sô wanklîche unbildest*« (102).

the *al spehende künstec ougen* penetrating the obscure machinations of love evoke an imagery that seems to transcend corporeal limitations. We are strongly reminded of the religious topos of the *cordis scrutator*, the image of God as the all-seeing inspector of the secrets of the human heart.[224] In a context in which sensualized etymologies is at work, the literal meaning of the expression, »all seeing, knowledgeable eyes«, is powerfully suggested.[225]

It is noteworthy that the only other appearance of the motif of the *cordis scrutator* in Wolfram's oeuvre occurs under analogous narrative circumstances, during the confessional scene between the desperate Parzival, who has been suffering in secret for a long time, and his older relative and mentor Trevrizent in Book IX the Grail romance:

> »[werdiu hulde] treit der durch gedanke vert.
> gedanc sich sunnen blickes wert:
> gedanc ist âne slôz bespart,
> vor aller crêatiure bewart:
> gedanc ist vinster âne schîn.
> diu gotheit kan lûter sîn,
> si glestet durch der vinster want,
> und hât den heleden sprunc gerant,
> der endiuzet noch enklinget,
> sô er vom herzen springet.
> ez ist dehein gedanc sô snel,
> er vom herzen vür dez vel
> küm, ern sî versuochet:
> des kiuschen got geruochet.
> sît got gedanke speht sô wol,
> ôwê der brœden werke dol!« (466. 15–30).

224 The main biblical passage is Wisdom, 1, 6 (*quoniam renum illius testis est Deus et cordis eius scrutator est verus et linguae illius auditor*); see also 1 Samuel 16, 7; 1 Chronicles 29, 17; Psalms, 7, 10; Jeremiah 17, 10; Romans 8, 27. Patristic literature: Jerome, ›Ad Innocentium presbyterum septies percussa‹ (Letter 1), 3.3; Augustine, ›De mendatio‹, 16, 31. For the motif in medieval courtly literature, see Andreas Capellanus, ›De Amore‹, Book 1, VI, 296; Hartmann von Aue, ›Der arme Heinrich‹, vv. 1356–60: *do erkande [der maget] triuwe unde nôt / cordis speculator, / vor dem deheines herzen tor / vürnames niht beslozzen ist* (On the othewise not attested form cordis speculator and for other references to the topical complex see ANTON SCHÖNBACH, Über Hartmann von Aue, Graz 1894, pp. 76–77).

225 The fact that the expression *al spehende* does not appear in Albrecht's ›Jüngerer Titurel‹ provides additional evidence for its aesthetic difficulty: *e daz der werde Gamuret inne wart der helbœren sorgen* (767, 2); *Gamuret den selben pin erkant und all die swere / daz der junge talfin uz Graswald was vreuden also lere* (771, 1–2).

> »This grace is His who penetrates our thoughts. Thoughts can be hidden from the light of the sun; they are secure without a lock, proof against all creatures; thoughts are darkness without light. Only the Deity can be so pure and bright that it pierces this wall of darkness, like a rider running to the attack, but soundless and unseen. There is no thought so swift, as it springs from the heart, but that, before it can pass from the heart out through the skin, it is already judged by God. Pure thoughts He approves. Since God perceives thoughts so clearly, alas that our feeble works grieve Him!«

In the same way the doll-scene represents a displaced hagiographic *praefiguratio* and Sigune's pubescence the *fremdiu wunder* of a displaced transsubstantiation, stanzas 93–97 in ›Titurel‹ present us with a displaced version of the divine visuality contained in the passage from ›Parzival‹. The clandestine confession scene, we recall, has defined love above all in terms of secret *gedanken*.[226] On his travels with Gahmuret and his large retinue, Schionatulander's thoughts remain hidden from the outside world, though their effects are plain to see; we might say they are *âne slôz bespart*, in the language of the above passage from ›Parzival‹. On the individual-biographic level, Gahmuret is a mere mortal who, for any number of perfectly plausible reasons (he has been occupied with his own thoughts of Herzeloyde, with the military campaign; Schionatulander is only one of a sizeable retinue, etc.) does not notice for a long that his young cousin is suffering. On the »sociological« level of the narrative, however, Gahmuret is the representative of courtly society, to whose scrutiny and observation Schionatulander's secrecy has always already been subjected. The *al spehende künstec ougen* are the metaphorical eyes of this social providence; Gahmuret merely slips behind them in his capacity as representative *scrutator* of his ward's courtly heart. This transcendent, always-already dimension of Gahmuret's representative sight is well captured in WOLFGANG MOHR's translation of *al spehende* in these stanzas: »eh der edle Gahmuret vorwissend inne ward der verhohlenen Sorgen [Schionatulanders]«; »Wer Minne klug im voraus ins Auge faßt«.[227]

The duality of Herzloyde's role in the text is expressed in a very different way – not with metaphorical subtleties, but in a strongly-marked rupture in the representation of her personality. Herzeloyde's personal attitude towards *minne* is highly conflicted, making it difficult for her to assume the role of spokesperson for courtly society her relationship with Sigune requires her to be. However, in this case, too, the discrepancy is first expressed in Herzeloyde's visual perception of Sigune's doleful behavior.

226 65, 3; 66, 1; 68, 2.

227 MOHR, Wolfram von Eschenbach. ›Titurel‹. Lieder, p. 39, my emphasis. Unfortunately, Mohr seems to have made no further comment on the passage in his writings.

For Gahmuret, it is immediately obvious that Schionatulander's problem is lovesickness,[228] and he urges the latter to divulge his secret.[229] Herzeloyde, too, recognizes what is going on with her ward: *diu küngîn wart innen mit herzen schrick, was Sigûne dolte* (114, 4). As far as I have been able to determine, the verb *inne werden* – which is also used to characterize Gahmuret's perception – always implies the truth or accuracy of what is recognized.[230] The expression *waz Sigûne dolte* makes it clear that Herzeloyde does not simply see that Sigune is suffering, but rather what she is suffering, i.e. love. Thus a misrecognition of Sigune's problem seems unlikely.[231] Moreover, the expression *herzen schrick* is very strong language, connoting a sudden surge of mortal fear,[232] a reaction for which there would presumably be good reason.

The accuracy of Herzeloyde's perception that *minne* is at work is therefore triply determined. Yet when she addresses Sigune directly, her words belie this recognition. She speaks as if she believes the cause of Sigune's *pîne* (116, 4) to be some political issue concerning her kingdom and its inhabitants: »*An lande unt an liuten, sprich, waz dir werre!*« (117, 1), an issue Sigune's exile from Katelangen prevents her from dealing with: »*ellendiu maget, nu muoz mich dîn ellende erbarmen*«. (118, 1).

This scene is parallel to Sigune's own misunderstanding of Schionatulander's words at the beginning of the love confession. Sigune, too, initially believed her friend's *kumber* to be some sort of political problem, with which she, unfortunately, cannot help him, being »*reht ein weise, aller mâge unt der liute mînes landes ellende*« (61, 4; see also 62, 1). But Sigune's misrecognition was sincere, prompted by Schionatulander's beating around the bush with vague talk of *hilfe* and *genâde*. In contrast, Sigune's symptoms of lovesickness, her »message« to Herzeloyde, speak a clear language:

> Rehte als ein touwec rôse unt al naz von rœte,
> sus wurden ir diu ougen: ir munt, al ir antlütze enphant wol der nœte.
> dô kunde ir kiusche niht verdecken
> die lieplîchen liebe in ir herzen: daz kal sus nâch kintlîchem recken. (115)

228 »*ich spür an dir die minne: alze grôz ist ir slâge!*« (100, 1).
229 100, 2; 102.
230 See also 55, 1.
231 MARGARET RICHEY, The Titurel of Wolfram von Eschenbach: Structure and Character, in: Modern Language Review 56 (1961), pp. 180–193: »Herzeloyde evades the main issue in suggesting her niece may be pining for her own land and people« (p. 188). Compare BFJ, p. 364. See my review of BFJ in: PBB 126 (2004), Heft 2, pp. 350–356, here p. 355.
232 Compare ›Parzival‹, 360, 20 and 597, 27. The expression seems to be unattested before Wolfram. Albrecht also employs it on multiple occasions: 916, 2; 1210, 4; 4206, 2; 4925, 4; 4949, 1.

> Just like a dewy rose, all wet from redness – so her eyes became; her mouth and all her face showed her sorrow. Then her modesty could not conceal the sweet love in her heart, which was grieving for a boy-knight far away.

This is a language Gahmuret (at least when he finally takes notice) has no trouble understanding from Schionatulander's very similar symptoms (93, 4–94). After she »recognized what Sigune was suffering«, it hardly seems credible that Herzeloyde would not also interpret the signs correctly. So she must be dissimulating or in denial. But why? We also do not immediately discover the reason for Herzeloyde's *herzen schrick*. To be sure, she speaks of a »new thorn« growing into her »melancholy« now that she knows Sigune is suffering (116, 4). But sympathy and compassion can hardly account for the sense of startled shock in *schric*.[233]

Once Sigune admits that her sorrow is due to *minne*, we learn the real reason for Herzeloyde's initial reaction. Whereas Gahmuret expresses – after a brief admonition to which we will return – unadulterated joy upon hearing Schionatulander's confession (108–111), Herzeloyde launches into an astonishing fit of wild invective:

> »Owê«, sprach diu küngîn, »du redest nâch den wîsen!
> wer hât dich mir verrâten? nu fürht ich der Franzoysære küngîn Anphlîsen,
> daz sich habe ir zorn an mir gerochen.
> al dîniu wîslîchen wort sint ûz ir munde gesprochen!
> Schoynatulander ist hôch rîcher fürste.
> sîn edelkeit, sîn kiusche getörste doch nimer genenden an die getürste,
> daz sîn iugent nâch dîner minne spræche,
> op sich der stolzen Anphlîsen haz an mir mit hazze niene ræche.
>
> Si zôch daz selbe kint, sît ez der brust wart enphüeret.
> gap si niht durch triegen den rât, der dich hât als unsanfte gerüeret,
> du maht im, er dir vil fröuden erwerben.
> sîstu im holt, sô lâ dînen wunschlîchen lîp niht verderben!« (127–129)

> »Alas«, said the Queen, »You talk like someone with experience! Who has betrayed you on my account? I fear the queen of the French has taken revenge upon me in her anger. All of your wise words are spoken from her mouth! Schionatulander is a high and powerful prince. But his nobility and modesty would never have ventured to the point where his youth would have made a claim on your love unless proud Anphlise's hatred were taking vengeance on me in her spite. She reared that boy since the time he was weaned. If she has not, from treachery, given the advice that has so grievously troubled you, you may offer him many

233 LEXER's first definition for the word is the physical act of leaping up (»der sprung, das plötzliche auffahren«); only thereafter the emotive definition (»das auffahren, erschrecken, der schreck«).

joys, and he you. If you are fond of him, do not let your desirable self waste away!«

This strange polemic against Anphlise has always caused significant difficulties for ›Titurel‹ scholarship.[234] It contrasts sharply with the characterization of Herzeloyde in Book II of ›Parzival‹. The earlier epic provides no evidence for any personal rancor between Herzeloyde and Anphlise.[235] The latter's claim on Gahmuret is handled by the former with cool courtesy and self-control.[236] True, Gahmuret's praise of Anphlise to Herzeloyde's court at the Leoplane is, without a doubt, the most superlative he ever directs towards any woman: he calls Anphlise his *wâriu frouwe*, »true lady« (the actual subject of comparison is his current wife Belakane, but the comment obviously also contains a barb for Herzeloyde, who is trying to convince/compel him to take her as his new lady); Anphlise and he grew up together; she »raised« him in a courtly fashion and »made him what he is«.[237] Even after Gahmuret accepts – or is constrained to accept – Herzeloyde in marriage, he tells Anphlise's messengers (though not in the presence of Herzeloyde) that he is still »her knight«, she is still his *hœhste leit*, »greatest longing«.[238]

Nonetheless, Gahmuret then shows every intention of changing his ways, settling permanently with Herzeloyde and living the »ordered life« (*lebelîche gebâren*).[239] He renounces his symbolic anchor for the patrimonial coat-of-arms,[240] abandons his sorrows, and regains his high spirits.[241] With the permission of his new wife to take part in one tournament per month,[242] he and Herzeloyde settle into a productive routine that represents the stable end-

234 See BFJ, p. 376–377, and the literature quoted there.

235 There is no mention of *zorn* on the part of Anphlise after Gahmuret leaves her, although her envoys depart »in anger« from Kanvoleiz: *sine gerten urloubes niht / als lîhte in zorne noch geschiht* (98, 11–12). See MARION GIBBS, Amphlîse im ›Parzival‹ und im ›Titurel‹. Wolfram-Studien 6 (1980), pp. 48–53, here pp. 49, 52.

236 *si sprach nâch zühte lêre / hinz Gahmurete mêre / »iu biutet vaste ir minne / diu werde Franzoysinne. / nu êret an mir elliu wîp, / und lât ze rehte mînen lîp. / sît hie unz ich mîn reht genem: / ir lâzet anders mich in schem«* (88. 23–30).

237 *»jâ diu ist mîn wâriu frouwe. / ich brâht in Anschouwe / ir rât und mîner zühte site: / mir wont noch hiute ir helfe mite, / dâ von daz mich mîn frouwe zôch, / die wîbes missewende ie flôch./ wir wâren kinder beidiu dô, /unt doch ze sehen ein ander vrô. / diu küneginne Amphlîse / wont an wîplichem prîse«* (94. 21–30). See also 325. 27–29: *Amphlîse diu gehêrte / ouch Gahmureten lêrte, / dâ von der helt wart kurtoys.*

238 *»vart wider, sagt ir dienest mîn; / ich sül iedoch ir ritter sîn./ ob mir alle krône wærn bereit,/ ich hân nâch ir mîn hœhste leit«* (98. 3–6).

239 99. 17–19.

240 99. 13–16; 101. 7–8.

241 100. 9–13.

242 96. 25–97. 12; 101. 16–20.

point of traditional chivalric romance à la Chrétien and Hartmann: the compromise between uxorious sloth and satiety (the *verligen* of Erec) and an excess of chivalric errantry (the *verrîten* of Iwein). Even when Gahmuret departs for the orient to assist the Baruc, no shadow falls on Herzeloyde's idyll at first. Of joys she has »more than too much«;[243] she has »surpassed the limits of her desire« and »turns her heart towards the good«.[244] And above all, she is »without envy« with regard to any other woman.[245]

This is the moment corresponding to Herzeloyde's talk with Sigune in ›Titurel‹. The discrepancy could not be more extreme. By interpreting Sigune's feelings of romantic agony in terms of premeditated »betrayal« (*verrâten*), »spiteful hatred« (*haz mit ir hazze*), »revenge« (*rechen*), and »malicious deception« (*triegen*) on the part of Anphlise, the Herzeloyde of ›Titurel‹ gives expression to a fundamentally negative, disaffected personal attitude towards *minne*. Her recognition of the symptoms of love affecting her niece give rise first to a traumatic shock, then to denial. When denial is no longer an option, she lapses into a paranoid fantasy concerning the deleterious influence of Anphlise – as if *minne* is, at root, something pernicious, the product of a malevolent will.

In the middle of the third stanza of her response (129), Herzeloyde finally manages to gain control of herself and say something positive to Sigune about her love for Schionatulander.[246] But this obviously costs her a great deal of effort, and after a short time, she reverts to her doubts:

»Ich klage et, daz du bist alze fruo sîn âmîe.
du wil den kumber erben, des Mahaude phlac bî dem talfîn Kurzkrîe!
dicke ir ougen habent an im erfunden,
daz er den brîs in mangen landen hielt under helme ûf gebunden«. (132)

As mentioned earlier this chapter (p. 93), Herzeloyde's reservation here, despite its outward appearance, has nothing to do with a belief that Sigune's love is premature, for which there is no hint in the relationship between Schionatulander's parents.[247] Here *alze fruo* does not mean »too soon«, but rather »at all«, a litotes. Herzeloyde's negative attitude is directed towards *minne* as such and towards the dangers *minnedienst* represents by its very nature.

243 *freuden mêre dan ze vil* (102. 29).

244 *si was gar ob dem wunsches zil. /si kêrte ir herze an guote kunst* (102. 30–103. 1).

245 *ob ie kein frouwe mêr gewan / sô werden friunt, waz war ir daz? / si möhtez lâzen âne haz* (103. 12–14).

246 The contrast is even more abrupt if one adopts the alternative punctuation suggested by HEINZLE (I, p. 173), a question mark behind *gerüeret*.

247 On further discrepancies between ›Titurel‹ and ›Parzival‹ concerning Gurzgri and Mahaute, see BFJ, p. 325–326 (comment to 89, 4).

This ambivalence – it is almost a schizophrenia – in Herzeloyde's character powerfully underscores the sociological duality in her role vis-à-vis her young charge. In her attacks on Anphlise and in her »reservations« about Sigune's youth, Herzeloyde is speaking in her individuality. I believe that Wolfram, in order to better convey the idiosyncratic nature of Herzeloyde's personality, has anachronistically transferred features from Book III of ›Parzival‹ onto ›Titurel‹. As we have already seen in the relationship between Sigune and Condwiramurs (25), Wolfram sometimes violates the chronology of ›Parzival‹ to achieve certain characterological or symbolic effects in ›Titurel‹.[248] Several other figures common to both texts are also depicted differently in the latter than the former.[249]

Before Gahmuret's death, Herzeloyde's character in ›Parzival‹ is depicted with the same generalizations of feminine encomia as any other courtly lady. Not until her widowhood in Soltane does she emerge as a truly unique figure, and it is precisely in her embittered, eccentric abomination of everything that has to do with knighthood that she is unique and unforgettable. This is another symbolic association Wolfram makes at the price of full empirical consistency with the Grail romance. The unfounded diatribe against Anphlise strongly recalls the wild distress and absurd projection of Herzeloyde's attack on Parzival's songbirds in Soltane. In the earlier epic, her anxieties and fears were directed against the emergence of *rîterschaft* in Parzival's personality. In ›Titurel‹, it is the emergence of *minne* in her protégé's life that occasions her *herzen schrick* and awakens paranoid fantasies of hatred, betrayal, and vengeance. Both structurally and symbolically, Herzeloyde's behavior reveals Sigune and Parzival to be at similar points in their lives.

Then, after her final warning, she finds words of high praise for Schionatulander, and the interview ends favorably for Sigune, who is left in no final doubt about her guardian's »approval« of the relationship: »*ûf gelt dîne minne ih im nenne*«, »I commend your love to him, let him requite it!« (135, 4). For so it must be. Herzeloyde is not called upon here to enforce a personal agenda, but rather the agenda of courtly society, to which, after all, Sigune and Schionatulander have conformed from the very beginning.

The first fragment thus comes to an end on a relatively upbeat note. Once the couple receive *urloub* for their relationship, their sorrows disappear. Schionatulander exclaims to Gahmuret that the »bonds of all affliction« he has suffered on account of Sigune have now been broken »since I love with your good graces« (112, 2–3). Only in the context of the societal sanction do the lovers achieve the *hôhen muot* that love was unable to provide in secrecy

248 See above, pp. 37–39

249 See BFJ's comments on the characterizations of Gurnemanz in 41, 2–3 (pp. 231–232) and Trevrizent in 138, 3–4 (p. 393).

and isolation.[250] With her aunt's blessing, Sigune's cries of *ôwê!* are replaced by a resounding final *ôwol!* (136, 3).[251] These expressions of joy now shed a different light on the long descriptions of the lovers' misery. What had appeared to be the sorrows of separation now reveal themselves to have been, in greater part, apprehensiveness vis-à-vis the sanction of society for their secret love.

The request for and granting of this approbation is also differently handled in each scene. Between the males, the obligation and sanction of society is personalized. Schionatulander emphasizes his personal service to Gahmuret,[252] requests his personal approval,[253] and, upon receiving it, understands that it is identical to the blessing of society in general (112, 3). This is not surprising, considering that Gahmuret nowhere expresses a personal view of *minne* deviating in any way from the courtly protocol. He is, in fact, the very voice of that protocol:

> »Ey kranker knabe, waz waldes ê muoz verswinden
> ûz dîner hant mit tioste, solt du der duzissen minne bevinden!
> werdiu minne ist teilhaft ordenlîche.
> si hât der sælige ellenthaft erworben ê dane der zagehafte rîche«. (107)
>
> »Alas, frail lad, what forests you must first use up in jousting if you are to know the love of the Duchess! Noble Love is granted according to certain rules, and the brave man with good fortune will win it sooner than the powerful man who wavers.«

The duality in Gahmuret's role is only expressed in the discrepancy between empirical and metaphorical visual perception. While Sigune, too, will request personal succor,[254] her first response to her aunt's query is to issue her own, preemptive warning. If Herzeloyde refuses her approval, she will be guilty of violating *zuht*. Sigune claims Herzeloyde's personal *hulde* as an objective, supra-personal, social right, as something »befitting us both«:[255]

250 *Schoynatulander / was leide zer verte, / wan im Sigûnen minne hôhen muot unt die fröude gar werte* (75, 1–2); *die flust sînes hôhen muotes* (89, 2); »*wie ist sus gescheiden / ûz mînem herzen hôchgemüete?*« (125, 1–2).

251 »*Ôwê, kunde diu minne ander helfe erzeigen*« (71, 1); »*ein ôwê muoz nu folgen uns beiden*« (125, 2); »*Ôwê des, mir ist sîn kunft alze tiure*« (126,1).

252 »*obe ich dîner sorge ie getrüege*« (104, 2); »*Ouch wis gemant, waz mers unt der lande ich durchstrichen / durh dîne liebe hân, niht durh armuot.* [...] *des sol ich alles wider dich geniezen*« (105).

253 »*sô sî mîn gedinge / dîn fride und dîn hulde*« (103, 1–2); »*lâ dîne helfe schouwen!*« (105, 4); »*wis mîn voget, daz dîn scherm mich erner vor Sigûnen twingen*« (106, 4).

254 »*lâ mich in dînen hulden*« (119, 4); »*Dînes râtes, dînes trôstes, dîner hulde bedarf ich mit ein ander*« (121, 1–2).

255 Compare BFJ, p. 366.

»Sô muoz ich mit sorge al mîn angest dir künden.
hâstu mich deste unwerder iht, sô kan dîn zuht sich an mir gar versünden,
sît ich mich dervon niht mac gescheiden.
lâ mich in dînen hulden, süeziu minne! daz stêt wol uns beiden«. (119)

»Then with anxiety I must tell you all my anguish. Your good breeding may well commit a sin against me if you think me any less worthy for it, for I cannot give it up. Admit me to your favor, sweet dear one! that befits us both«.

It is also possible to interpret *süeziu minne* in the last line as an address not to Herzeloyde (»let me have your approval, sweet dear [aunt]!«), but rather, given that Herzeloyde's private approval is uncertain, as a direct appeal over her aunt's head to the higher authority of love personified (»let me have your approval, sweet Love! That is fitting for both of us, [i.e., myself and Herzeloyde]«).

As we have seen, Sigune's warning is apropos. In the final stanzas, one has the impression that Herzeloyde, in contrast to Gahmuret, has withdrawn her true, conflicted self (suspecting the plots of Anphlise and believing Sigune will suffer mortal sorrow on account of her beloved) completely behind the responsibilities and the dutifully optimistic rhetoric of her socio-symbolic role. The official nature of the transaction is mirrored in the language of the final stanza:

Aldâ was minne erloubet, mit minne beslozzen.
âne wanc gein minne ir beider herze was minne unverdrozzen.
»ôwol mich, muome«, sprach diu herzoginne,
»daz ich den Grâharzoys vor al der werlde nu mit urloube sô minne!« (136)

Thus, then, was authorized love with love embraced. Steadfastly toward love their two hearts were undismayed by love. »Oh, how happy I am, my aunt«, said the Duchess, »that I may now, with permission, so love the Graharzois before the eyes of the whole world!«

The grammatically passive, agentless first line underscores the ultimately impersonal character of Herzeloyde's approbation, and Sigune addresses this permission not as *dîn urloube*,[256] as we would expect in a direct address to her aunt (and like Schionatulander to Gahmuret), but simply as *urloube*, as if Herzeloyde has had nothing personally to do with granting it. Which is quite true.

256 As Schionatulander asks Gahmuret for *dîne hulden* in 112, 3.

VI

The theme and practice of secrecy have received much attention from medievalists in recent years.[257] It was long assumed that the Middle Ages did not, in principle, recognize the separation between public and private spheres characteristic of modernity, and that pre-modern individuals neither knew nor laid claim to areas of personal experience reserved from public scrutiny. Clandestine love, one of the main themes in the pan-European representation of courtly love, was something of an exception, but only as a literary discourse, the artificiality of which was understood by the recipient public and which did not therefore represent a danger to societal morals or norms.[258]

Such assumptions are increasingly the subject of revaluation and critique. This is especially the case in the study of political communication, where recent scholarship recognizes, within the seemingly monolithic openness of the medieval public-political realm, a discrete space of »non-publicity«, a »counter-realm firmly anchored in consciousness« that can be understood as »secrecy« and, in certain cases, as »privacy«.[259] This revaluation has also affected the understanding of medieval literature and its representations of amorous secrecy. In the following section, I will synopsize two recent studies in the field of medieval German literature, DIETRICH HUSCHENBETT's analysis of the role of secrecy in what he argues is a discrete genre tradition called the »Minneroman«, or novel of courtly love, of which ›Titurel‹ forms one of the first German examples; and HORST WENZEL's interpretation of the clandestine behavior of the lovers in Gottfried von Strassburg's ›Tristan‹.[260]

257 See the contributions in Schleier und Schwelle. Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation V. Band 1. Geheimnis und Öffentlichkeit, ed. ALEIDA and JAN ASSMAN, München 1997.

258 RÜDIGER BRANDT, ...his stupris incumbere non pertimescit publice. Heimlichkeit zum Schutz sozialer Konformität im Mittelalter, in: Schleier und Schwelle (footnote), pp. 71–88, here pp. 71–72.

259 BRANDT, ...his stupris incumbere, p. 72. See also the same author's Enklaven – Exklaven. Zur literarischen Darstellung von Öffentlichkeit und Nichtöffentlichkeit im Mittelalter. Interpretationen. Motiv- und Terminologiestudien, München 1993; HORST WENZEL, Das höfische Geheimnis: Herrschaft, Liebe, Texte, in: Schleier und Schwelle, pp. 53–69, especially p. 53; *Ze hove* und *ze holze – offenlîch* und *tougen*. Zur Darstellung und Deutung des Unhöfischen in der höfischen Epik und im Nibelungenlied, in: Höfische Literatur, Hofgesellschaft, höfische Lebensformen um 1200, ed. GERT KAISER and JAN-DIRK MÜLLER, Düsseldorf 1986, pp. 277–300, esp. pp. 289–290; GERD ALTHOFF, Colloquium familiare-Colloquium secretum-Colloquium publicum. Beratung im politischen Leben des früheren Mittelalters, Frühmittelalterliche Studien 24 (1990), pp. 145–67, esp. pp. 153–54.

260 HORST WENZEL, Öffentlichkeit und Heimlichkeit in Gottfrieds ›Tristan‹, ZfdPh 107 (1988), pp. 335–361. HUSCHENBETT, Johann von Würzburg: ›Wilhelm von

HUSCHENBETT's claims about the influence of the »Minneroman« tradition on Wolfram's ›Titurel‹, though uncertain, nontheless shed light on our interpretation of the text. Gottfried's romance, I will argue, is the most important touchstone for understanding the representation of secrecy in ›Titurel‹.

According to HUSCHENBETT, the genre of the »Minneroman« is defined by a qualitatively unique narrative approach to love, one that transforms *minne* from the secondary or episodic role it plays in other medieval genres to a structure-defining, »driving force of the plot«.[261] Courtly love is represented developmentally, beginning in childhood and proceeding through several discreet stages.[262] The most important element in this developmental process is, in HUSCHENBETT's analysis, the creation of an individualized »private space« for the protagonists:

> The meaning of this depiction of a developmental process seems considerable to me, because it creates in effect a »private« space delimited from the rest of society (in the story), a space meant for the hero and heroine alone. Since the rest of society remains subject to the strict rules of a feudal-noble society, a kind of opposition between the »public« and the »private« comes into being.[263]

The main concern of the genre is to »plausibly account for the contrast of the ›private‹ vs. the ›public‹, or, more correctly, to account for the phenomenon of the private«. The space of privacy represents a »space for individuality – understood as an individual achievement independent of public expectation«. The »*minne*-process« is thus seen as a »process of individualization«.[264]

Generally speaking, this characterization fits the representation of secrecy and »privacy« in Schionatulander's and Sigune's relationship, such as we have described it above, very well. Indeed, according to HUSCHENBETT, Wolfram's ›Titurel‹ was the most important and influential early »Minneroman« in Germany: »[f]or the further development of the genre we can assume that Wolfram influenced all later ›Minneromane‹ of the Middle Ages«.[265] It was not, however, the first example. HUSCHENBETT traces the

Österreich‹, in: Mittelhochdeutsche Romane und Heldenepen, ed. Horst Brunner, Stuttgart 1993, pp. 412–433, esp. pp. 427–431; Ehe statt Minne? Zur Tradition des Minne-Romans in Mittelalter und Neuzeit, in: Spannungen und Konflikte menschlichen Zusammenlebens in der deutschen Literatur des Mittelalters. Bristoler Colloquium 1993, ed. KURT GÄRTNER, INGRID KASTEN, and FRANK SHAW, Tübingen 1996, pp. 189–203.

261 HUSCHENBETT, Ehe statt Minne?, p. 191.

262 See the »Minneroman« structural scheme in HUSCHENBETT, Ehe statt Minne?, p. 191, footnote 7. This structure was originally presented in HUSCHENBETT, Johann von Würzburg, pp. 423–426.

263 HUSCHENBETT, Ehe statt Minne?, p. 191.

264 HUSCHENBETT, Ehe statt Minne?, p. 191.

265 HUSCHENBETT, Ehe statt Minne?, pp. 195–196.

beginnings of the genre in Germany to the introduction of the French story of ›Flore et Blancheflur‹, fragments of which survive in Middle High German from around 1170, with a complete version by Konrad Fleck from about 1220.[266] Although he does not enter into the question of sources for ›Titurel‹, HUSCHENBETT argues that Wolfram's »Minneroman« should be approached in terms of the author's conscious modifications of a pre-existing generic structure, and he further implies that Wolfram was acquainted with the story of Flore and Blanscheflur.[267] While there is no concrete evidence for these assumptions, as indeed for any claim thus far advanced in the scholarship about the sources and models of ›Titurel‹, the representation of childhood love-secrecy is in several ways very similar in the two works.

In ›Flore et Blancheflor‹, the relationship between the protagonists is a kind of hybrid between legitimate couplehood and forbidden passion. Although they belong to two different religions, Flore and Blancheflor are permitted to associate closely and openly during their whole childhood. They eat together, sleep in the same bed together, and attend school together, where they read »pagan books treating of love« as part of their officially sanctioned curriculum.[268] Thus, at least at the beginning, their intimacy is public and legitimate. There is no comment in the text to suggest that this situation is in any way unusual. Only when they are fifteen years old does Flore's father, the heathen king, suddenly decide that the relationship is inappropriate (obviously this has something to do with puberty), after which he takes steps to separate the couple. Even though his decision is prompted by reasons of state, however, it is represented as irrational and pathological, directed against the law of love symbolically higher than religion: after Blancheflur's staged death, the king publicly commemorates her romance with his son with a lavish monument. This is tantamount to a public admission of his error.[269] Thus, HUSCHENBETT'S claim about the opposition between the private and the public is not strictly accurate even for what he claims to be the first »Minneroman«.

Nontheless, within this overall public exposure and acceptance, the »aristocratic version« of the story strongly emphasizes the young lovers' private sphere. When, guided by the example of the pagan love-books, their companionship turns into romance, Flore and Blancheflur begin to meet every day

266 HUSCHENBETT, Johann von Würzburg, pp. 427–428; the author also refers to Ulrich von Gutenburg's Laich, which contains a detailed reference to the story (MF, 74, 23–33).

267 HUSCHENBETT, Ehe statt Minne?, p. 195. In addition to ›Flore und Blanscheflur‹, HUSCHENBETT also considers the story of Riwalin und Blanscheflur to be among the German »Minneromane« preceding ›Titurel‹ (p. 196).

268 WILHELMINE WIRTZ, ed., ›Flore et Blancheflor‹, nach der Pariser Handschrift 375 A, Frankfurt am Main 1937, pp. 193–240.

269 ›Flore et Blancheflor‹, vv. 551–666.

alone together in the garden of Flore's father.[270] By the time they are fifteen years old, they converse and write notes to each other in Latin, »so as not to be understood by anybody«.[271] This episode is lacking in the »popular version« of the tale. Konrad Fleck, whose adaptation is notable for its psychological expansion and development of the simpler French narrative,[272] finds a pithy expression for this contrast and cohabitation of the private within the public. The young lovers »hide their love openly, in the manner of children«:

> alsô hât undr ir brusten
> minne ir stat besezzen,
> daz sie niht mohten vergezzen
> grôzer fröuden âne sorgen,
> die sie hâten verborgen
> in kindes wîse offenbar.
> wan ir alter und ir jâr
> wâren cleiner dan ir sinne. (700–705)
>
> Thus Love had taken its place in their breasts, such that they were not able to forget great joys without anxieties, which they had openly hidden, as is the way with children. For their age and years were smaller than their sense.

This passage reads like a more straightforward version of the elaborate explanations and metaphors of open secrecy in ›Titurel‹.[273] It represents the kind of common-sense knowledge of childhood that Wolfram, as earlier in the doll-scene, turns to complex narrative, psychological, and aesthetic effect. The ›Titurel‹-narrator's comment that even a blind person must notice *minne under kinder* (49, 1–2) is very similar to Fleck's observation. Yet as we have seen, stanza 53 of ›Titurel‹ complicates the commonplace by grounding the clandestine impulses of the lovers in terms of positive social and biological forces, *zuht* and *art*. The *offenbar* nature of their secrecy, too, is not, as in

270 ›Flore et Blancheflor‹, vv. 241–254.

271 ›Flore et Blancheflor‹, vv. 268–272 ([...] *furent andoi si bien apris / que bien sorent parler latin / et bien escrire en parkemin / et consillier, oiant la gent, / en latin que nus nes entent*). See also vv. 749–750.

272 BUMKE, Geschichte der deutschen Literatur im hohen Mittelalter, Munich 1993 (2nd edition), p. 235.

273 I think it possible that this passage shows the influence Wolfram. Fleck continues *wider der natûre minne / unde wider dem rehte / wolte er ir ze knehte / und ze dienste niht enwesen* (708–711). This is a strong rejection of the courtly love service paradigm as a model for Flore to follow. To be Blanscheflur's servant and in her service would be »against the nature of love« and »against right« (the antecedent of ir is admittedly somewhat unclear, but *ir* = *minne* seems syntactically impossible). In effect, Fleck is saying that Flore will not make the mistake of Schionatulander by placing himself in subjection to Blanscheflur as a *minnefrouwe*. It is, of course, possible that the reference is meant generally.

Fleck's text, the result of their immaturity, but part of a process of subjectivization that looks forward to the ultimate exposure of the private to the test of the public gaze.

This is the key difference separating ›Titurel‹ from all other texts HUSCHENBETT identifies as »Minneromane«. None of them (with the partial exception from the French ›Flore et Blancheflur‹ discussed above) follow Wolfram in representing a society that openly approves of the relationship of the protagonists. This is a narrative move that, HUSCHENBETT admits, »completely contradicts the structure of the genre«,[274] since it disavows any essential opposition between the private and the public sphere. He dismisses this difference, putting it down to the fact that Wolfram wrote ›Titurel‹ to »conform with the ending of the Sigune-Schionatulander story found in ›Parzival‹«.[275] While this is obviously true, it is hardly enough to explain the depth of the interlacement between the private and the public in ›Titurel‹. This interlacement is the very heart of the text's conception of *minne*, not merely a fact of plot that had to be accounted for. If he had wanted to represent the story of Sigune and Schionatulander as one of essential contrast between the private/individual and the public/courtly, then Wolfram was certainly enough of an artist to accomplish this purpose. He was not locked in to any particular structure. The Sigune-episodes in ›Parzival‹ were simply not detailed enough to presume – or preclude – any particular kind of narrative. And the love-confession scene in ›Titurel‹, as we have seen, is constructed on a programmatic continuity between the public and the private, not on a contrast or opposition.

The real referent for this representation of continuity lies, I argue, not within the generic constraints of the »Minneroman«, but in Gottfried's ›Tristan‹. Let us turn to HORST WENZEL'S analysis. WENZEL identifies in Gottfried's narrative an »ambivalence between public and non-public spheres of activity« that »sublates the clear oppositions of traditional value standards«.[276] By pursuing their illegitimate love covertly, Tristan and Isolde »act in a manner that is, to be sure, detrimental to political rulership, but nonetheless in a way that does not openly seek to call rulership into question«.[277] By scrupulously striving to confine their intimacies to the non-public space of secrecy, the lovers fulfill the requirements of *êre*, for *êre* is ultimately tantamount to the appearance of *êre*. Here WENZEL points to medieval conceptions of law:

> Activity performed in secret in order to protect external honor is [...] in no way automatically criminal. Given the primacy of representative pub-

274 HUSCHENBETT, Ehe statt Minne?, p. 196.

275 HUSCHENBETT, Ehe statt Minne?, p. 196.

276 WENZEL, Öffentlichkeit und Heimlichkeit, p. 335.

277 WENZEL, Öffentlichkeit und Heimlichkeit, p. 337.

> lic space, a »non-public« scandal is not a full-fledged scandal. [...] As far as public adjudication is concerned, the compromising of the public order [by a crime] is irrelevant as long as the appearance of honor is maintained, for the public appearance of the order functions in the same way as the public order itself.[278]

In WENZEL'S view, therefore, Marke and his counselors are ultimately the ones who seem to represent a danger to the public order, indeed who appear »pathological«, »for they seek to destroy the stabilizing appearance of *êre*« by constantly attempting to expose the secrecy of Tristan's and Isolde's love.[279] Consequently, and already for a medieval audience, Gottfried's epic reveals itself to be »open for a double reading« of the traditional oppositions of secret, illegitimate love. Possible are both an »interpretation from inside«, that is, from the perspective of the lovers themselves, the »noble hearts« (*edele herzen*), »who alone are in a position to understand the interconnectedness of the opposing demands of the public and the clandestine«; and an »interpretation from outside«, from the point of view of the court, precisely that »world of those people« (*ir aller werlde*) against whom Gottfried polemicizes in his prologue.[280]

Comparing the status of *ir aller werlde* in Gottfried's critique with the status of *al diu werlde* in Sigune's enthusiastic exclamation in ›Titurel‹ gives us an immediate sense of the dramatic contrast in the two texts' representations of the relation between secret love and society. In Wolfram's text, »the world« is itself the patron and sponsor of secret love. Secrecy is part and parcel of courtly socialization (*schemelîchiu zuht* [...] *twanc si*; Schionatulander *hal durh zuht*), a discursive space of subject-formation prior to the entrance of courtly lovers into society. In ›Titurel‹'s representation of non-public space, the lovers do not cultivate, as do Tristan and Isolde, »individual needs and interests at odds with the norms and conventions of their social and political life-world«;[281] rather, secrecy is the occasion where needs and interests that will later become the norms and conventions of courtly society are, for the first time, perceived to be individual, performed and appropriated by the subjects as their own individuality.

This is the logic behind Schionatulander's words to Sigune concerning »*minne an gedanken, daz mac ich wol mit mir selbem bewæren*«.[282] The non-public space of secret love has a socially integrative function. Within it, the »demands of representative action« (in this case representative *minne* and

278 WENZEL, Öffentlichkeit und Heimlichkeit, p. 354.
279 WENZEL, Öffentlichkeit und Heimlichkeit, pp. 357–358.
280 WENZEL, Öffentlichkeit und Heimlichkeit, p. 350; Gottfried von Straßburg, ›Tristan‹, v. 50.
281 KLAUS MORSCH, Schœne daz ist hœne. Studien zum Tristan Gottfrieds von Straßburg, Erlangen 1984, pp. 22–23, quoted from WENZEL, p. 345.
282 ›Titurel‹, 68, 2

paradigmatic courtly couplehood) are not suspended, as in Gottfried, but adopted, internalized, and subjectivized.[283] Sigune and Schionatulander do not withdraw into the asocial seclusion of their own erotic world, like Tristan and Isolde in the *foissure a la gent amant*, but rather into a kind of protosocial antechamber of official courtly love practice.

To argue that secrecy has a socially integrative function in ›Titurel‹ represents, of course, no interpretive stopping point. For only here does the actual problematic of the text become fully clear. The tragedy and catastrophe of Sigune's and Schionatulander's relationship seems to lie precisely in its integration into and conformity with courtly norms and values. In the penultimate edition of his standard study and research guide to Wolfram, JOACHIM BUMKE wrote that »the roots of the misfortune [of Sigune and Schionatulander] lie within the lovers' inability to liberate themselves from the constraints of courtly protocol«.[284] In the latest, considerably revised version of the book, this sentence no longer appears. The formulation is now the following:

> The lovers are subjected to courtly ceremonial and play the roles that have been laid out for them in paradigmatic fashion. The first fragment can be read as a glorification of »normalized« romance. Nowhere has the narrator articulated a warning. Nonetheless, the solemn, melancholic tone of the narrative, which seems to adumbrate the misfortune to come, does not seem appropriate for a glorification of love.[285]

»Constraints of courtly protocol«, from which Sigune and Schionatulander cannot »liberate« themselves: BUMKE's earlier interpretation suggests a tragedy of failed individual emancipation from the social collective. Implied is that the lovers are unable to accomplish an envisaged personal-individual project of life and love, a project lying outside the purview of the »normalized love« of courtly protocol.

From our analysis, it is clear why BUMKE abandoned such an interpretation. Not only is there no mention of an alternative to »authorized« *minne* in the text; the lovers themselves desire nothing more than to be authorized. Even the sphere of clandestine non-publicity, the space in which erotic alternatives to official amorous practice and alternative ethics are, in principle, possible, is restructured into a part of the courtly social system, indeed into the first stage in the protocol of erotic normativity. The cleft between the »interpretation from inside« and the »interpretation from outside«, which in ›Tristan‹ is maintained until the end, is manifestly non-existent in ›Titurel‹'s version of secrecy. Concerning the role of society in the tragedy of personal

283 WENZEL, Öffentlichkeit und Heimlichkeit, p. 344.
284 BUMKE I, p. 279.
285 BUMKE II, p. 249.

love, it seems as if Wolfram wishes to demonstrate interpretive unequivocality precisely where Gottfried pushes a double reading.

It has been argued that Gottfried employs an »Abelardian« separation between »inner« and »external« ethics.[286] ›Titurel‹, in contrast, represents courtly society as an ideal communicative community in the intergenerational transmission of a singular, unified, total ethics of love:[287] two youths fall in love with each other; they meet, talk, confess their feelings, and declare themselves willing to engage in a kind of relationship that has been urged upon them since childhood as a model to imitate and internalize, i.e. a courtly love service partnership; their prospective union is examined by their elders as official representative of the courtly social system and is accepted as valid. In other words, the normative process of *minne* proceeds without a hitch, and the new subjects are released into their personal freedom to get together. Courtly society has fulfilled its role and may symbolically wash its hands of the outcome.

If this is true, then we must seek the text's problematic elsewhere – in the figures themselves, in what is granted to them as personal freedom, and in the individual mode of its realization. This is, I believe, the true response of ›Titurel‹ to ›Tristan‹. Gottfried's version of *minne* grants a higher justification, indeed a sort of inviolable sanctity, to the sphere of the personal-individual, and ascribes to normative courtly society a wantonly pathological self-destructiveness. ›Titurel‹, in comparison, fundamentally disallows a coherent, explicit critique of normative courtly society, locating amorous misfortune on the figural level. It is there that we can ascertain, if not individual guilt, at least personal causality and contingency set into motion by individual choices. It is to these choices we now turn.

286 HANS FROMM, Gottfried von Straßburg und Abaelard, in: Festschrift für Ingeborg Schröbler, Tübingen 1973, pp. 196–216.

287 See WEHRLI, Wolframs ›Titurel‹, p. 24.

Chapter 5. Sigune as reader

I

The appearance of Gardeviaz and his leash seems to bring a new element into the story of Sigune and Schionatulander: the motif of reading a written text. Sigune's desire to read is generally considered to be a change vis-à-vis the representation of her character in ›Parzival‹. The one reference to the *brackenseil* in the earlier text (141. 16) contains nothing about a *schrift*; the only mention of reading in connection with Sigune is the narrator's comment that she was carrying a psaltery when she received Parzival at her hermitage in Book 9.[288]

It has also been argued that the repeated emphasis on writing and reading in ›Titurel‹'s second fragment signal a qualitatively different, more mediated and material aspect of courtly language and discourse than the primarily oral forms of communication that dominate the first part of the narrative.[289] Recent scholarship has posited a programmatic opposition in ›Titurel‹ between textual phenomena, represented by the leash inscription, and the realm of courtly discourse in general, which functions orally. The meaning and ethics of »communication« on the one hand and »reading« on the other are thought to hold the clue to the understanding of ›Titurel‹'s final scene, in which the two lovers demonstrate such puzzlingly opposite reactions to the loss of the *schrift*: Schionatulander complete indifference, Sigune a concern nothing less that existential in its intensity. For HELMUT BRACKERT, the problem is the solitary nature of Sigune's absorption in the *âventiure* on the leash; her »isolated reading [...] dissolves the courtly context«, alienating her from the »communicative order« of courtly society, the moral/ethical foundations of which rest upon »the reciprocity of oral communication«.[290] For WALTER HAUG, Sigune's mistake is that she prefers reading about love to any direct experience of love itself, and is willing to sacrifice the latter for »narrative experience«.[291]

288 ›Parzival‹, 438. 1: *si truoc ein salter in der hant.*

289 The word *schrift* and forms of *schrîben* occur ten times (146, 2; 148, 3; 158, 4; 159, 4; 168, 4; 169, 1, 3–4; 170, 1, 4;), *lesen* eight times (149, 1; 150, 1; 151, 3; 155, 1; 159, 2, 4; 169, 3; 170, 2) in the second fragment. They barely feature at all in the first fragment (6, 3; 49, 4).

290 BRACKERT, Sinnspuren, p. 170.

291 HAUG, Lesen oder Lieben? Erzählen in der Erzählung: vom ›Erec‹ bis zum ›Titurel‹, in: PBB 166 (1994), p. 321.

Our exploration of socialization suggest a somewhat modified view. If isolated reading and an obsession with narrative experience are the direct catalyst and proximate cause of her behavior towards Schionatulander, its ultimate grounding lies in Sigune's own isolation in a process of socialization animating the female subject to realize herself as literature, or to realize that she is literature. As a five-year-old *minnefrouwe*, Sigune is, in a certain sense, already alienated from the communicative context of courtly society. A meaningful distinction between communication and literary/textual experience is difficult to make in her case. Her childhood is intensely communicative, but nonetheless markedly non-relational, sequestered and incubated within the *a priori*, solipsistic ideality of the *minnefrouwe*. This is the meaning of the scene with the dolls, which symbolically expresses and approves the monolateral nature of the love service relationship. This is also precisely what does not happen to Obilot in ›Parzival‹. Gawan communicates the difference between reality and literary experience to Obilot in no uncertain terms, and he brutally shatters the fiction of their pseudo-relationship at the end of Book VII, breaking the little girl's heart.

II

Sigune's unmediated relationship to courtly discourse predisposes her to an intense, substantial-ontological encounter with the text on the dog's leash. But predisposition is not predetermination. As we have seen in the love-confession scene, Schionatulander succeeds in persuading Sigune to put aside her literary preoccupation with *minne* and accept their mutual love as an interior personal experience. This kind of love is something she has really known all along, he tells her, without her having to ask him any questions. He then exhorts her to take action on her feelings. He requests nothing specific, no particular kind of relationship, only that Sigune »do right by love« (H 69, 4), and do it quickly. The terms of their *minne* are clearly hers to determine. What does she choose?

She tells Schionatulander that he has not yet earned her and must first serve her on the battlefield:

> »Owê, kunde diu minne ander helfe erzeigen,
> dane daz ih gæbe in dîn gebot mîn frîen lîp fur eigen!
> mich hât dîn iugent noch niht reht erarnet.
> du muost mich under schilteclîchem dache ê gedienen: des wis vor gewarnet!«
> (71)

To which Schionatulander agrees:

> »Frouwe, als ich mit kraft diu wâpen mac leiten,
> hie enzwischen unt ouch dane mîn lîp wirt gesehen in den süezen sûren arbeiten,
> sô daz mîn dienst nach dîner helfe ringe.
> ich wart in dîner helfe erboren. nu hilf, sô daz mir an dir gelinge!« (72)

> »Alas, that Love could provide some other recourse to me giving my free person into your command! Your youth has not yet earned me rightly. You must first serve me by fighting under the protection of your shield. Be so advised beforehand!« »Lady, as soon as I have strength to wield weapons, now and thereafter I shall be seen striving in those bittersweet labors so that my service may seek to win your help. I was born in your help. But help me to win you!«

The conventional reading of 71 is that Sigune is expressing the wish that there be some other form a love relationship might take that would not involve a loss of her freedom, but then, once she realizes there is no such utopian *ander helfe*, she names her terms for giving herself to Schionatulander in marriage: courtly love service. In doing so, she »constitutes herself as the traditional literary courtly lady«.[292]

Our exploration of Sigune's socialization suggests a somewhat modified view. As we have seen, Sigune was »constituted« as a courtly lady long ago. Her first words in the narrative, as a five-year-old girl, look forward to the moment when she will be able to obligate knights in her service. And her predisposition to this role and concomitant disinclination to marriage go back even further. The doll episode, we recall, is part of Sigune's symbolic break with the world of fulfilled conjugal love (a world represented by the anachronistic cameo appearance of Condwiramurs) and of her metaphorical journey – her *verte* – to Kanvoleiz and Herzeloyde, the capital of high courtly love service.

To this extent, the tendency of the older ›Titurel‹ scholarship to consider Sigune's choice in stanza 71 as characteristic of her behavior throughout the text is quite correct.[293] How that behavior should be evaluated is another matter. In the old debates over the question of guilt, Sigune's demand was often seen as flowing from an »exaggerated self-consciousness of her own worth« and a view of love as »power to be exercised over the young knight«.[294] That is true to a certain extent. The Sigune of the doll episode is certainly very ambitious at a very tender age, and it is difficult to avoid a negative impression from her *stolzen and lôsen* at Kanvoleiz, despite that fact – or perhaps especially since – the narrator hastens to assure us that her intentions were good. But precisely therein lies the difference: the narrator's critique is directed not so much at Sigune herself as at the discursive environment in which she is brought up. The peculiarly dialogic structure of

292 BFJ, p. 297. See also ERNST S. DICK, Minne im Widerspruch. Modellrevision und Fiktionalisierung in Wolframs ›Titurel‹, in: Der Buchstab tödt – der Geist macht lebendig. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Hans-Gert Roloff, ed. JAMES N. HARDIN et al., Bern 1992, vol. 1, pp. 399–420, here p. 413.

293 BFJ, p. 298.

294 KÖNNEKER, p. 28.

Sigune's socialization at Kanvoleiz shows that the court, too, has an exaggerated sense of Sigune's stature, one with which the narrator takes issue.

Consequently, the fact that Sigune decides that her *minne* with Schionatulander will be a love service relationship tells us little we do not already know about her. It is true that her attitude about the loss of her freedom – and thus about any kind of mutual *minne*, including a reciprocated, service-reward relationship, not necessarily just marriage – seems negative in principle in a way the text has not before made explicit. Nevertheless, Sigune clearly imagines that she will one day give up her freedom, that Schionatulander can and will earn her, once he fulfills her conditions. As BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE point out, these conditions do not themselves already predetermine the tragedy of the dog's leash at the end of the text.[295] In fact, we might see a certain development here – or the possibility of development – vis-à-vis the five-year-old Sigune's very monolateral understanding of the power-dynamic of the *minnedienst* relation.

Nowhere in the text does the love service relationship itself come in for any kind of criticism. Quite the opposite, as we have seen from the lovers' dialogues with Gahmuret and Herzeloyde at the end of the second fragment. It is of course true that the *minnedienst* relationship is »conventional«, as WERNER SCHRÖDER pointed out in his critique of Sigune.[296] But Sigune's choice in no way represents any kind of »flight« into convention. After all, Schionatulander has clearly linked the origins of personal, interior, emotional love-*gedanken* to the discourse of *minne* in courtly society, and it was this insight that has given him access to Sigune's own experience of love. There is no individualist project here. Sigune's words to Schionatulander in stanza 71 are indistinguishable from those of an »experienced courtly lady«,[297] and I see no reason not to consider them as part of a generally positive representation of two precocious young people making their way towards each other in an exemplary way and consequently of a successful first cycle in the sense of Chrétien's model of courtly-chivalric development – the discourse that introduced the conversation in stanza 59. Only by accepting the success of this »first adventure« and marking the conditions of its achievement can we clearly perceive the failure in the events to follow.

III

These events are narrated in ›Titurel‹'s second fragment, which tells of Sigune's and Schionatulander's encounter with the hound Gardeviaz and his

295 BFJ, p. 297.
296 WERNER SCHRÖDER, Kommentar statt Edition? Nachträgliches zu HEINZLE'S ›Titurel‹-Kommentar, ZfdPh 99 (1980), pp. 28–36, here p. 34.
297 BUMKE II, p. 249.

wondrous leash. If it is true, as the majority of scholars would argue today,[298] that the narrative's fragmentary character is to be understood as authorially intended, authorially sanctioned, or otherwise not in need of completion, then one of the obvious ways we can interpret the break between the first and second fragments is, as CHRISTA ORTMANN has argued, in terms of the traditional structure of the Arthurian romance: the whole first fragment represents the first cycle, the second fragment the moment of crisis and failure.[299] As for the traditional Arthurian second cycle, I will discuss my views on that at the end of the study.

Although the protagonists' actions are not predetermined, there are several elements in the first fragment's representation of Sigune that do, in fact, foreshadow the concrete choice she will make at the end of the second fragment. The first occurs immediately after the love conversation. Before Schionatulander departs with Gahmuret for the orient, he meets again secretly with Sigune to say goodbye:

> Der iunge fürste urloup nam ze der maget tougenlîche.
> er sprach: »owê, wie sol ih geleben, daz diu minne an fröuden mich rîche
> schiere mache, unt von tôde entscheiden?
> wünsche mir heiles, süeziu maget! ich muoz von dir zuo den heiden«. (76)
>
> »Ich bin dir holt, getriwer friunt. nu sprich, ist daz minne?
> sus wil ich imer wünschende sîn nâch dem gewinne,
> der uns beide hôhe fröude erwerbe.
> ez brinnent elliu wazzer, ê diu liebe an mir verderbe«. (77)
>
> Vil liep beleip aldâ, liep schiet von dannen.
> ir gehôrtet nie gesprechen von mageden, von wîben, von manlîchen mannen,
> die sich herzenlîcher kunden minnen.
> des wart sît Parzivâl an Sigûnen zer linden wol innen. (78)[300]
>
> The young prince took leave of the maiden in secret. He said: »Alas, how shall I live so that Love will make me rich in joy and yet preserve me from death? Wish me well, sweet maiden: I must leave you and go to the heathens«. »I am fond of you, loyal friend, but tell me – is that Love? As things are, I will forever be wishing for the rewards that high joy might bring to us both. All waters will burn before my love dies«. Much love remained there, and Love departed thence. You never heard tell of maidens, of women, of manly men, who loved each other more profoundly. Parzival later recognized this of Sigune at the linden tree.

As BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE have brilliantly shown in the commentary to their new edition, Sigune's words do not only express the contents of her own conscious wish, but also a prophecy on the course of her life:

298 See the summary of views in BFJ, pp. 440–442.
299 ORTMANN, p. 43–44 (see footnote 199).
300 The stanzaic order here is that of manuscript M, according to majoritarian editorial practice (see HEINZLE I, p. 122 and BFJ, p. 310).

> The separation of *wünschende* and *nach dem gewinne* by means of the interposed *sîn* isolates the wish and makes it permanent. The artificiality of this placement expresses the fact that Sigune not only is, but will also always remain, one who is wishing. This is underscored by her – unconscious – choice of the word *immer* and her use, not of an accusative direct object of her wishing, but the prepositional object, which has the effect of undermining the directness of the wish.[301]

A Sigune whose wishing for her beloved has been made permanent is, of course, the Sigune of ›Parzival‹. The next stanza's intertextual reference to one of the paradigmatic images of her condition in the Grail romance can be no accident in this context. (I have already advanced other arguments that it provides strong evidence for the meta-narrative continuity between the two works).[302] Thus the effect of Sigune's words in 77 could not be more radically ambivalent. In what has always been considered perhaps her strongest and sincerest declaration of love to Schionatulander,[303] she is simultaneously telling him, on another level, that they will never be united and that she will long for him forever.

Precisely what level of the narrative that is, however, is not easy to determine. This is one of the interpretive puzzles of the text as a whole. Many scholars have noted that Wolfram adopts the foreshadowing technique of the ›Nibelungenlied‹ stanza in many places throughout ›Titurel‹, but modifies it in several ways.[304] One of them consists in imputing to the figures a kind of willfulness or desire, or immediate physical efficacy, in bringing about the catastrophe told of in ›Parzival‹. This device figures most prominently in the second fragment, especially with respect to Schionatulander: When, for example, the hound appears and Schionatulander contemplates pursuing it, the narrator comments that *er wil fröude verkoufen / unt ein stætes trûren dar an enphâhen* (139, 2–3). Middle High German *wellen* is, of course, often simply future in meaning. But here the suggestion of voluntarism (*er wil*) is strong, since the passage immediately beforehand depicts Schionatulander's thoughts in inner monologue (lines 1–2), the one directly afterwards (*als er wolte den bracken ergâhen*) an unambiguous act of voluntaristic *wellen*. This and other similar passages generate a kind of phantom causality symbolically linking many different aspects of the scene in the second fragment to the never-narrated death of Schionatulander.[305]

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301 BFJ, p. 309.

302 See above, pp. 19–21.

303 See the authors quoted in BFJ, pp. 308–309.

304 MERTENS, Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion, pp. 359–78.

305 Other similar passages: 20, 3–4 (*Schoysîânen tôt half im ûz borgen / die flust an rehten fröuden unt gewin imer mêre an den sorgen*); 140, 1–3 (*sît in den wîten walt niht mohte gekêren / daz flühtege wilt, wan her für den talfîn, daz wil sîn arbeit gemêren. / künftec trûren brâhtez im ze teile*); 143, 1–2 (*Waz er mit dem bracken begreif, lât ez iu nennen: / gefurrierten kumber mit arbeit er muose unverzagetlîche erkennen, / unt imer mêre grôz kriegen et nâch strîte*); 159, 1–3 (*Schoynatulander mit einem vederangel / vienc aschen unt vorhenne, die wîle si las, unt der fröude den mangel, / daz er sît wart vil selten der geile*). On stanza 140 see esp. ELISABETH SCHMID, *dâ stuont âventiur geschriben an der strangen.* Zum Verhältnis von Erzählung und Allegorie in der Brackenseilepisode von Wolframs und Albrechts ›Titurel‹, in: ZfdA 117 (1988), pp. 79–97, esp. p. 81. Confusingly, BFJ believe that 140, 1–3 has »possibly also a voluntative meaning« (p. 395), but not 139, 2–3 (p. 394).

Since stanza 77 is in the first person,[306] however, it makes little difference whether we interpret Sigune's »*ih wil imer wünschende sîn*« as voluntaristic or futurative. The essential meaning is the same, and it cannot simply be regarded as symbolic in the way the third-person passages can. It seems to imply some sort of psychological provenance. We note that BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE describe Sigune's choice of the word *imer* as »unconscious«. This seems to suggest that she harbors the secret desire – secret even from herself – that her longing, and therefore her separation from Schionatulander, be permanent. Is this the case?

The answer, I believe, lies in the last section we will examine before turning to the final scene and concluding this study: the famous »lyrical« stanzas from Sigune's conversation with Herzeloyde at the end of the first fragment.

IV

In the middle of her interview with Herzeloyde, while confessing her love for Schionatulander, Sigune suddenly lapses into a highly poetic idiom:

> »Ich hân vil âbende al mîn schouwen
> ûz venstren über heide, ûf strâze unt gein den liehten ouwen
> gar verloren. er kom et mir ze selten.
> des müezen miniu ougen friundes minne mit weinen tiure gelten.
>
> Sô gên ich von dem venster an die zinnen.
> dâ warte ich ôsten unt westen, obe ich möhte des werden innen,
> der mîn herze lange hât betwungen.
> man mac mich vür die alten senden wol zelen, niht für die iungen.
>
> Ich var ûf einem wâge eine wîle
> dâ warte ich verre, mêre dane drîzec mîle,
> durch daz ich hôrte solhiu mære,
> daz ich nâch mînem iungem clârem friunde kumbers enbære«. (122–124)

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306 BFJ have identified several other passages of adumbrative or prophetic discourse in first-person speech. See BFJ, p. 354 (»*Sigûne, diu sigehaft ûf dem wal, dâ man welt*«), p. 369 (»*bant – bendec*«) and p. 385 (»*wie kan er sich schicken*«). However, they do not interpret 107, 4 (»*si hât der sælige ellenthaft erworben ê dane der zagehafte rîche*«) in these terms. See below, pp. 148–150.

> »Many an evening have I gazed out of windows across the heath, onto the roadway, and toward the lovely meadows, but all in vain. He never comes to me. And so my eyes must pay dearly with tears for the love of my friend. Then I leave the window and go to the battlements. There I keep watch to the east and to the west, to see whether I can catch sight of the man who has long oppressed my heart. I can well be counted among the old lovers, not the young. I sail out a while on the wide waters. There I keep watch far and wide, more than thirty miles, in the hope of hearing any tidings that would rid me of the misery I am feeling because of my handsome young friend«.

Most scholars agree that the language of these stanzas is lyrical, at least somewhat more so than the rest of the text, which, by virtue of the stanzaic form and the oft-broken narrative continuity, possesses a certain lyrical quality throughout. The main point of contention is whether Sigune's language explicitly invokes a particular type, or historical period, of German lyric – to wit, early Middle High German minnesong of the kind represented by the poems of Der Kürenberger or Dietmar von Aist. The argument to the positive was made most notably WOLFGANG MOHR, who showed that these stanzas differ in a formally conspicuous way from the rest of the text: each beginning line contains only six accented syllables, in contrast to the usual eight. According to MOHR, Wolfram understood the »Frauenstrophen« of Der Kürenberger in terms of this scansion, and he intended Sigune's language to allude to these or similar poems of early German minnesong.[307] Other scholars have pointed out additional features invoking early minnesong from the Danube area: the basic scenario of the amorous woman reflecting upon and longing for her absent lover, the characteristic motifs of *vriunt*, *warten*, the female gaze *über heide* and from *zinnen*, and the short, simple expressiveness of the syntax.[308]

This view has been called into question by RUTH HARVEY, who, in a short but broadly-based intertextual study, concludes that Sigune's complaint shows »little specific connection to early Danube-area lyric poetry«. At the same time, however, HARVEY, too, recognizes that the motifs and images Sigune employs in 122–124 belong to a female-specific language of amorous complaint from an older (and in fact universal) tradition, a language that the narrator intentionally marks – and which, presumably, will have been recognized – as such in the narrative.[309]

307 MOHR, Wolfram von Eschenbach. ›Titurel‹. Lieder, pp. 14–15; Zur Textgeschichte von Wolframs ›Titurel‹, Wolfram-Studien IV (1977), pp. 104–151, here pp. 142–43.
308 BFJ, p. 370.
309 RUTH HARVEY, Zu Sigunes Liebesklage, pp. 54–62, hier p. 62; commented by BFJ, p. 370.

The most radical claim for a connection between Sigune's lament and early German minnesong was made by KARL KORN, who thought that Sigune's observation that she ought to be counted »*vür die alten senden*« (123, 4) should not to be interpreted as »among the old [i.e., aged] lovers«, but rather »among the lovers of old«. That is, Sigune is expressly comparing herself to »one of the women of the early Dietmaresque ›Frauenlyrik‹«. Conversely, her disavowal of belonging »*für die iungen*« means, for KORN, that Sigune does not consider her predicament to resemble that of the »younger« or »newer« lovers of later, high courtly love poetry,[310] in which a male lyrical I tends to be the suffering party and the *frouwe* distant, absent, or emotionally inaccessible.

This remarkable argument has never found acceptance in the scholarship. For HARVEY, KORN'S interpretation imputes to Sigune's words a »self-analytical distance, the effect of which would be to destroy the mood that had just been created«.[311] HEINZLE summarily dismisses it as »eccentric«.[312] In a text as replete with eccentricities as ›Titurel‹, however, this is not a sufficient basis of rejection. In fact, there are solid textual reasons to be skeptical about the conventional interpretation of *alte senden* as »old« or »aged lovers«. Two separate passages in ›Titurel‹ emphasize advanced age as a period of life in which erotic passion no longer has any power over the individual. In his valedictory address at the beginning of the text, Titurel declaims for a whole stanza on this theme (3).[313] As we have seen, a very similar observation is made by the narrator in the *minne*-excursus (48).[314] The point can almost be considered programmatic for the representation of *minne* in ›Titurel‹.

However, the literary commonplace of »amorous age« is also reflected in text's broad and at times self-contradicting depiction of *minne*. During their first conversation, for example, Schionatulander observes to Sigune that that »*minne kan den iungen, den alten sô schuzlîchen spannen*« (H 66). However, this passage, referring to the power of love to suddenly seize a person in advanced age, offers little support for the traditional reading of Sigune's comment in 123, 4, which underscores the duration or quality of her suffering. HEINZLE'S own suggestion (»Sigune's love is so great that, notwith-

310 KARL KORN, Studien über »Freude und Trûren« bei mittelhochdeutschen Dichtern. Beiträge zu einer Problemgeschichte, Leipzig 1932 (Von deutscher Poeterey, 12), p. 124.
311 HARVEY, p. 55.
312 HEINZLE I, p. 169.
313 »*Obe ich von hôher minne ie trôst enphienge, / unt op der minnen süeze ie sælden kraft an mir begienge, / wart mir ie gruoz von minneclîchem wîbe, / daz ist nu gar verwildet mînem seneden klagendem lîbe*«.
314 [...] *swâ diu minne in der iugent begriffen wirt, diu wert aller langest. / op daz alter minnen sich geloubet, / dannoch diu iugent wont in der minne bant, minne ist krefte unberoubet.*

standing the short time, she has already suffered as much as only the *alten senden* have«), while cogent, requires not only that we read a good deal into the passage, but also interpret it directly against the narrator's claim that youth is the true time of love-suffering, age free of it (48).

My interpretation provides, I believe, a basis for a renewed look at KORN's thesis. Sigune is drawing a conscious parallel between her own despondent longing for her absent lover and the literary experience portrayed in the »Frauenklagen« of early German minnesong. This has nothing to do with self-analytical distance. Quite the opposite: it reflects a preoccupation with the self as literary experience, a preoccupation that is anything but truly self-analytical. As we have seen in the first two chapters, Sigune's socialization, beginning at the age of five, has prepared her to think of herself as a courtly lady of the type of whom poetry is made and sung. The language of her complaint and the self-image it reflects are linguistically and ideologically continuous with the lyrical heteroglossia of her praise as a young child at Herzeloyde's court – language that, as we recall, the narrator distanced himself from (32–33) and suspected of working *fremdiu wunder* upon Sigune's physical person as she grew up (36). The heteroglossic stylization of Sigune's discourse in 122–124 reveals that her passion for Schionatulander is underwritten by a fundamentally literary interest in and self-experience of *minne*. Sigune's love is, quite literally, made out of poetry, and – a further development of the proclivity to role playing we investigated in chapter 2 – she is acting here as a »lyrical I« within her own poem.

It is therefore beside the point to question which stations on the path Sigune describes in 122–124 are »realistic« and which represent a »voyage in the mind«.[315] Nor does the fact that Sigune's poem differs in significant respects from actual early minnesong, as HARVEY argues, mean that it cannot have been intended or will not have been understood to invoke the latter. As BAKHTIN observes in his discussion of novelistic heteroglossia and inserted genres, lyrical texts appearing in novelistic discourse are not to be understood as actual poems, but »novelistic images of lyrics«, in which »[d]epartures from the empirical reality of the represented language may be [...] highly significant. [...] [T]hey are a free creation of new elements – which, while true to the spirit of a given language, are utterly foreign to the actual language's empirical evidence«.[316]

This free creation of new elements is very evident in the particular stanza HARVEY sees as most different from actual early German minnesong: the unrealistic image of the voyage onto the sea in the climax of Sigune's confession in 124.[317] For it is by virtue of precisely this image, which – as HARVEY

315 HEINZLE I, p. 169. BFJ, p. 372.
316 BAKHTIN, Dialogic Imagination, pp. 47, 336–337.
317 HARVEY, p. 56.

herself points out – suddenly and strongly disturbs the otherwise completely plausible logistic scenario of 122–123 (containing no physical action Sigune might not have realistically performed at Kanvoleiz), that we realize Sigune is speaking and experiencing her suffering, not realistically, nor even symbolically-spiritually, but rather poetically.

In this way, Wolfram's Sigune represents a character very much like the most famous problematic female reader of the Middle Ages, Dante's Francesca da Rimini, fully a century before the ›Commedia‹. While making his way through the Second Circle of Hell, where the lustful are swept and driven in the infernal storm of their punishment, the Pilgrim falls into conversation with the shade of this young woman, who tells him the sad story of how a single, disastrous act of reading condemned her and her love Paolo to eternal punishment (V, 127–138).[318] Francesca prefaces her story with a complaint, three stanzas of which are cast in highly lyrical form:

> »Amor, ch'al cor gentil ratto s'apprende
> prese costui de la bella persona
> che mi fu tolta; e 'l modo ancor m'offende.
>
> Amor, ch'a nullo amato amar perdona,
> mi prese del costui piacer sì forte,
> che, come vedi, ancor non m'abbandona.
>
> Amor condusse noi ad una morte:
> Caina attende chi a vita ci spense«
> Queste parole da lor ci fuor porte. (V, 100–108)
>
> »Love, which is swiftly kindled in the noble heart, seized this one for the lovely person that was taken from me; and the manner still injures me. Love, which pardons no one loved from loving in return, seized me for his beauty so strongly that, as you see, it still does not abandon me. Love led us on to one death. Caïna awaits him who extinguished our life«. These words were borne from them to us.[319]

As many Dante scholars have noted, Francesca lapses here into phrases and clichés borrowed from the courtly love poets of the Italian *stinovisti* school. There are many different interpretations of this complaint, as there are of Francesca and Paolo as readers, and to investigate them is beyond the scope of this study. But most scholars agree that the quasi-intertextual references –

318 »We were reading one day, for pleasure, of Lancelot, how Love beset him; we were alone and without any suspicion. During many breaths that reading drove our eyes together and turned our faces pale; but one point alone was the one that overpowered us. When we read that the yearned-for smile was kissed by so great a lover, he, who will never be separated from me, kissed my mouth all trembling. Galeotto was the book and he who wrote it: that day we read there no further«. Dante Alighieri, ›The Divine Comedy‹, vol. 1., ›Inferno‹, ed. and transl. ROBERT M. DURLING, New York, Oxford 1996, p. 93, V, vv. 127–138.
319 DURLING, ed., ›Inferno‹, p. 91.

a classic BAKHTINIAN »inserted genre« – were intended by the poet to depict Francesca as a figure problematic in her overidentification with literary modes of amorous experience.[320] In this she is much like Sigune, although of course the nature of the isolated act of reading and its relationship context are very different.

Remarkably, the lyrical part of Francesca's complaint consists of three stanzas, exactly like that of Sigune.[321] There is probably a general poetic law at work here: one or two stanzas would probably not be sufficient to mark a clear genre shift, but three would. And, just as Sigune's free combination of new poetic elements and images transcends the empirical boundaries of actual early minnesong, so too does Francesca's poem overstep the inserted literary style it seeks to imitate. As MARK MUSA has pointed out, each of Francesca's stilnovistic references are followed by »sensual and most unstilnovistic ideas. For in the idealistic world of the *dolce stil nuovo*, love would never ›seize‹ a man for the beauty of the woman's body alone, nor would the sensual delight that ›seized‹ Francesca be appropriate to stilnovistic love, which was distant, nonsexual, and ideal«.[322] In other words, Dante makes his point about Francesca's and Paolo's relationship by means of deliberate stylistic inaccuracies and violations of the inserted genre. This strikingly confirms BAKHTIN'S point about the importance of departures from the empirical reality of the represented language. Exactly the same thing is going on in Sigune's poem in ›Titurel‹.

It may seem strange that Sigune thinks of herself in the mode of the suffering woman of early minnesong when her acts, from stanza 77 onward, suggest rather the *frouwe* of the poetologically »young« mode of high minnesong. This is, in effect, the great paradox of her existence, and, I believe, one of Wolfram's strokes of genius in the representation of her character. By dint

320 The most famous reference is that of line 100 to Guinizelli's canzone ›Al cor gentil‹, a kind of manifesto for the *stilnovisti* poets. See GIANFRANCO CONTINI, Dante come personaggio-poeta della ›Commedia‹, in: L'Approdo letterario, 4 (1958), 19–46 (repr. in Un'idea di Dante, Turin 1976, pp. 33–62); ROGER DRAGONETTI, L'Épisode de Francesca dans le Cadre de la Convention courtoise, in: ROGER DRAGONETTI, Aux frontièrs du langage poétique. Études sur Dante, Mallarmé, Valéry, Romanica Gandensia 9, Gent 1961, pp. 93–116; Dante Alighieri, ›The Divine Comedy: Inferno‹, v. 2 (Commentary). Trans. CHARLES SINGLETON. Princeton 1970, pp. 89–91; TEODOLINDA BAROLINI, Dante's Poets. Textuality and Truth in the ›Comedy‹, Princeton 1984, esp. pp. 5–7; MICHELANGELO PICONE, Poetic Discourse and Courtly Love: An Intertextual Analysis of ›Inferno‹ 5, in: Lectura Dantis Newberryana, v. 2, ed. PAOLO CHERCHI, ANTONIO C. MASTROBUONO. Evanston 1990, pp. 173–186, esp. pp. 182–184; Patrick Boyde, Perception and Passion in Dante's ›Comedy‹, Cambridge 1993, pp. 295–298.

321 ›Inferno‹ V, vv. 100–108.

322 Dante Alighieri, ›Inferno‹, transl. Mark Musa, New York et al., 1984, p. 119.

of operating in the latter mode, Sigune ultimately ends up within the former. The height of this irony is, of course, the leash episode, in which a single, Reinmaresque or Guenever-like moment of autocratic feminine caprice will impose on her a life sentence within the genre of the »Frauenklage«. Sigune's self-designation as one of the *alte senden* in her lyrical complaint is exactly analogous to the unconscious prophecy of her words in stanza 77. She foreshadows her own destiny in ›Parzival‹, which is to persist in a permanent state of *wünschen* and *senen* until the end of her days, in which condition her pining *nâch mînem iungem clârem friunde* (124, 4) will be realized in the most literal possible manner.

At the same time, it will be clear by now that Sigune's language, as in the doll episode described in the first chapter, reveals more than yet another aspect of the complex narrativity that ties ›Titurel‹ and ›Parzival‹ together. It also shows the way Sigune thinks. It is part and parcel of her psychology and character, her »ideology« in the BAKHTINIAN sense, and it connects these to her fate in ›Parzival‹.

There is a great deal of resistance in Wolfram scholarship to psychologizing interpretations of ›Titurel‹, especially of the figure of Sigune. Psychological arguments, it is feared, always tend toward a reopening of the question of culpability, which has become highly unfashionable. Any yet, in one way or another, psychology always and inevitably creeps into the analysis. This is nowhere more evident than in the case of BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE. In the richly detailed but interpretively unsystematic commentary to their edition, the authors frequently criticize »psychological« approaches to the text,[323] only to argue at other times for »surprisingly far-reaching psychological insight« placed by Wolfram in the speech of a particular character.[324]

The ambivalence can be seen in the passage quoted above, where Sigune's choice of the word *imer* is interpreted by BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE as »unconscious«. Are the authors using this term psychologically, i.e., referring to Sigune's hidden intentions? Or do they mean that the choice of such language is part of the narrator's elaborate regime of prefiguration, but has nothing to with the intentions of the figures? From the tendency of most of their commentary, one gets the impression that the latter is what the authors have in mind, but the rhetoric of their formulation undermines their purpose: »[...] Sigune, ihr unbewußt, [legt] sich auf ein *immer* fest« (»Sigune, unconsciously to herself, commits herself to saying ›forever‹«).[325] This is bona fide literary psychoanalysis, suggesting that Sigune's explicit wish to be united with

323 See the comments on the love-confession scene in BFJ, p. 253 (on analyses by RAHN, CHRISTOPH, WOLFF, KÖNNEKER), p. 267 (on 61, 1), p. 269 (on CHRISTOPH, HAUER); on the figure of Herzeloyde, p. 379 (129, 2).

324 BFJ, p. 378 (on 128, 4).

325 BFJ, p. 309.

Schionatulander is underwritten by a surreptitious impulse in the opposite direction, a secret desire to preserve her longing as a permanent condition. From here it is only a short step away to KORN'S reading of the *alte senden* in 123, 4.

The key to Sigune's psychology is not, however, the Freudian unconscious (though I would not deny a tacit insight on Wolfram's part into something like that phenomenon), but rather her long-prepared orientation towards an essentially literary mode of *minne* self-experience. This is the key to her reaction when she encounters the love story in the *âventiure* on Gardeviaz's leash.

V

Most scholars agree that Sigune identifies in some way with the *schrift* on Gardeviaz's leash, which contains stories or biographies in some way parallel to Sigune's own life or meaningful to her in some vital way. However, there is great disagreement over what is actually on the leash and over what Sigune reads and does not read – what she longs to finish reading – before it is torn from her grasp.

It is clear that she commences (148–150) with Gardeviaz's collar (*halse*), which contains an explanation of the meaning of the hound's name (»*hüete der verte*«, »Stay on the path!«) and an exhortation that men and women take this maxim as a guide for their own lives in order to achieve the favor of this world and salvation (*sælde*) in the next. But this is where the scholarly consensus ends. Basically, there are two schools of thought concerning the rest of the *brackenseil*, which I call »long leash« and »short leash« interpretations.

According to long leash interpretations, Sigune reads, in addition to the opening proverbial section on the collar, two biographies: the story of Clauditte and Ehkunat (151, 155–158), the owners of Gardeviaz, and the story of Clauditte's sister Florie and her lover Ilinot (152–154). Queen Florie and Ilinot were childhood sweethearts. The only thing Florie ever withheld from her *âmîe*, whom she had raised to be a knight and prized above all else, was the sexual fulfillment of their relationship (*bî ligende minne*). Ilinot was killed in a joust on the battlefield in pursuit of her love, whereupon Florie also died. Clauditte inherited her sister's crown. The princes of her kingdom required her to marry in order to give the kingdom a ruler. She convened the court and publicly chose as her *âmîe* Duke Ehkunat of Salvasch Florien, whom she had loved before. Short leash interpretations consider stanzas 152–153 (and possibly also 154) to represent a narratorial digression not on the actual leash.[326] In this view, Sigune reads only the opening proverb and the

326 The main reasons being the »reporting« style of the narrative and the narrator interjection in 153, 2–3. See BRACKERT, Sinnspuren, p. 159.

story of Claudite and Ehkunat; she does not read the story of Florie and Ilinot.

At first glance, these two different theories would seem to lead to quite different interpretations of Sigune's attitude toward the *schrift*. Or to put it another way: many scholars consider the presence or absence of the Florie/Ilinot story to make a significant difference.[327] The long leash contains two contrasting versions of the courtly love relationship: a *minnedienst*-model in which the knight risks his life on the battlefield in order to earn the love of his lady (or rather, the sexual fulfillment of an already existing love); and a counter-model in which lovers may be freely and publicly united without any requirements of service or battle at all. In reading the long leash, therefore, Sigune is in a position – at least theoretically – to recognize the parallels between her own story and that of Florie and Ilinot and to realize that other, alternative relationship models are available to her and Schionatulander.[328] The tragic example of Florie and Ilinot functions as an explicit forewarning – whether Sigune perceives it or not – of the possible deadly consequences of a courtly lady's demands for service *under helm*. In short leash interpretations, on the other hand, the foreshadowing and the symbolism of the Florie/Ilinot story is a message the narrator communicates to the reader, but Sigune has no access to them.[329] This interpretation de-emphasizes the sense of her reading as a direct confrontation with the *exemplum*-like representation of the possible consequences of her own lifestyle choice, or with the idea of a lifestyle choice at all.

Further reflection, I believe, reveals that this difference is ultimately not very significant, neither for an evaluation of Sigune's behavior, nor for an understanding of what, exactly, she wishes to finish reading on the leash. If Sigune is responsible for anything, then her responsibility would in no way be materially mitigated by the absence of an explicit warning *exemplum* on the leash. By the same token, the possibility of a choice between contrasting *minne*-projects is in no way reserved exclusively to an encounter with a long leash. Even without the story of Florie and Ilinot, Sigune will be fully aware of the contrast between her own project of love service *minne*, which she and Schionatulander worked out in their long conversation in the first fragment, and the model represented by Claudite and Ehkunat.

In addition their irrelevance for a judgment of Sigune's behavior, the differences between the long and short leashes can have no significant bearing

327 See BRACKERT, Sinnspuren, p. 159

328 For example SCHMID, dâ stuont aventiur, pp. 82–83.

329 BRACKERT, Sinnspuren, p. 163. The story of Florie and Ilinot is very briefly told in Book XII of ›Parzival‹ during the *minne*-digression occasioned by Gawan's sufferings. Curiously, the audience is presumed to be already familiar with the story, though there is no prior or further mention of either figure in that text.

on how we interpret Sigune's actual desire for the *schrift*. If the Florie/Ilinot story is present, then, because of its placement on the leash, Sigune would have read both its beginning and its conclusion before Gardeviaz's escape tears the leash out of her hands. It is unambiguously the section dealing with Claudite and Ilinot she is unable to finish. This story alone, therefore, is the source of her suspense and the object of her desire.

Even HELMUT BRACKERT, who sees the audience's inability to determine the exact contents of the leash as part of a poetic strategy of deliberate obfuscation on the part of the author,[330] argues that Sigune's primary interest in the leash must concern the relationship between Claudite and Ehkunat. According to him, Sigune's main point of identification is the discrepancy in social position between the young queen and her *âmîs*, who is only a duke. Despite this difference, Claudite has followed her feelings and publicly committed herself to her beloved. »In doing so, she claims for herself and asserts a vital existential happiness, acting in a manner that, although completely within the feudal paradigm, demonstrates freedom and autonomy vis-à-vis the norms of the courtly hierarchy«. This behavior, BRACKERT writes, must necessarily intrigue Sigune, who has not yet publicly attached herself to Schionatulander, but simply obtained the permission of Herzeloyde and Gahmuret to do so.[331]

The sudden appearance of Gardeviaz with his mysterious leash has always been interpreted only with respect to the narrative future, in terms of what message it contains for Sigune's and Schionatulander's lives to come, what it foreshadows or allegorizes, and how it links – or complicates the link – between ›Titurel‹ and the later narrative time of the Grail romance. What has gone unnoticed is that Gardeviaz is also a »messenger« from the past,[332] bearing a message that has always been part of Sigune's life. The appearance of a story of fulfilled conjugal union on the leash of an animal named after life's symbolic »path« brings us full circle to the beginning of ›Titurel‹. Sigune's confrontation with contrasting models of courtly love relationships began – at least in a metaphorical sense – early in her childhood, in the journey from Katelangen to Belrapeire, where she was raised together with Condwiramurs, and then in her final passage to Herzeloyde's court at Kanvoleiz. As we have seen, Sigune's first words in the text troped the discourse of hagiographic *præludium*. The figure of Condwiramurs, too, was part of this prefiguration (a fact underscored by the manipulation of the ›Parzival‹ chronology). Like the love of Claudite and Ehkunat, Condwiramurs' relationship with Parzival, based on an unhesitating, mutual and full public commitment,[333] contrasts

330 BRACKERT, Sinnspuren, pp. 160–161.
331 BRACKERT, Sinnspuren, pp. 164–165.
332 On Gardeviaz as »Bedeutungsträger« see BUMKE III, p. 412.
333 It might be argued that Parzival, too, serves Condwiramurs *under helm* before they are united. But she never requests nor requires his service, which is freely

sharply with the strenuous, long-deferred, gender-hierarchical service-*minne* characteristic of the rest of Arthurian society. At the very moment she took leave of her childhood *gespil*, Sigune self-consciously committed herself to a future based on the latter model, and she believed that in doing so, she put herself on her »proper« path in life, her *verte*.

All significant moments in the life of the Arthurian hero happen in pairs.[334] Gardeviaz's sudden appearance in her life returns Sigune to the primal symbolic confrontation of her childhood and gives her the freedom of choosing now freely and consciously that which she – and her social environment – have always already understood to be »the place that is hers by nature«. Or the freedom of rejecting it for another, better course.

VI

The narrator tells us that the story »turns bitter« at the moment Sigune speaks to Schionatulander about the *schrift* on the leash after the young man returns from his fruitless attempt to catch the hound in the thorny underbrush:

> Si kôs im vil wunden an beinen unt an füezen:
> si klagt in, er klaget ouch sie. nu wil sich diz mære geunsüezen,
> dô diu herzogîn begunde sprechen
> hin ze im nâch der schrifte an dem seile: diu flust muoz nu vil sper zerbrechen
> (168)

Their parley over the retrieval of the leash takes up the rest of the text, followed by one brief stanza of narrator commentary:

> Er sprach: »ich vriesch ie wênec der seile überschribene.
> brieve, buoch, en franzoyse – ich weiz wol, solch kunst ist mir niht diu belibene:
> dâ læse ich an, swaz dâ geschriben wære.
> Sigûne, süeziu maget, lâ dir sîn die schrift an dem seile gar unmære!«
>
> Si sprach: »dâ stuont âventiure an der strangen!
> sol ich die niht zende ûz lesen, mir ist unmære mîn lant ze Katelangen.
> swaz mir iemen rîcheit möhte gebieten,
> unt obe ich wirdec wære ze nemene, dâ für wolt ich mich der schrifte nieten«.
>
> Daz spriche ih, werder friunt, dir noch niemen ze vâre.
> ob wir beidiu iunc solten leben zuo der zît unsere künftigen iâre,
> sô daz dîn dienst doch gerte mîner minne,
> du muost mir daz seil ê erwerben, dâ Gardevîaz ane gebunden stuont hinne«.
>
> Er sprach: »sô wil ich gerne umbe daz seil alsô werben.
> sol man daz mit strîte erholen, dâ muoz ich an lîbe unt ane prîse verderben,
> oder ich bringe ez wider dir ze handen.
> wis genædec, süeziu maget, unt halt niht mîn herze sô lange in dînen banden!«

and spontaneously given, and they are married immediately after his first rapid victory on the morning after his arrival in Belrapeire (199. 22–201.20).
334 HAUG, Vernacular Literary Theory, pp. 97–100.

»Genâde unt al daz imer maget sol verenden
gein ir werdem clâren friunde, daz leist ich, unt mac mich des willen niemen erwenden,
op dîn wille krieget nâch der strangen,
die der bracke zôch ûf der verte, den du mir bræhte gevangen«.
»Dar nâch sol mîn dienst imer stæteclîchen ringen.
du biutest rîchen solt. wie gelebe ich die zît, daz ez mîn hant dar zuo müeze bringen,
daz ich die hulde dîn behalte?
daz wirt versuochet nâhen unt verre. gelücke unt dîn minne mîn walte!«
Sus heten si mit worten ein ander ergetzet,
und ouch mit guotem willen. der anevanc vil kumbers, wie wart der geletzet!
daz freischet wol der tumbe und ouch der grîse
von dem verzageten sicherboten, obe der swebe oder sinke an dem prîse.
(169–175)

She saw the many cuts on his legs and feet. She expressed pity for him, and he did the same for her. Now this tale turns bitter, as the duchess began to speak to him about the writing on the leash. The loss of it will now lead to the breaking of many spears. »I have heard precious little of leashes with writing on them. Letters, books, in French – these I do know; such skill is not unfamiliar to me. I might read whatever is written there. Sigune, sweet maid, let the writing on that leash be of no consequence to you!« She said: »But there was adventure on the leash! If I cannot finish reading it, my whole land of Katelangen will be meaningless to me. No matter what wealth anyone might offer me, provided I were worthy to accept it, I would give it all to have the leash! I do not say this, worthy friend, to put you or anybody else in danger. If we were both to remain young to the end of our days and if your service were to go on striving for my love, you must still bring me the leash with which Gardeviaz was tied here«. He said: »Then I will gladly strive for the leash under that condition. If it is to be won in combat, I will lose life and fame or else bring it back to you. Have mercy, sweet maiden, and do not hold my heart that long in bondage!« »Favor and everything a maiden should grant her beloved, that I will do, and no one shall prevent me from doing it, if you are determined to get me the leash that the hound was dragging along when you brought him to me«. »My service shall faithfully strive for it. You offer a rich reward. But how shall I go on living until the time my hand can bring it to you, so that I might receive your favor? I shall seek near and far. May fortune and your love guide me!« Thus they compensated each other with words and also with good intentions. The beginning of much sorrow! How was it to end? The young and old alike will hear a report of the faint-hearted pledger, whether his fame soars or sinks.

These radically contrasting attitudes towards the leash powerfully reflect the contrasting processes of socialization we observed at the beginning of this study, and the effects of which we have observed throughout ›Titurel‹.

Schionatulander, observing his role model Gahmuret's example, came to understand the literary language of *minne* – both oral and written, we recall – in distanced, rational, instrumental terms. He developed an »accidental« relationship to literary courtly discourse, and this disposes him to react with cool indifference to the *âventiure* on the leash. For Schionatulander, the story on the *brackenseil* is a random piece of script, unusual perhaps in its manner of appearance, but otherwise just like any other kind of written *kunst* and, therefore, of no particular interest. The reference to »letters« recalls the communications he once transmitted between Gahmuret and Anphlise, a key moment in his apprenticeship in the uses of courtly discourse in matters of the heart (54). If we interpret the passage in 169, 2 as *brievebuoch en franzoys*, as the majority of scholars do, then it is possible that the *süeze botschaften* between Gahmuret and Anphlise were borrowed from or modeled on collections of exemplary love letters.[335] This perfectly exemplifies the idea of written language as a tool in the service of inner feeling (of *gedanken*, in the words of the love confession). But written language is not consubstantial with love; it is mere *kunst*, »craft«.

Schionatulander's exhortation contains a play on words that expresses this attitude towards textuality: In admonishing Sigune to let the inscription be *unmære*, »indifferent« to her, he is playing the double sense of *mære*, meaning not only – as an adjective – »of value« »precious«, but also – as a noun – »tale« or »narrative«. That is, he is entreating her not to identify with the *schrift*, to consider it »no story« or an »un-story« for herself or of herself. For him, the leash and its inscription are manifestations of pure chance, quite literally accidental, signifying nothing important and with no significance for his and Sigune's lives and love.

In contrast, Sigune's self-image has been, from her earliest childhood, enveloped in and determined by the literary image of the courtly lady, with the result that she has developed a quasi-ontologically »substantial« relationship with courtly love language, a relationship that disposes her to identify directly and existentially with the story on the *brackenseil*. She rejects Schionatulander's free association of the leash-script with other kinds of writing. This is something different than letters or books. It is *âventiure*. We would actually expect the line to read »*da stuont ein âventiure and der strangen*«, since the word *âventiure*, when referring to a story or narrative (which of course the *schrift* is), is always preceded by a definite or indefinite article. Albrecht clearly perceived the strangeness of the passage, and added *geschriben* to eliminate the ambiguity.[336] As it stands in Wolfram's text, how-

335 See HEINZLE I, p. 211. BFJ are skeptical: pp. 430–431.

336 In the ›Jüngerer Titurel‹, Sigune says: »*solch aventiure ist wesende geschriben an der strangen.*« (A 1215, 1); »*Auentiur ist wesende geschriben an der strange*« (H 1002, 1). The one other example I have found of non-articled use of *âventiure*

ever, Sigune's language suggests that she perceives the *âventiure* not as »a story«, a phenomenon of discursive mediation, but directly-experientially, as »adventure« itself, as the unmediated action or wondrous event for which the Arthurian hero is existentially poised.[337]

Yet it is not enough to say that Sigune identifies with the *âventiure* on the leash or that she supposes it to be connected her own fate, that is, in temporal perspective, as something to do with her future life. Rather, the *schrift* is for her a veritably ontological matter, connected with the substance of her being. When, echoing Schionatulander's expression, she claims that Katelangen will be *unmære* to her if she cannot finish her reading, Sigune refers to the source of her material existence, her very biological life. In becoming »of no value« to her, her life perforce becomes an »un-text«. Loss of the *schrift* is not merely an existential crisis for Sigune, but a loss of her material substance, tantamount to death.

In chapter 1, I suggested that the constellation of ›Titurel‹'s final scene is intimated already on the narratorial level in ›Parzival‹. The prologue and »self-defense« of the Grail romance are underwritten by a gendered dichotomy of literary reception representing, on the one hand, a rationalist, »male« approach to narrative *mære* in which the proper attitude is modelled on the chivalric pathway of the middle course between existential extremes; and, on the other hand, a view of female readership criticized for its overidentification with a literary text at the expense of her societal relations. I argued that Sigune reduplicates the problematic, poetry-fixated »woman of weak wit« in the »self-defense«, whose love of literature causes her to neglect the proper object of her affections – the poet in his capacity as knight, which is his true *art*. I proposed that we view the final scene in ›Titurel‹ as a kind of narrative *mise-en-scène* of this narratorial scenario.

Sigune's original stipulation to Schionatulander (in the first ›Titurel‹ fragment) is that he »earn her under the shield«, i.e., in his capacity as a

to mean story/narrative: ›Der Welt Lohn‹, vv. 55–57: [*er*] *haete ein buoch in sîner hant, / dar an er âventiure vant / von der minne geschriben.* There are a number of examples of un-articled usage with the verb *hœren*: ›Titurel‹, 146, 3 (*âventiure hoeret, obe ir gebietet!*; adapted by Albrecht, ›Der Jüngere Titurel‹, 1187, 3); ›Eckenlied‹, 241, 6 (*nu hoerent âventiure*); ›Virginal‹, 1014, 2–3 (*»ich hôrte von hern Dieterîch gern âventiure sagen«*), but the sense here is »now listen to something strange and wondrous!« (a synonym for *wunder*), i.e. the narrator is not referring to the medium of the narrative (e.g. ›Parzival‹ 404. 11–12: *nû hoere dise âventiure / der getriuwe und der gehiure*), but rhetorically invoking the immediacy of the event itself. Otherwise, as far as I have been able to determine, unarticled usage of *âventiure* = »narrative« is not found with verbs that signal textual mediation (*schrîben, tihten, lesen*, etc.).

337 Paradigmatically in Hartmann, ›Erec‹, vv. 220–221 (*er* [...] *ûf âventiure nâch reit*), v. 3111 (*nâch âventiure wâne*); ›Iwein‹, v. 525 (*»ich suoche âventiure«*).

knight.[338] As many scholars have pointed out, we learn nothing explicit about whether he has fulfilled this condition by the time of the second fragment. On the one hand, his departure to the orient with Gahmuret could be interpreted as the beginning of his military *dienst* to Sigune. He may have earned his knighthood and fought in Sigune's name while on this journey. Alternatively, he may have simply served his older cousin as a squire and refrained from actual combat himself. Despite this ambiguity, I believe the textual evidence speaks more for the first possibility than is generally recognized. From the way both parties assume that the leash will have to be regained *mit strîte* and through an arduous process of *kriegen* and *ringen*, it appears that Schionatulander has indeed gotten to the point where he can *mit kraft diu wâpen leiten*. This was not yet the case at the time of the love confession (72), which is what Sigune meant when she told Schionatulander that his *iugent* had not yet achieved her. (The point was also made forcefully by Gahmuret in stanza 107).

It is true that in their original agreement, Schionatulander swore to persevere in Sigune's service even after attaining knighthood (*ouch dane*).[339] And the fact remains that it is up to Sigune to determine when Schionatulander has performed sufficient *dienst*, that is, when he has achieved her. Schionatulander accepts this. Clearly, then, there is no way to view Sigune's demand for the leash as any kind of explicit violation of or problematic female tampering with the love service »contract«, which is one of the central themes of the Gawan-books of ›Parzival‹.[340]

The point of ›Titurel‹'s second fragment is a different one. What it shows, I believe, is that the whole contractual, official, and public dimension of Sigune's and Schionatulander's relationship – the dimension in which *minne ist teilhaft ordenlîche*, in which the public discourse about love must be consulted and reflected upon and internalized and public permission for love sought – has been fulfilled and transcended, transformed and sublated, and that Sigune and Schionatulander now possess the very private and personal freedom to get together. The public side of love is the concern of the first fragment, which comes to an end with the official sanction of the couple's relationship (despite the strong personal reservations of Herzeloyde, as we have seen). The second fragment is set within a *locus amoenus* topology (the isolation of the couple, the tent pavilion, the idyllic and solitary forest clear-

338 *»mich hât dîn iugent noch niht reht erarnet. / du muost mich under schiltecliîchem dache ê gedienen: des wis vor gewarnet«*. (71, 3–4).

339 *»hie enzwischen und ouch dane mîn lîp wirt gesehen in den süezen sûren arbeiten, sô daz mîn dienst nâch dîner helfe ringe«* (72, 3–4).

340 Apart from the Meljanz-Obie episode, compare the dispute between Gawan and Orgeluse in the adventure of *li gweiz prelljus* (esp. 611. 7–612. 20) and Arthur's comments to Feirefîz about the obligations of *lôn* (*»ein ieslîch wîp enfienge haz / von ir dienstbietære / op dir ungelônet wære«* (767. 26–28)

ing, the life of leisure) that generates, from the first line forward,[341] a sensual atmosphere of erotic suspense predicated on the expectation of imminent sexual fulfillment. (Many scholars have pointed to the similarities between this scene and the minne-idyll in the *foissure a la gent amant* in Gottfried's ›Tristan‹).[342]

Sigune's culpability is thus nothing more nor less than what she reproaches herself for in ›Parzival‹: »*ich hete kranke sinne, daz ich im niht minne gap*« – i.e., for not sexually fulfilling their relationship when she might have done so. The destructive power of resistance to sexual love is an important theme in classical literature and, as MARCELLE THIÉBAUX has pointed out in the case of Ovid, frequently the subject of hunting narratives (Daphne and Apollo, Narcissus and Echo, Adonis andd Venus).[343] In addition, the quasi-salvational force of sexual love is a frequent theme throughout Wolfram's œuvre, and the love-excursus before the confession scene invokes the simultaneous earthy and transcendental dimensions of *minne* in ›Titurel‹.[344] Sigune's desire for the leash deprives her and Schionatulander of the opportunity to partake of the full earthy-spiritual measure of their love while they are both still alive.

This loss and its circumstances represent the exact inverse of the scenes im ›Willehalm‹ where the hero and his wife Gyburg enjoy brief but infinitely meaningful and spiritualized moments of conjugal sexual bliss, encounters stolen from the ceaseless press of chivalric duty and *dienst* in the epic battles with the heathens.[345] *ob dâ schimphes waere zît?* This is the question the ›Willehalm‹-narrator poses as a preface to Gyburg's and Willehalm's first encounter, which takes place between the catastrophic first battle and Willehalm's headlong rush to the north for emergency reinforcements. A similar question hangs over ›Titurel‹'s final scene in the *locus amoenus* of the forest idyll. The tragedy is that it could have been answered in the positive even though Schionatulander had to rush off to retrieve the leash. The first fragment allows no other conclusion than that we echo for Sigune's and Schionatulander's *minne* the narrator's answer to his own question before Willehalm and Gyburg fall into bed in Orange:

> ob dâ schimphes waere zît?
> waz sol ich dâ von sprechen nuo?
> wan ob si wolden grîfen zuo
> ze bêder sîte ir frîheit,
> da engein si niht ze lange streit.
> wand er was ir und si was sîn. (100. 2–7)
>
> Was there time for play? Well, what can I say? For they certainly did not either of them waste much time in making use of their freedom. After all, he was hers and she was his.

The theme of sexual fulfillment is one of the areas in which Albrecht's idealizing revisionism is most in evidence in his continuation and »completion« of Wolfram's ›Titurel‹. In Albrecht, just before Schionatulander leaves in search of Gardeviaz, Sigune confesses to him that she often dreams of their embrace.[346] This emboldens Schionatulander to ask for a kiss and (in language borrowed from the sexually explicit reference to Gahmuret and Herzeloyde in Titurel)[347] a brief look at her naked body:[348] Sigune's compliance with his wish (she not only lets him gaze, but also touch) is represented as the granting of *lôn*,[349] and Schionatulander departs well-content and *vrî vor noeten*.[350]

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341 On the erotic connotations of *sus lâgen si* (137, 1) see BFJ, p. 390.

342 WERNER SIMON, Zu Wolframs ›Titurel‹, in: Festgabe für Ulrich Pretzel zum 65. Geburtstag, dargebracht von Freunden und Schülern. Ed. WERNER SIMON, WOLFGANG BACHOFER, and WOLFGANG DITTMANN, Berlin 1963, p. 189; WEHRLI, Wolframs ›Titurel‹, pp. 23–25. HAUG, Erzählen vom Tod her, p. 19.

343 MARCELLE THIÉBAUX, The Stag of Love. The Chase in Medieval Literature, Ithaca and London 1974, p. 96.

344 *Diu minne hât begriffen daz smal unt daz breite. /minne hat ûf erde und ûf himele für got geleite. / minne ist allenthalben wan ze helle. / diu starke minne erlamet an ir krefte, wirt der zwîfel mit wanke ir geselle* (51).

345 ›Willehalm‹ 100. 1–23; 279. 6–280. 9. On the importance of sexual love in ›Willehalm‹ and Wolfram in general, see BUMKE, Wolframs Willehalm, pp. 175–180).

346 *»Ist daz geheizen minne«, sprach Sigune, di sueze, / »daz ich in herzen, sinne dich mit liebe vor aller werlde grueze? / so bistu in dem slafe mir so nahen, / daz ich des ofte swuere, ich sulle dich mit armen umbevahen«* (1276).

347 *im gap dar diu küngin ir hemde / blanc sîdin, als ez ir blenke ruorte. / ez ruorte ouch etwas brûnes an ir huf.* (85, 2–4).

348 *»Getorste ich sueze, wol gevar, ich wold dich biten gerne, / du vreude mines herzen gar, und ouch min uf gender morgen sterne, / du bluom, du ros, daz mich din mundel ruerte / mit williclichem chusse, hei, was ich starker ponder dann zevuerte!* (1279). *Ob miner vert ein seld, ein heil von dir, vil sueze, geschehe, / so daz ich sunder lach ein teil dines blanken libes hie gesehe, / die epfel ungevelschet uf bluendem rise? / des ist min herze gerende fur alle wunschel zwi in paradise* (1280). *Min tyost vil ungevelieret durch schilde liecht gezillet, / herz und muot gezieret wirt da von und luterlich gewillet, / beruert din blenk mins innern herzen wafen./ vil baz dan zuo dem grale wer ich an selden wunsches arm entslafen!«* (1281).

349 *»Ich vreu mich dirre maeren, ob ich also kan tiuren / gen der sorgebæren verte dinen lip, den gar gehiuren«. / den lie sie grifen an den claren, suezen, / den vil jungen Grahardois. der chunde si vil lieplichen gruezen* (1282). *Uz pliat sidin wol gevar Sigun lie von ir slifen / von Lunders ein porten clar. des richeit mocht ein lant nicht ubergrifen. / den kunde si nu von ir gurten schone. / ir vruende, dem herzenlieben, bot si disen werden dienst zu lone* (1283).

350 *Ein umbevanc mit triwen zart, ein kus von rotem munde, / da mit urloup genomen wart mit wazzerrichen ougen an der stunde. / »got si mir als ich dir«, so*

The image of Sigune's body sustains him throughout the battles to come.[351] Thus the ›Jüngerer Titurel‹ not only deproblematizes the non-fulfillment of the sexual relationship between the couple, it offers a kind of ersatz consummation that turns into a positive advantage for the hero.[352] Albrecht's Sigune would be perfectly justified in thinking that if she had given in to desire and slept with her beloved before her departed on the quest, he would ultimately have fared the worse for it. Later in the story, after the public reading of the text on the leash, the roles reverse. It is now Sigune who desires Schionatulander's love (in language modelled on her previous expression of desire for the leash),[353] while he insists on fulfilling his mission first.[354] Accordingly, the sexual aspect of Sigune's self-reproach after Schionatulander's death is all but incoherent. She blames herself for the *missetât* (Albrecht apparently felt constrained by Wolfram's ›Parzival‹), but adds that it was Schionatulander refusal that ultimately prevented their union.[355] Nowhere is there any mention of *kranke sinne*. In fact, the opposite is true: Sigune admits to Schionatulander that his unwillingness to consummate their relationship even after the reading of the *schrift* on the leash proceeds from *rehte sinne*, and that she

sprach der werde, / »so var ich vri vor noeten durch elliu lant.« daz was ouch ir begerde (1285).

351 *Daz selb ist an dem suezen wol ein geliche merke, / dem Sigune gruezen gab noch me wan fumfe manne sterke, / di von Sigunen minne in ane wæten, / do er so minniclichen ir lip sach und ir brustel, diu gedræten* (1456).

352 There is another such scene in 2552–2554 (see footnote 354).

353 »*Min minne stet zuo dem waren, daz han ich dir erzeiget, / diu din in wankels varen, und hast si offenliche von mir geneiget, / swaz du mir unschulde maht gebieten, / da fur ich, freunt und herre, mich diner edlen minne wolde nieten*« (2547). Compare 1215, 3–4: »*und swaz mir ieman richeit kund gebieten, / da vur ich dannoch wolde der schrift an dem seile mich genieten*«.

354 »*Vil herzen liebe, sueze, daz dich diu selde riche / und dir hoch danken mueze der dinen suezen guete wirdicliche! / bedenk daz recht, iz wer uns noch an ere / bi diner vlust der strangen, und ich der rache sunder wider kere* (2548). *Wol tusent falten kumber wil ich vil sender liden, / e man mich dester tumber an wirde het, und muest ouch ich vermiden / vil werdicheit, diu wird mir sus ze teile: din wirde git mir prisen, so git min pris dir werdicheit zuheile*« (2549). Hereafter follows the second episode (2552–2554) in which Schionatulander desires to see Sigune naked.

355 »*We, daz din klare varwe mit wart ie kunt den ougen! / ich was ein kint begarwe, do dich min herz erwelt zu liebe tougen. / do wart mir minne kunt von dinem libe: / des muoz ich immer weinen, daz ich, magt, niht wart von dir ze wibe* (5124). *Daz ist, des du mich bete vergeben an dem ende. / anderer missetaete werstu anders gen mir gar ellende. / do ich dich minne bat, daztu versagende / were durch min ere, daz ich muoz nu immer sin diu clagende*« (5125).

is behaving irrationally for desiring his *edle minne*.[356] Thus, all the while strictly adhering the externals of Wolfram's characterization (the idea of sex as an obligation, non-consummation as Sigune's *missetât*), Albrecht completely undermines the substance of Sigune's self-accusation in ›Parzival‹ that she was foolish for not granting Schionatulander her love.

In Wolfram's ›Titurel‹, Sigune's failure to consummate her *minne* with Schionatulander is predicated upon a more fundamental error: of failing to recognize that there is no longer any external authority whose task it is to tell her when and under what conditions a maiden *sol verenden* her love for her *vriunt*. There is no longer any *sollen*. Sigune's problem is that she still thinks, right up to the final scene, that there is some third party involved in their relationship who has the right, or even the desire, to determine – who *mac erwenden* – the moment of its fulfillment. There is no such party. The *âventiure* on the leash is part of this illusionary external mandate over her life that Sigune feels compelled to consult before giving herself to her beloved. But there is no such mandate. There is no more courtly »protocol« at all at this point. That is, Sigune and Schionatulander have become that protocol, and whatever they choose to do out of their own private *frîheit* is, by definition, an adherence to the »proper path«. Therefore, there is simply no reason to be concerned about the manner in which other couples do justice to the maxim *hüete der verte*. There is no reason to identify with any kind of external representation of love.

But by the same token, Sigune's failure is an utterly personal one, and her culpability is radically private. Because this is the case, it is impossible to critique (here the modern consensus is correct), since all criticism ultimately reduplicates Sigune's own error of evaluating her relationship with Schionatulander according to some external imperative independent of the particular choice she makes. The only proper scholarly task with respect to Sigune's guilt is to illuminate the basis, logic and the extent of her own bitter self-reproach.

Ironically for the anti-culpability camp in modern ›Titurel‹ scholarship, however, only by stressing a close connection with ›Parzival‹ can we truly argue this is the case. Although it does not provide much actual detail, the Grail romance is very specific about the agent, instrument and reason for Schionatulander's death. Sigune tells Parzival that Orilus killed him in a joust for defending Parzival's lands. In other words, Schionatulander would have died even without the leash. It has occasionally been argued that the quest for the leash

356 *Si sprach: »din edliu minne, di hat mich so betoubet. / du pfligst der rechten sinne, daz dir min ja nu furbaz mer geloubet. / du hast wol recht, als mich din witze wiset, ich wil nu beiten gerne, sit ez uns an wirde hoher priset*« (2550).

was what brought Schionatulander into contact with his murderer.[357] While this seems plausible at first glance, or assuming all manner of complicated intermediary logistics (such as those Albrecht invents in the ›Jüngerer Titurel‹), we also know that Schionatulander's commitment to the defense of Parzival's kingdoms was a permanent one from which he would never have shrunk.[358] It seems would have come up against Orilus in any case, leash or no.

But why then does Sigune also tell Parzival that Schionatulander »died because of a dog's leash«? This is the mystery with which we began this study. The answer, I believe, is that while this is objectively and factually utterly wrong, it is subjectively correct. It is Sigune's own private, idiosyncratic truth. It is her moment of profound insight into the consequences of a life spent within a literary construct of courtly womanhood, a life guided by the compulsion to substantially identify with external, textual representations of a particular courtly-feminine ideal and of ideal *minne*. Since this compulsion caused her to send Schionatulander after the leash in what turned out to be the last possible moment for the always-deferred authentic expression of her own inner love, Sigune counterfactually blames herself for his death. Certainly it cannot be too modern to say that this kind of irrationality could hardly be more natural.

And Schionatulander? The failure at the end of ›Titurel‹'s second fragment is also his failure. The narrator makes this clear in the text's final line, where he tells his audience that they will find out »whether the faint-hearted pledger will soar or sink in praise«. The philological status of the word *verzageten* in manuscript G has always been very controversial.[359] Virtually all editors and interpreters, beginning with LACHMANN, have followed Albrecht in changing it to *unverzageten*. But I believe the text contains hitherto-neglected evidence suggesting it is correct as it stands.

In the conversation between Gahmuret and Schionatulander in the first fragment, the older knight tells his ward: *»werdiu minne ist teilhaft ordenlîche. / si hât der sælige ellenthaft erworben ê dane der zagehafte rîche«* (107, 3–4: »Noble love is granted according to certain rules. The man of fortune and courage will attain it sooner than the powerful, pusillanimous one«). *zagehaft* and *verzaget* are etymologically related synonyms. Since it is always certain that Schionatulander never, in fact, does »attain noble love«,[360] the statement – which is also in the pessimistically proleptic fourth line – can

357 See for example WOLFGANG SPIEWOK'S commentary on the scene in the Reclam edition of ›Parzival‹, Stuttgart 1981, v. 1, p. 243.

358 *»dirre vürste wart durch dich erslagen, / wand er dîn lant ie werte: / sîne triwe er nie verscherte«* (141. 2–4).

359 See the discussion in BFJ, p. 438 (»perhaps the thorniest problem of the textual constitution in ›Titurel‹«).

360 The pronoun *si* in the fourth line can also be interpreted as »she«, i.e., Sigune, since in the second line Gahmuret refers to »the duchess«.

be interpreted as an adumbration of his fate. He will be the *zagehafte rîche*. As BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE have shown, character speech in ›Titurel‹ is often a vehicle of prophecy.[361] Apart from the etymological connection, the term *verzageter sicherbote* in 175, 4 is far too similar in its unusual construction (a basically laudatory noun prefaced by a pejorative adjective) to be tampered with in the name of a pre-conceived notion of the narrator's view of Schionatulander's character.

How are we to understand the nature of Schionatulander's »faint-heartedness«? Several possibilities have been considered in the scholarship. HEINZLE suggests that the word refers to the impatience or concern Schionatulander expresses in the penultimate stanza.[362] BRACKERT/FUCHS-JOLIE propose, on the one hand, that it is to be understood not in the primary and emphatic sense of »cowardly«, »lacking courage«, or »despairing«, but rather as »hesitant« or »reserved«. But they admit that the latter sense is very scarcely attested in Wolfram, who almost always employs the semantic field of *verzaget* in the first, stronger sense.[363]

I believe we must interpret the word in the hard sense. In depicting Schionatulander as a »cowardly« character, the ›Titurel‹-narrator is implying that he should have persisted in his rational relationship to textuality, remained firm in his insistence that the *âventiure* on the leash was inconsequential, and simply refused to go after the escaped hound.

In a recent, highly provocative essay on medieval courtly love, ALOYS WOLF discusses the way in which various figures in certain later medieval texts, operating within the conventional ideologies of love and adventure, »break out of the system« in a manner that prefigures Cervantes' ›Don Quixote‹. WOLF calls this »disillusionment«. In the ›Prose Tristan‹, for example, Isolde accuses Palamedes, a knight devoted to her with the conventional radicality, of being simply »crazy«. Dinadan, an errant knight looking for not only *aventure*, but also *le sens du monde*, tells a knight who challenges him that the Arthurian *coutume* of the chivalric duel is nonsense.[364] »Already centuries before Cervantes«, writes WOLF, »the middle ages was able, at least sporadically, to call into question its own unique achievements«. Pointing to Parzival's self-critical assessment in Book IX of the Grail romance (*»ich ensuochte niht wan strîten«*), WOLF sees, if not yet a »radical critique« of the Chrétien/Hartmann concept of chivalric *âventiure*, at least the prerequisites for such a disillusionment.

361 See footnote 306.

362 HEINZLE I, p. 218. However, he considers this reading »an emergency solution«. See also WEHRLI, p. 24 (»It is probable that Schionatulander, with his hesitation and his comment about French literature, is not equal to this task.).

363 BFJ, p. 438.

364 Quoted from ALOYS WOLF, Das Faszinosum der mittelalterlichen Minne, Freiburg 1996, pp. 47–52.

I believe that the narrator's evaluation of Schionatulander as a *verzageter sicherbote* – which is thus the one place in the whole of the Sigune-Schionatulander story (including ›Parzival‹) that can be interpreted as a direct critique – points to the possibility of this kind of disillusionment. It implies that Schionatulander could and should have done something analogous to Isolde in the ›Prose Tristan‹, telling Sigune that she is »crazy« for ascribing such existential significance to the writing on a dog's leash, her »illusion«. After all, he knows better. He is the *herre dirre âventiure*. The success of the first adventure was achieved under his guidance and his insight into the proper relationship between real inward love and external discourse about *minne*. His »wise« words to Sigune during the confession scene demonstrated an awareness of *minne* as inner experience – connected to the outside world of public discourse, to be sure, but now a matter of direct personal insight: *»daz mac ich wol mit mir selbem bewæren«*. Sigune also committed herself to this idea of love. In the erotic setting of their sylvan utopia, there is no longer any need for *minne von mæren* or a *geselleschaft mit worten*. Now, words can only be an *ergetzen* (175, 1), a »compensation« for something more important left undone. The time has come for a *minne mit werken*. But Schionatulander proves unable to accomplish the disillusionment of his beloved. Instead, he pledges himself as a *sicherbote* of Sigune's personal fictions of *minne*. Here we finally see the consequences of his *niht starken sinne*. This is his »cowardliness«.

There may be another reason for the personal intervention of the narrator at this point. If, as I suggested in the first chapter, Sigune represents a version of the poetry-obsessed woman in the »self-defense« of the Grail romance, then Schionatulander occupies the place of the narrator himself, the knight whose chivalric deeds and *art* are neglected by feminine overidentification with literature. And indeed, there are several highly suggestive parallels. Like »Wolfram von Eschenbach« in the »self-defense«, Schionatulander shows an open contempt for the written word. He displays a complete indifference to the story on the leash. As soon as Schionatulander has delivered the captured hound to Sigune, he goes fishing, leaving her to read alone.[365] He does not even linger long enough to learn that there is a story on the leash. His comment that he has »never heard of leashes with writing on them« implies that he was not present when Sigune »unfolded the leash between the rings« and discovered the *schrift*.[366] If Sigune's isolation in her reading of the leash is problematic,[367] then it is important to note that she is alone because Schionatulander has left her to her own devices, not because she has actively sought out solitude for herself.

365 159, 1–2

366 146, 1–2.

367 BRACKERT, Sinnspuren, p. 170.

Schionatulander's remark about books betrays a similar attitude toward writing in general. Obviously he, in contrast to the self-representation of the ›Parzival‹-narrator, is literate, but like him he expresses a complete indifference to reading, since he can only imagine doing so in the subjunctive, *ich læse*, »I might read«. The sovereignly dismissive observation »whatever might be written there« (*swaz dâ geschriben wære*) further indicates that he possesses only a vague or highly generalized idea of the contents of the books he speaks about and does not care to know anything more. (This reflects the order of priorities in the confession scene, where he says he once learned about love from external accounts, but is now personally acquainted with it). For Schionatulander, therefore, there can be nothing special about the story on the leash by the very fact of it being something *geschriben*.[368] As is well known, the anti-bookish attitude is not confined to the ›Parzival‹-narrator; it is also an important part of the poetics of ›Willehalm‹.[369] Whether or not we ascribe it any kind of real autobiographical significance, I think this attitude helps explain why the narrator is »subjectively« invested in his hero's inability to convince his beloved of the insignificance of mere written words. In fact, the harshness of the condemnation of his hero is mitigated if we imagine the narrator is also ironically condemning himself in the process.[370]

VII

The argument for ›Titurel‹'s interpretive autonomy depends on the correlate that the Grail romance represents a realm of narrative truth, fact, style, and representation that is whole, unitary, coherent, and closed, into which the radical fragmentality, contradictions, and incommensurabilities of the late text cannot be made to fit. This view is obsolete. One of the major critical shifts within ›Parzival‹ scholarship in the last decade has been the acceptance of the fact that Wolfram's ›Parzival‹ is already a deeply polyphonic text, orchestrating a congeries of incompatible representations of society, philosophical-theological world-views, and narratorial personae. As BUMKE writes

368 See also ALBRECHT CLASSEN, Utopie und Logos. Vier Studien zu Wolframs Titurel, Heidelberg 1990, who speaks of Schionatulander's contempt for fictional literature and reading (p. 26, 45).

369 ›Willehalm‹, 2. 19–22: *swaz an den buochen stêt geschriben / des bin ich künstelôs beliben. / niht anders ich gelêret bin, / wan hân ich kunst, die gît mir sin.*

370 There is a minority tradition in the scholarship (see BFJ, p. 439) interpreting *verzageter sicherbote* as a self-reference of the narrator, though for different reasons than those proposed here. The most recent is MERTENS, who reads the line as a poetological declaration of the »end of narrative« (Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion, p. 376).

in the most recent version of his authoritative scholarly overview of Wolfram:

> We are dealing here with a many-voiced work, in which the narrator presents himself in diverse roles and speaks in diverse tongues. In addition, the figures that carry the plot are assigned perspectives and discourses that do not harmonize with each other. Rather, they differ in many ways and even contradict one another.[371]

In the introduction to ›Romancing the Grail‹ (the work BUMKE cites in the footnote to the above passage), ART GROOS discusses the programmatic importance of the fact that the ›Parzival‹-prologue introduces the narrative only in the plural, not as one story, but as a number of »stories«:[372]

> [The] guide is no longer inherent in the narrative. Rather, it has to be pursued in a quest forced on the audience by that narrative's multiplicity – as the plural *mære* (»stories«) suggests. The text offers no unifying principle, but coexists with all the contradictions of secular existence. [...] ›Parzival‹ will immerse us in a discourse that is not so much authorial and monologic as fundamentally decentered and pluralistic.

Sigune's comment about the leash, which is incompatible with the facts of Schionatulander's death, such as she relates them to Parzival, is introduced under the sign of this narrative pluralism:

> »nu hœr was disiu mære sîn.
> ein bracken seil gap im den pîn« (141. 15–16)

Sigune's voice, her private truth, and the whole narrative of ›Titurel‹ is nothing less nor more than one of these *mære*, one of the many conflicting and competing voices within Wolfram's Grail world. To posit a close connection between the two texts or to interpret the later in terms of the earlier is therefore in no way automatically to restrict or limit the meaning – however openly or deconstructively we wish to view it – of ›Titurel‹. If anything, an insistence on their separation limits the extent to which we can perceive the evolution of the entire Grail world narrative in Wolfram's artistic consciousness. For if it is true, as most scholars believe, that Wolfram wrote ›Titurel‹ many years after ›Parzival‹, then he nonetheless wrote it in such a way that the story would dovetail tightly with the earlier epic and retroactively awaken to life a dimension of the Grail world that was always there, but underilluminated. That is also another reason ›Titurel‹ has no prologue. Its poetics do not fundamentally differ from those of ›Parzival‹. They are only somewhat more developed. Like Gardeviaz chasing the stag and chased by Schionatulander, ›Titurel‹, too, »flees us and pursues«. And in doing so, it powerfully literalizes, in a way we have observed throughout this study, the poetological dis-

371 BUMKE III, p. 126.

372 ›Parzival‹, 2. 7–8: [...] *welher stiure disiu mære gernt, / und was si guoter lêre wernt.*

course of the Grail romance within the characterological world. I would even venture to claim that we cannot not fully appreciate or understand the scope of the poetological program contained in the ›Parzival‹ prologue until we incorporate ›Titurel‹ into it, i.e., until we treat it as one of the several interrelated but independent *maere* of Wolfram's Grail world.

The idea that Sigune's life represents a kind of »Entwicklungsroman« is not a new one. It was always the other, less schoolmasterly, more humanistic side of the old debate over Sigune's guilt and sins. If Sigune is a culpable figure, then she, no less than the Grail hero himself, is capable of insight, change, and redemption, and we can view the post-leash part of her life in terms of this transformation. By the same token, the scholarly attack on the guilt-discussion usually also implies a more-or-less static, iconic, non-developmental view of Sigune's character. This emerges very clearly in MAX WEHRLI'S reading, which was one of the first and most forceful breaks with the older scholarship:

> [Sigune], rather, sends her lover out on the high chivalric quest for the right path, for the essence of true *minne*. It is much more probable that Schionatulander, with his hesitation and his comment about French literature, is not equal to this task. [...] The so frequently posed question about culpability, about reward and punishment in the economy of the courtly poets, often takes on a schoolmasterly quality and leads to a questionable characterization of figures whose situations represent more general-human than individual-moral conflicts. Sigune is no different from Enite or even Laudine in being the lady of the hero, and she must not be made into the problematic heroine of her own *Entwicklungsroman*. The absoluteness of her demand and function as a *geleite ze himele* cannot be called into question.[373]

For WEHRLI, Sigune is ultimately a philosophically motionless and abstract figure, the representative of an elevated, »esoteric« kind of love, »even more remote from social and historical reality« than the courtly romance, and a »still higher ideal« than anything in Wolfram's other works: »a chivalric love that has always already embraced all suffering and death«.[374] Much modern ›Titurel‹ scholarship, of course, no longer even poses the question of the representation of character development, stressing instead the idea that language itself is the subject and that the real development is within the text's narratorial voice vis-à-vis ›Parzival‹ and the courtly tradition (again, not a particularly current view of the Grail romance). In doing so, however, it implicitly represents Sigune and Schionatulander as static, iconic figures, non-

373 WEHRLI, pp. 24–25.

374 To be sure, WEHRLI also calls the Sigune-episodes in ›Parzival‹ »einen kleinen Roman, eine Seelengeschichte« (p. 10), which seems to imply some kind of character development. This is one of the unresolved tensions in his essay.

developmental and non-autonomous, helplessly adrift in the semiotic networks of uncontrollable and ultimately deadly language.[375]

My own interpretation of ›Titurel‹ leads back to the old idea of Sigune's life, her »poetic biography«, as a coherent and independent narrative of development. But with several modifications. The first concerns what has been regarded as another major difference between the late and earlier epics, that ›Parzival‹ represents a »transcendental« narrative world, ›Titurel‹ a discursive realm of pure »immanence«. As VOLKER MERTENS writes, ›Titurel‹, »unlike the prose of the Grail novels, oriented toward salvation history, and unlike even ›Parzival‹, does not span a transcendental horizon for the story, but remains within the immanence of the heroic epic«.[376]

This immanence is not exclusive to ›Titurel‹. It also characterizes the Sigune-episodes in ›Parzival‹. Throughout all her religious devotions after Schionatulanders death, Sigune remains fixated on the here and now. She says nothing about an eventual reunion with Schionatulander. Rather, she believes that he is *vor gote mîn man* (440. 8). In all of Parzival's meetings with her, Sigune speaks of Schionatulander's immediate physical presence as if her were still alive.[377] This is the »mutual love« intertextually reflected in stanza 78 of ›Titurel‹. It is not lacking in a certain ghoulish quality at times.[378] Sigune says virtually nothing about the afterlife, only that her ring *für got sol mîn geleite sîn* (440. 14), and it is significant that this single reference to the transcendent dimension of their *minne* is reformulated in ›Titurel‹ in a way that transforms the futurative-eschatological dimension into a quasi-mystic presentism: *minne hât ûf erde unt ûf himile für got geleite* (51, 2). This immanence is another of the ways the ›Titurel‹-›Parzival‹ relation is actually much closer than has been realized. In a sense, Sigune's personality has remained exactly the same; she has only switched existential »genres«. In ›Titurel‹ she lived within a poem. In ›Parzival‹ she changes her life to a prayer.[379] Or rather, in view of the compositional sequence, we might say that Wolfram designed her character in ›Titurel‹ to conform closely to her »psychological profile« in the Grail romance.

More significant, however, is the fact that the ›Parzival‹-narrator, too, is profoundly silent about the transcendental horizon within which Sigune's redemption takes place, unlike with Parzival. The same is true of all other characters in the text. The nature of Parzival's sins, guilt, and redemption are

375 See BFJ, p. 441 (»the deadly consequentiality of language«).
376 MERTENS, Wolfram von Eschenbach: ›Titurel‹, p. 198.
377 *»nu minne i'n alsô tôten«* (141. 24); *»ich hânn alhie«* (252. 20); *si sprach »den hân ich hinne / des kleinœt ich sider truoc«* (439. 28–29); *»ich pin hinne selbe ander: / Schîânatulander / ist daz eine, dez ander ich«* (440. 17–19).
378 *si minnete sînen tôten lîp* (436, 3).
379 *ir leben was doch ein venje gar* (435. 25).

a matter of ceaseless – and contradictory – public debate.[380] No one reflects on Sigune's *verte*. Even the one theophanic element in all of the Sigune-episodes, the quasi-hagiographic representation of Schionatulander's corpse as unputrefied, turns out to possess a perfectly plausible explanation in the realm of natural science: the narrator tells us twice that he has been embalmed.[381] MARION GIBBS has suggested that the final episode, where Sigune's body is placed in the grave with Schionatulander,[382] was inspired by the popular legend that Héloise was buried in the same coffin as Abelard, who held out his arms to greet her.[383] If this is true, as seems plausible, then the significant thing for the Grail romance's narrative art is not the borrowing per se, but what Wolfram eliminated from it – the outstretched arms. They would have immediately objectified and secured Sigune's idiosyncratic truth within the transcendental horizon of the Grail world. Parzival's story concludes with several such direct theophanies: the appearance of the writing on the Grail, the sudden healing of Anfortas, and (however parodically we interpret it) Feirefiz's sudden ability to see the Grail after he has accepted baptism. It seems very unusual that in Sigune's life, which is generally thought to represent a more overtly religious pathway than Parzival's,[384] such direct markers of a *Heilsweg* should be completely lacking.

The second caveat concerns the narrative structure and developmental valence of Sigune's biography. This study has argued that the elements of the traditional chivalric pathway are reflected in ›Titurel‹ to a much greater degree than has previously been realized.[385] The first fragment is analogous to the first part of the Arthurian structural scheme of the double cycle. It represents the rapid success of the protagonist, freshly emerged from the anonymity of the court, in his first independent adventure. The second fragment stands for the moment of crisis and failure. The existence of two discrete, chronotopically different fragments underscores this structure. There are, as we have seen, many significant innovations in content vis-à-vis the classic Arthurian romances. In ›Titurel‹, there are two heroes (though only one is named *herre dirre âventiure*). Their entrance into individuality is a more psychological event, the representation of the relationship between individual and society more subtle and sophisticated – and more modern – than in the tradition. The foundational exploit of the first cycle is not a battle, but a conversation. It is a kind of internal adventure, a quest in *gedanken* and *worten*.

380 See BUMKE III, pp. 127–130.
381 249. 16 and 804. 29.
382 804. 30–805. 2.
383 GIBBS, Wîplîches wîbes reht. A Study of the Women Characters in the Works of Wolfram von Eschenbach, Pittsburg 1972, p. 57, footnote 14.
384 See BUMKE III, p. 120 (»the authentic Christian path«).
385 The idea is present but only schematically developed in ORTMANN (see footnote 200).

It is none the less conceived and announced as an *âventiure* revealing *magetlîche sorge unt manheit mit den arbeiten*, just like, for example, Erec's battle with Iders at Tulmein with Enite looking on.

But it is obvious that we are not dealing with a traditional Arthurian second cycle, in which the development of the crisis-hero leads to an ultimate reintegration with society. As several commentators have pointed out, ›Titurel‹ represents, in this respect, an »anti-romance«. WALTER HAUG writes that

> it is clear that Wolfram intended the work as an anti-Arthurian romance, in that the hero dies in the course of the quest on which the beloved has sent him. In other words, Chrétien's model, in which the counter-world could be integrated within the Arthurian scheme by means of a symbolic passage through death, has now been definitively abandoned: the action does not end in the traditional Arthurian festivities, but in the lonely cell to which Sigune retreats with the body of her beloved.[386]

For Schionatulander, and therefore for the official, public *herre dirre âventiure* in ›Titurel‹, the second cycle has indeed been definitively abandoned, and the impact of the rupture is all the more powerful for the transformed clarity of the Arthurian scheme in the ›Titurel‹-fragments. Schionatulander's life is an ›anti-Parzival‹.

But Sigune's is not. This verdict does not do her justice. She does undergo a transformation in the Grail romance, and a close re-illumination through ›Titurel‹ makes this especially clear. Although Sigune's redemption through her »marriage« to Schionatulander and her dedication to *minne*-sainthood does not commence until her third appearance in ›Parzival‹ (the same moment the narrator announces the official beginning of the main hero's spiritual renewal),[387] her insight into what she believes to be her failure occurs much earlier. At the end of her first episode in Book III, Sigune deliberately sends Parzival, who wishes to avenge Schionatulander's death, along a false path, so that he will not also be killed by Orilus.[388] In the absence of a re-illumination through ›Titurel‹, this act is merely one of the many alterations and general amplification Wolfram undertakes with Perceval's single encounter with his nameless *germaine cousine* in Chrétien's ›Li Contes del Graal‹. There, Perceval's cousin wishes him to pursue her lover's killer.[389] In

386 HAUG, Vernacular Literary Theory, pp. 366–67. Similarly MERTENS, Wolfram von Eschenbach: Titurel, pp. 208–209.

387 *sîn wolte got dô ruochen* (435, 12).

388 *si wîste in unrehte nâch: / si vorht daz er den lîp verlür / unt daz si groezeren schaden kür* (141. 30–142. 2).

389 *Vos tenrez ce chemin ferré, / Se vos me creez, par decha; / Que par cel chemin s'en ala / Li chevaliers fel et estous / Qui m'a ocis mon ami dols. / Mais por che ne l'ai je pas dit / Que je weille, se Diex m'aït, / Que vos en ailliez aprés lui, / Si volroie je son anui / Autant com s'il m'avoit ocise.* (›Li Contes del Graal‹, vv. 3644–3653).

the poetic biography of a strong ›Titurel‹-›Parzival‹ connection, however (open to any reader or audience of the G manuscript), Wolfram's change takes on a profound significance. It means that Sigune is sending the Grail hero away from Gardeviaz and his leash and renouncing her desire to finish reading the adventure written upon it. This act signals a decisive change vis-à-vis her attitude in her final conversation with Schionatulander. It is also stands in strong contrast to the instrumentalizing treatment Parzival will soon experience in Nantes, where Arthur and Kay cynically use him to deal with Ither's challenge. I think it highly likely that the second ›Titurel‹ fragment ends where it does in order to make this juxtaposition clear.

But most importantly, Sigune's decision re-predicates the salvation of the entire Grail realm on a moment of profound »feminine« insight into the relationship between love and discourse, between *minne* and *mæren*. And so we can argue all we want about the end of courtly narrative or the deadly consequentiality of courtly language and protocol in ›Titurel‹, but that pessimism is itself already deeply ironized and ultimately caught up in a redemptive project of life and language.

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Abbreviations

AS	Acta Sanctorum, ed. Johannes BOLLAND, Jean Baptiste CARNANDET, Edito novissima, Paris 1863–1919
ATB	Altdeutsche Textbibliothek
BFJ	Wolfram von Eschenbach, ›Titurel‹, ed. Helmut BRACKERT and Stephan FUCHS-JOLIE, Berlin, New York 2002
BUMKE I	Joachim BUMKE, Wolfram von Eschenbach, Stuttgart, Weimar 1991
BUMKE II	Joachim BUMKE, Wolfram von Eschenbach, Stuttgart, Weimar 1997
BUMKE III	Joachim BUMKE, Wolfram von Eschenbach, Stuttgart, Weimar 2004
DTM	Deutsche Texte des Mittelalters
HEINZLE I	Joachim HEINZLE, Stellenkommentar zu Wolframs ›Titurel‹. Beiträge zum Verständnis des überlieferten Textes. Tübingen 1972
HEINZLE II	Joachim HEINZLE, Nachlese zum ›Titurel‹-Kommentar, in: Studien zu Wolfram von Eschenbach. Festschrift für Werner Schröder zum 75. Geburtstag. Ed. Kurt GÄRTNER and Joachim HEINZLE, Tübingen 1989, pp. 485–500.
MF	Des Minnesangs Frühling (38th edition), ed. Hugo MOSER and Helmut TERVOOREN, Stuttgart 1988.
PBB	Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur
ZfdA	Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum
ZfdPh	Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie

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Transatlantische Studien zu Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit –
Transatlantic Studies on Medieval and Early Modern Literature and Culture 2

Die vorliegende Arbeit ermöglicht eine neue Lektüre der »Titurel«-Fragmente Wolframs von Eschenbach, einem der schwierigsten Texte des deutschen Mittelalters. Sager zeigt, dass der »Titurel« in engstem Zusammenhang mit »Parzival« gedeutet werden kann. Er behandelt die Repräsentation weiblicher Literaturrezeption im Gralsroman als Vorbild von Sigunes problematischem Lesen, neue Verbindungen zur zeitgenössischen Hagiographie in der Darstellung und Deutung von Kinderspielen, Unterschiede der handschriftlichen Überlieferung, den Bachtinschen »Dialogismus« und den dezentrierten »Titurel«-Erzähler, die unterschiedliche Sozialisierung der Geschlechter sowie das Liebesgeheimnis und die Darstellung der Subjektivität. Sager schließt mit einem neuen Blick auf die alte »Schuldfrage« und einer Würdigung Sigunes, deren Lebensweg den des Hauptthelden Parzival in kritischer und ästhetischer Potenz vielleicht noch übertrifft.

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